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Methodology
This report attempts to assess the human rights impact of the UK’s Prevent strategy 
in the health and education sectors. It focuses on these sectors because they have par-
ticular care-giving functions that have not traditionally been directed towards prevent-
ing terrorism, which is the objective of Prevent. In addition, these sectors are critically 
dependent on relationships based on trust – for example, between medical professionals 
and patients, and between education professionals and students (including children). 
The need for trust in the effective functioning of these sectors raises prima facie ques-
tions about their suitability for being conscripted into preventing terrorism. 
The Justice Initiative conducted research for this report from January to Septem-
ber of 2016. During this period, the Justice Initiative interviewed more than 87 people, 
including parents, school teachers, university officials, college and university students, 
members of parliament, current and former government officials, health professionals, 
religious leaders, community advocates, academics and journalists. The interviews were 
conducted in Bradford, Birmingham, Cheadle Hulme, Edinburgh, Kingston, Leicester, 
London, Luton, and Manchester, as well as other locations in the West Midlands and 
Lancashire. The interviews were supplemented by legal research as well as an extensive 
review of relevant publicly available materials. 
The Justice Initiative announced in multiple public outlets that it was conducting 
research on the UK’s Prevent strategy in health and education and seeking to interview 
relevant individuals for this project. These outlets included networks of health and edu-
cation professionals, students and community advocates, as well as conferences where 
community advocates, academics, UK government officials, and Prevent practitioners 
were present. Leads for the 17 case studies documented in this report were obtained 
from this outreach and interviews conducted by the Justice Initiative. 
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 The Justice Initiative did not confine its requests for information to Muslims. It 
specifically attempted – unsuccessfully – to interview the parent of a non-Muslim child 
who the press reported had been wrongfully targeted under Prevent. The fact that all of 
the individual case studies in this report are about Muslims does not imply that there 
are no human rights violations at issue with respect to non-Muslims targeted under 
Prevent. The prominence of case studies relating to Muslims is, however, consistent 
with UK government figures showing that in 2015, around 70 percent of referrals to 
Channel were linked to “Islamist-related extremism” while only 15 percent were linked 
to “far-right extremism”.1 
All of the individuals interviewed for this report were informed of the purpose of 
this report. Only if a person gave informed consent for the contents of their interview 
to be contained in this report was this information included. With respect to the single 
account of a minor included in this report, the Justice Initiative obtained parental con-
sent. None of the individuals interviewed for this report received any financial benefit 
for participating. Almost all of the interviews were conducted in person; a handful were 
conducted on the phone. 
Most of the case studies and many of the other interviews of health and educa-
tion professionals documented in this report have been anonymised, or use fictional 
names for real ones, at the request of the interviewees because they feared retaliation 
by the institutions with which they were affiliated and/or government authorities. The 
interviewees’ request for anonymity constrained the Justice Initiative’s ability to cor-
roborate the facts of some of the case studies from additional sources. However, some 
individuals were able to provide the Justice Initiative with documentation that corrobo-
rated key facts. 
The UK government’s position is that it cannot comment on individual cases 
arising under Prevent. In the few cases where interviewees did not request anonymity, 
the Justice Initiative approached the relevant school or university for comment unless 
it had publicly indicated that confidentiality obligations constrained it from divulging 
details about the individual case. 
There were several other accounts of arbitrary treatment under Prevent that could 
not be documented in this report because the individuals subjected to this treatment 
reported fearing retaliation from speaking out about it. In addition, because individu-
als targeted under Prevent experienced it as inherently stigmatising, some declined to 
speak about their experiences. Two individuals with accounts of arbitrary treatment 
under Prevent communicated with the Justice Initiative with an intent to be included 
in this report, but subsequently withdrew, fearing retaliation. 
This report does not purport to have a complete account of every possible experi-
ence of Prevent. Indeed, a report of this nature could not possibly record every instance 
in which Prevent was applied in an inappropriate way: the Government’s own figures 
E R O D I N G  T R U S T   1 3
state that between April 2007 and 31 March 2014, 3,934 referrals were made to Chan-
nel, but about 80% were set aside, showing that the hit rate was very low (about 20%) 
and that thousands of individuals were wrongly referred to Channel.2 In light of these 
figures, the number of case studies contained in this report are likely to be a significant 
underestimate of instances of possible human rights violations associated with the 
Prevent strategy. 
Finally, most of the case studies documented here relate to incidents that occurred 
after the Prevent statutory duty took effect.3 Three case studies relate to incidents that 
occurred prior to the Prevent statutory duty taking effect, but during the period that 
the 2011 Prevent strategy was in effect.4 Two case studies span a period that pre-dates 
and post-dates the statutory duty5. While public source information suggests that the 
volume of allegations of arbitrary treatment under Prevent has significantly increased 
since it became a mandatory duty, these case studies suggest the pre-statutory version 
of Prevent also created some risk of human rights violations. 
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“I’ve never felt not British. And this [Prevent experience] made me feel very, very, 
like they tried to make me feel like an outsider. We live here. I am born and bred 
here, not from anywhere else”.6 
“It could have gone the opposite way if I wasn’t thinking straight, if I were the 
type who was being brainwashed. The way they went about it, [Prevent] could 
have made me do exactly what they told me not to do. I associate with Prevent 
negatively, it is not helpful at all”.7
Executive Summary 
and Recommendations
The UK’s Prevent strategy, which purports to prevent terrorism, creates a serious risk of 
human rights violations. The programme is flawed in both its design and application, 
rendering it not only unjust but also counterproductive.
Launched in 2003, the Prevent strategy has evolved against the background of 
increased public fears over the threat of “home grown” terrorism. The strategy in its 
current form aims “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”.8 In 
2015, legislation created a statutory Prevent duty on schools, universities, and NHS 
trusts, among other public sector entities, to have “due regard to the need to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism”.9 This requires doctors, psychologists, and 
teachers, among other health and education professionals, to identify individuals at 
risk of being drawn into terrorism (including violent and non-violent “extremism”) for 
referral to the police-led multi-agency “Channel” programme (for England and Wales) 
or “Prevent Professional Concerns” (for Scotland), both of which purport to “support” 
such individuals10.
This report analyses the human rights impact of Prevent in its current form in 
the education and health sectors. It focuses on these sectors because they are critically 
dependent on trust and have particular care-giving functions that have not traditionally 
been directed towards preventing terrorism. Under Prevent, doctors and teachers who 
have a professional duty to care for their charges are now required to assess and report 
them for being at risk of “extremism”, which is defined as “vocal or active opposition to 
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fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.11 Because the conscription 
of these sectors into preventing terrorism is part of a growing trend,12 the report’s prin-
cipal findings, listed below, not only apply to the United Kingdom, but are relevant and 
instructive for other governments grappling with these challenges. 
 First, the current Prevent strategy suffers from multiple, mutually reinforcing 
structural flaws, the foreseeable consequence of which is a serious risk of human 
rights violations. These violations include, most obviously, violations of the right 
against discrimination, as well the right to freedom of expression, among other 
rights. Prevent’s structural flaws include the targeting of “pre-criminality”, “non-
violent extremism”, and opposition to “British values”. This “intensifies” the 
government’s reach into “everyday lawful discourse”.13 Furthermore, Prevent’s 
targeting of non-violent extremism and “indicators” of risk of being drawn into 
terrorism lack a scientific basis. Indeed, the claim that non-violent extremism – 
including “radical” or religious ideology – is the precursor to terrorism has been 
widely discredited by the British government itself, as well as numerous reputable 
scholars.14 Prevent training, much of it based on unreliable indicators, appears to 
be largely unregulated. Moreover, the statutory duty creates an incentive to over-
refer. This incentive is reinforced by the adverse consequences associated with 
non-compliance with the Prevent duty15 and the lack of adverse consequences 
for making erroneous referrals. The case studies and interviews in this report 
confirm the tendency to over-refer individuals under Prevent. The fundamental 
nature of these defects makes them unlikely to be cured by a mere renaming of 
Prevent to “Engage”.16 
 Second, Prevent’s overly broad and vague definition of “non-violent extremism” 
creates the potential for systemic human rights abuses. On the basis of this defi-
nition, schools, universities, and NHS trusts, among other “specified authorities” 
subject to the Prevent duty, are required to assess the risk of children, students, 
and patients being drawn into terrorism and report them to the police-led Chan-
nel programme where necessary.17 By the government’s own admission, thou-
sands of people have been erroneously referred to the Channel programme18. 
Individuals (including children) erroneously referred under Prevent experience 
the referral as inherently stigmatising and intensely intimidating. They also fear 
continued surveillance and the creation and retention of Prevent records, which 
may taint them and lead others to view them as “extremists” in the future19. 
 Specifically, the targeting of non-violent extremism raises serious concerns about 
possible violations of the right to freedom of expression. Children in schools 
have been targeted under Prevent for expressing political views.20 University 
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conferences relating to Islamophobia and Islam in Europe have been cancelled,21 
raising questions of possible breaches under the Education Act (1986) and article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.22 More generally, the case studies 
and interviews in this report suggest that Prevent has created a significant chilling 
effect on freedom of expression in schools and universities, and undermined trust 
between teachers and students.23 This risks driving underground, removed from 
debate and challenge, conversations about controversial issues such as terrorism. 
In addition, as indicated by the large number of interviewees for this report who 
requested anonymity, there is a genuine and intensely held fear among some that 
public criticism of Prevent will trigger retaliation.24 This fear is particularly acute 
for parents who fear that their children will bear the brunt of the retaliation.
 Third, the Prevent duty creates a risk of discrimination, particularly against Mus-
lims. Frontline professionals have broad discretion to act on their conscious or 
unconscious biases in deciding whom to report under Prevent. Current and for-
mer police leads for Prevent recognise that currently, Prevent operates in a cli-
mate marked by Islamophobia.25 Significantly, between July 2015 and July 2016, 
Islamophobic crime in London rose by 94 percent.26 This climate creates the risk 
that Muslims in particular may be erroneously targeted under Prevent. All of the 
case studies relating to the targeting of individuals under Prevent raise serious 
questions about whether they would have been targeted in this manner had they 
not been Muslim.27 Relatedly, in some case studies, Muslims appear to have been 
targeted under Prevent for displaying signs of increased religiosity, raising ques-
tions about the violation of their right to manifest their religion.28
 Fourth, by requiring the identification and reporting of individuals at risk of vio-
lent and non-violent extremism, Prevent creates a risk of violations of the right to 
privacy. Many of the case studies describe individuals being intrusively questioned 
under intimidating conditions about their religious and/or political beliefs29. One 
case study raises troubling questions about the collection (apparently without 
informed consent) of names and political opinions from Muslim children for the 
Home Office.30
 Fifth, there are serious concerns about the treatment of children under Prevent.31 
Although the government describes Prevent as a form of “safeguarding” (a statu-
tory term which denotes promotion of welfare and protection from harm), the 
two sets of obligations have materially different aims, particularly with respect 
to children. In contrast to the Prevent strategy, for which the primary objective 
is preventing terrorism,32 the primary objective of the duty to safeguard children 
under domestic legislation is the welfare of the child.33 This reflects the obligation 
under article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to make the best 
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interests of the child a primary consideration in all actions relating to children.34 
Accordingly, while compliance with safeguarding obligations would only permit 
referral to Channel while prioritising the best interests of the child, the Channel 
duty guidance does not specify that as a mandatory or even a relevant consider-
ation. All of the case studies in this report relating to children – including one in 
which a four year-old child was targeted35 – appear to be instances in which the 
best interests of the child were not a primary consideration. 
 Sixth, the Prevent duty risks breaching health bodies’ duty of confidentiality 
towards their patients and undermining the relationship between health profes-
sionals and their patients. The standard for disclosure of confidential information 
under Prevent appears to be much lower than that warranted by the common law 
duty of confidentiality enshrined in the NHS confidentiality code of practice and 
the General Medical Council’s confidentiality guidance. Specifically, requiring a 
medical professional to report to the police-led Channel programme an individual 
who is at “risk of being drawn into terrorism”, including “non-violent extremism”, 
appears to be a much lower standard than requiring the medical professional to 
report (under the GMC guidance) the individual only when failure to disclose 
confidential information would expose others to a risk of death or serious harm. 
This could generate breaches of the confidentiality duty along with violations of 
the right to private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.36 
 Finally, there are serious indications that Prevent is counterproductive. The case 
studies show that being wrongly targeted under Prevent has led some Muslims 
to question their place in British society.37 Other adults wrongfully targeted under 
Prevent have said that, had they been different, their experience of Prevent could 
have drawn them towards terrorism, and not away from it.38 Government data 
reveal that 80% of all Channel referrals were set aside, implying that there were 
thousands of individuals wrongly referred to Channel39. This in turn risks under-
mining the willingness of targeted communities to supply intelligence to law 
enforcement officials which could be used to prevent terrorist acts.40 
 As Sir David Omand, the architect of the original version of Prevent, has observed: 
“The key issue is, do most people in the community accept [Prevent] as protective 
of their rights? If the community sees it as a problem, then you have a problem”.41 
This report demonstrates that the UK’s Prevent strategy is indeed a serious 
problem.
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Recommendations
To the UK Government:
1. Repeal the Prevent duty with respect to the health and education sectors.
2. End the targeting and reporting of “non-violent extremism” under the Prevent 
strategy.
3. End the use of empirically unsupported indicators of vulnerability to being drawn 
into terrorism.
4. Establish an independent public inquiry – with civil society participation – into 
the Prevent strategy and associated rights violations.
5. Create a formal and independent complaints mechanism through which individu-
als whose rights have been violated by the Prevent strategy can seek and obtain 
prompt and meaningful remedies.
6. Publicly commit to a policy of zero tolerance regarding retaliation against indi-
viduals who allege rights violations under Prevent.
7. Publicly disclose data on total number of individuals referred to and processed 
through Prevent, Channel, and Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC), as well a 
the breakdown of these figures by age, type of extremism, and referring authority.
8. Publicly disclose, to the extent it exists, evidence underpinning and data relating 
to the UK’s Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG) 22+.
To the Children’s Commissioners for England, Wales, and Scotland:
Conduct an assessment of the impact of Prevent on children, including but not limited 
to whether the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in Prevent-related 
actions.
To the National Association of Head Teachers, the National Association of 
Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers, the Association of Teachers and 
Lecturers, the National Union of Teachers, and other teachers  associations:
Conduct an assessment of the impact of Prevent on teachers and children, including 
but not limited to the extent to which the best interests of the child are a primary con-
sideration in Prevent-related actions.
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To Universities UK:
Conduct an assessment of the impact of Prevent in universities, including but not lim-
ited to its impact on academic freedom and freedom of speech.
To the General Medical Council:
Review and clarify professional standards relating to the duty of confidentiality as inter-
preted and applied in Prevent settings.
To the British Medical Association, the British Psychological Society, 
the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, the Royal College of General 
Practitioners, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and other professional bodies 
in the health sector:
Conduct an assessment of the impact of Prevent on the practice of doctors, psycholo-
gists and other healthcare professionals, and on patients and patient care, including but 
not limited to an assessment of how the duty of confidentiality is being interpreted and 
applied in Prevent settings.
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I. History of Prevent
The UK government’s Prevent strategy has evolved against the background of increased 
public fears over the threat of “home grown” terrorism. In July 2005, four British men 
carried out coordinated suicide attacks in London that killed 52 people and injured hun-
dreds more.42 The threat of attacks has remained. Throughout 2015, the government’s 
Joint Analysis Centre assessed the threat level for the UK to be “SEVERE”, meaning “an 
attack was highly likely”.43 According to the government, “Islamist terrorism” includ-
ing attacks by terrorists “inspired or directed by Daesh”, has “remained the principal 
threat”.44 The government estimates that about 850 individuals “of national security 
concern” have travelled from the UK to Iraq and Syria since the conflict there began, 
and just under half have returned.45 According to the government, “terrorists associated 
with the extreme right also pose a threat, though it remains lower by comparison”.46 
Prevent does not directly apply in Northern Ireland47 where the threat from dissident 
republican groups remains. In 2015, there were 16 “national security attacks” there and 
the threat was assessed as “SEVERE”.48 
In 2006, following the July 2005 London bombings49, the UK government pub-
lished Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s strategy.50 The strategy 
noted that since early 2003, the government had a strategy known as “CONTEST” for 
“countering international terrorism”. The aim of the CONTEST strategy was to “reduce 
the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely 
and with confidence.51 The strategy was divided into four principal strands: “PREVENT, 
PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE”.52 The 2006 strategy document stated that the 
Prevent strand is “concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals” and sought 
to do this by (i) “tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural 
problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequali-
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ties and discrimination”; (ii) “Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who 
encourage others to become terrorists – changing the environment in which the extrem-
ists and those radicalising others can operate”; and (iii) “engaging in the battle of ideas 
– challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, pri-
marily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so”.53
As the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator from 2002 until 2005, Sir 
David Omand was the instigator of the original version of CONTEST and its compo-
nent, Prevent. (He was previously the former director of Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), the UK’s signals’ intelligence agency). He told the Justice Ini-
tiative that the government had launched the Prevent strategy in 2003, but it was not 
made public until later.54 Sir David recalled: “The year after 9/11, everyone was very busy 
patching holes in security. We needed to take a step back and see what strategy we are 
adopting against al-Qaeda and where future investment in security was best directed. 
To do this we needed to construct a British national counterterrorism strategy for which 
I coined the acronym CONTEST”.55 
In contrast to the US counterterrorism strategy which was based on the premise 
that “America is at war”, Sir David noted, he and his team “contended the opposite, that 
for the UK, the strategic objective – in 2002–03 and for the next 5 years which was the 
timescale of the original CONTEST – was normality”. He told the Justice Initiative: “If 
we could continue with normal life, the terrorists are losing since their objective is to 
disrupt society. We therefore came up with the strategic objective, which was to reduce 
the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their normal lives 
freely and with confidence”.56 
He recalled the original conception of Prevent: 
Prevent was all about preventing violent extremism. So a useful parallel for Prevent 
work in the UK could be seen in earlier programmes to discourage young people 
from becoming a gang member – you are trying to stop the route into violence. 
Prevent is about persuading people that violence, including against innocents, 
is not a legitimate way in a democracy to promote your aims.... Notions which 
later crept in about the need to promote specifically “British values”, including 
equality for women, however justified, were not an explicit part of the CONTEST 
strategy to prevent violent extremism.... Policing is about upholding the criminal 
law, not about policing some concept of “Britishness” in the community. But it is 
of course legitimate and desirable for an elected government to promote values 
such as freedom, equality and democracy”.57 
From 2007 onwards, when it was first piloted, the Channel programme was a key 
element of the Prevent strategy.58 Very little was publicly known about Channel when 
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it commenced or indeed when it was later implemented across England and Wales in 
April 2012.59 In a subsequent version of the UK’s strategy for countering international 
terrorism published in 2009, the Government described Channel as “a community-
based initiative which uses existing partnerships between the police, local authority 
representatives and the local community to identify those at risk from violent extremism 
and to support them, primarily through community based interventions”.60 
The 2009 counterterrorism strategy described the Prevent strategy as aimed at 
“stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism”.61 The strategy 
noted that the Government had introduced a revised Prevent strategy in October 2007 
“based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which 
people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism)”.62 The 2009 publica-
tion did not define “extremism”. It defined “radicalisation” as “the process by which 
people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups”, 
while noting that radicalisation “has a range of causes (including perceptions of our 
foreign policy), varying from one country and one organisation to another”.63 The objec-
tives of the new strategy were to: (i) challenge the ideology behind violent extremism 
and support mainstream voices; (ii) disrupt those who promote violent extremism and 
support the places where they operate; (iii) support individuals who are vulnerable to 
recruitment, or have already been recruited by extremists; (iv) increase the resilience 
of communities to violent extremism; and (v) address the grievances which ideologues 
are exploiting.64 The publication noted: “Because the greatest threat at present is from 
terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam, much Prevent activity takes place in 
and with Muslim communities. But the principles of our Prevent work apply equally to 
other communities who may be the focus of attention from violent extremist groups”.65
The Prevent strategy and the Channel programme were criticised as being based 
on the vague concept of “extremism” that could be exploited to target anyone with 
radically different opinions, and for lacking transparency and accountability.66 Prevent 
was also criticised for constructing Muslims as a “suspect community” by pressuring 
local authorities to accept Prevent funding in direct proportion to the numbers of 
Muslims in their area.67 There were also concerns that through the embedding of 
counterterrorism police officers within the delivery of local services and the pressure 
on Prevent-funded voluntary sector organisations and local authority workers to supply 
information to the police, Prevent operated as a method of government surveillance of 
target communities.68
Sir David told the Justice Initiative: 
Over the years, Prevent got revamped and relaunched. There was quite a lot of 
criticism in 2010 when the government changed. They criticised the fact that in 
the course of countering violent extremism, government agencies were talking 
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to Islamic groups who took a fairly extreme (even if non-violent) position on cur-
rent events which the government ministers thought was unwise. Some Minis-
ters were attracted by the conveyor belt theory of how individuals could start by 
association with non-violent radical groups but then be spotted and recruited into 
violent networks. So the later version of Prevent was very much about insisting 
upon democratic values; the government said it would not work with or subsidise 
groups that do not embrace British values.69
In 2011, the coalition government revised the Prevent strategy. The June 2011 
Prevent strategy stated: “the Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government 
was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology 
at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, 
funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should 
have been confronting”.70 
The 2011 strategy stated that “Prevent is part of our counter-terrorism strategy, 
CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”.71 It 
identified three objectives for Prevent: to “respond to the ideological challenge of terror-
ism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn 
into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and, work 
with a wide range of sectors and institutions (including education, faith, health and criminal 
justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address. 72 It noted that 
“a Prevent strategy needs to engage with many of the sectors considered here because 
they have the capability of addressing and resolving challenges we face”.73 Accordingly, 
although the Prevent statutory duty for health and education bodies did not come into 
effect until 2015, the 2011 Prevent strategy expressly contemplated enlisting them in 
preventing individuals from being drawn into terrorism. 
The Prevent strategy was expressly modified in 2011 to address “all forms of 
terrorism” and “non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to 
terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit”.74 The revised strategy 
stated that resources would continue to be allocated in proportion to threats which, in 
light of the threat assessment at that time, meant that the majority of resources and 
efforts would continue to be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting 
Al Qa’ida, its affiliates or related groups.75 In addition, the revised strategy observed: 
“In the past, funding for local authority Prevent projects was allocated on the basis of 
Muslim population size, with those areas with the largest Muslim populations receiv-
ing the most funding. The limitations of this approach are clear, but at the time, it was 
considered the best available. With the benefit of greater information and understand-
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ing, funding to local authorities in the future will be prioritised on our assessment of 
the risk of radicalisation in specific areas.76
The 2011 strategy stated that “preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist 
(and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean 
intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into ter-
rorist-related activity”.77 The 2011 strategy defined “extremism” as “the active opposition 
to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”, as well as “calls 
for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas”.78 
The strategy added that as a general rule, to avoid giving integration and cohe-
sion programmes a “security label”, they would remain distinct but coordinated with 
Prevent. The government had decided that responsibility for Prevent would lie with the 
Home Office (in the OSCT) and responsibility for integration with DCLG [Department 
of Communities and Local Government.79 
The new Prevent strategy was to build on Channel, the existing multi-agency 
programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation.80 Radi-
calisation was referred as “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism 
and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”.81 Finally, the 2011 Prevent strategy noted 
that the term “violent extremism” previously used in Prevent documents was “ambigu-
ous” and that while the strategy avoided that term, it recognised that “programmes 
comparable to Prevent are being run in other countries under the banner of preventing 
or countering violent extremism.82 
For years, the Prevent strategy has absorbed significant financial and human 
resources. From 2011–2015, the annual budget for Prevent ranged between £35 million 
and £40 million.83 The government’s annual report of CONTEST reveals that in 2015, 
over 400,000 frontline staff received Prevent training, more than double the number 
from the previous year”.84 This scale of Prevent operations is troubling in light of 
its structural flaws, described below, which generate a serious risk of human rights 
violations. 
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II. Current Prevent Strategy
The scope of the Prevent strategy has been repeatedly expanded, and its obligations 
enhanced. As a result, the current version contains a series of structural flaws that 
together create a serious risk of human rights violations, in particular: the breadth of 
activities that can be caught by poorly defined or undefined terms such as “non-violent 
extremism” or “terrorist ideology”; the imposition of a statutory obligation to refer; the 
fact that this obligation is imposed on such a broad range of public servants engaged 
in entirely unrelated professions and with inadequate training and guidance; and the 
fact that any referral under this broad and obligatory system involves the police at the 
first instance. This section describes the structure of the current strategy which forms 
the basis for the analysis in the subsequent section.
A.  Prevent Duty
A key element of the current version is the Prevent statutory duty created in 2015, by the 
Counterterrorism and Security Act (CTSA). The Act states: “A specified authority must, 
in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism”.85 Schedule 6 of the Act lists “specified authorities”, and includes 
schools, most further and higher education bodies, NHS trusts and foundation trusts, 
local authorities, prisons, probation service providers, and the police. Although the duty 
applies to institutions rather than individuals, individuals are likely to find themselves 
required by the institutions for whom they work or are otherwise associated to address 
the Prevent duty in the course of their work.
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The Prevent duty is a mandatory duty, and specified authorities are monitored 
for their compliance with it.86 Failure to comply can lead to adverse consequences. If 
a specified authority is failing to discharge the Prevent duty, under section 30 of the 
CTSA, the Secretary of State is empowered to issue directions for the purpose of enforc-
ing the performance of the duty.87 In requiring “due regard” to the need to prevent 
people being drawn into terrorism, however, the Prevent duty is a process duty, rather 
than a duty of result.88 
The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales89 and the Revised 
Prevent Duty Guidance for Scotland90 purport to “assist authorities to decide” what the 
Prevent duty of “due regard” means in practice. (The Prevent Strategy (including the 
Section 26(1) duty) does not apply to Northern Ireland.91) Section 29(2) of the CTSA 
states that “a specified authority must have regard to any such guidance in carrying out” 
the Section 26(1) duty. The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance defines “having due regard” 
as meaning “authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need 
to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors 
relevant to how they carry out their usual functions”.92 Existing case law indicates that 
authorities are obliged to follow clear requirements in guidance unless there is good 
reason to depart from it.93 However, the guidance cannot authorise a failure to comply 
with other statutory duties. 
The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance indicates that the current strategy is a con-
tinuation of the 2011 strategy. It notes that “[t]he aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce 
the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or support-
ing terrorism”.94 
The Scottish Guidance as well as the Guidance for England and Wales specify that 
“being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent 
extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popular-
ise views which terrorists exploit”.95 Both sets of guidance also define “extremism” in 
the same way, viz., “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, includ-
ing democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs”.96 However, Scottish government officials told the Justice 
Initiative: “We don’t ever use that phrase ‘British values.’ It’s in the guidance, but it’s 
just not the focus of our approach. It could be damaging or unhelpful if it endorses a 
‘them and us’ mentality”.97
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B.  Channel and Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC)
  Duty
Each local authority has a duty under the CTSA to ensure that a panel of persons is in 
place to for its area to “provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into ter-
rorism”.98 This duty is met through the Channel panel programme (for England and 
Wales), and the Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) programme (for Scotland) that 
purport to provide “support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism”.99 
(Scottish government officials told the Justice Initiative: “When we looked at Channel 
in 2010, we didn’t take the Channel brand name but we did take many features of the 
Channel scheme and incorporate them into PPC”.100 ) 
The Channel process is led by the police. The Channel Police Practitioner (CPP) 
is responsible for co-ordinating Channel in their area and managing referrals and cases 
through the Channel process.101 Referrals to Channel are likely to be made in the first 
instance by individuals (such as those working in the education sector, social services, 
health, children’s and youth services) who come into contact with vulnerable people.102 
When the initial referral is received, the CPP will lead in assessing whether or not the 
case is potentially appropriate for Channel. If the individual’s vulnerability is not “terror-
ist related”, the CPP will refer the individual to other support services. If the individual 
is not filtered out by the CPP, he will be subject to a “thorough assessment of vulner-
abilities” by the Channel panel. The Local Authority Chair, known as the Channel Panel 
Chair, has oversight of all Channel cases in his or her area.103
The Channel Duty Guidance, which members and partners of Channel panels 
“must have regard” to104, notes that the “police co-ordinate activity by requesting rel-
evant information from panel partners about a referred individual. They will use this 
information to make an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the vulnerability 
which the person has. The information will then be presented to a panel”.105 
C.  Prevent in Schools
The 2011 Prevent strategy identified education as a “priority” sector.106 In England, 
about eight million children are educated in some 23,000 publicly-funded and around 
2,400 independent schools. 107 In Wales, over 450,000 children attend Local Authority 
maintained schools, in addition to those that attend 70 independent schools.108
The 2011 Prevent strategy notes that “sympathy for terrorism is highest among 
young people. Statistically, it is clear that in this country and overseas most terrorist 
offences are committed by people under the age of 30. We therefore regard it as vital 
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that Prevent engages fully – though in differing ways – with schools, higher and further 
education”.109 
By 1 July 2015, private and publicly funded schools in England, Wales, and Scot-
land were subject to the Prevent duty. The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England 
and Wales states that to comply with the duty, schools are expected to assess “the risk 
of children of being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that 
are part of terrorist ideology” and, if appropriate, to refer them to the Channel pro-
gramme.110 
The Guidance makes clear that schools could face adverse consequences for non-
compliance with Prevent obligations. The Guidance states: “Maintained schools are 
subject to intervention, and academies and free schools may be subject to termination 
of their funding agreement, if they are judged by Ofsted to require significant improve-
ment or special measures, or if they fail to take the steps required by their local author-
ity, or for academies or free schools by the Secretary of State pursuant to their funding 
agreement, as applicable, to address unacceptably low standards, serious breakdowns of 
management or governance or if the safety of pupils or staff is threatened”.111 The Office 
for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) monitors schools’ 
compliance with the Prevent duty. 
The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for Scotland states that to comply with the 
Prevent duty, schools are expected to, inter alia, have robust procedures for sharing 
information about vulnerable people, undergo Prevent training, and submit to moni-
toring and enforcement by Education Scotland, the schools inspectorate, with respect 
to this duty.112 
D.  Prevent in Further and Higher Education Bodies
The 2011 Prevent strategy observes that “[u]niversities and colleges – and, to some 
extent, university societies and student groups – have a clear and unambiguous role to 
play in helping to safeguard vulnerable young people from radicalisation and recruit-
ment by terrorist organisations”.113 It adds: “Whether radicalisation occurs on campus 
or elsewhere, staff in higher and further education institutions can identify and offer 
support to people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism”.114
The Prevent duty applies to private and publicly funded further and higher educa-
tion “specified authorities” in England and Wales as well as in Scotland.115 The further 
and higher education guidance requires appropriate staff members to have sufficient 
training to be able to recognise individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and 
know how to respond, including by making referrals to the Channel programme.116 
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 Section 31 of the CTSA provides that, when carrying out the duty under section 
26(1), further and higher education bodies have a corollary duty to “have particular 
regard to the duty to ensure freedom of speech”; and “must have particular regard to 
the importance of academic freedom”. The further and higher education guidance for 
England and Wales and for Scotland specifies that in order to comply with the Prevent 
duty, those institutions should have policies and procedures in place for the manage-
ment of events held on their premises and “balance” their legal duties in terms of both 
ensuring freedom of speech and also protecting student and staff welfare.117 
In particular, the guidance states that when deciding whether or not to host a 
particular speaker, institutions “should consider carefully whether the views being 
expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people 
into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. In these circumstances the event should 
not be allowed to proceed” except where institutions “are entirely convinced that such 
risk can be fully mitigated without cancellation of the event. This includes ensuring 
that, where any event is being allowed to proceed, speakers with extremist views that 
could draw people into terrorism are challenged with opposing views as part of that 
same event, rather than in a separate forum. Where institutions are in any doubt that 
the risk cannot be fully mitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the event 
to proceed”.118
Finally, as part of the institution’s role in pastoral care for students, the higher and 
further education guidance requires institutions “to have clear and widely available poli-
cies for the use of prayer rooms and other faith-related facilities”119, to have appropriate 
policies students and staff using IT equipment to research terrorism, and to consider 
the use of internet filters to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism.120
E.  Prevent in Health Bodies
The 2011 Prevent strategy identified health as a “priority” sector.121 It notes that “[t]he 
National Health Service (NHS) spans primary care, acute hospital care, community 
and mental health care, dentistry, pharmacy and delivery of services such as prison 
health. 1.3 million NHS workers have contact with over 315,000 patients daily and some 
700,000 workers in private and voluntary healthcare organisations see many thousands 
more”.122 The Prevent strategy notes that “[g]iven the very high numbers of people who 
come into contact with health professionals in this country, the [health] sector is a 
critical partner in Prevent”.123 It adds that “healthcare professionals may meet and treat 
people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. People with mental health issues or learn-
ing disabilities ... may be more easily drawn into terrorism”.124 
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Health specified authorities to which the Prevent duty applies are NHS Trusts 
and NHS Foundation Trusts.125 The Scottish Guidance adds that the health “specified 
authorities” subject to the Prevent duty include Health Boards, Special Health Boards, 
and Healthcare Improvement Scotland.126 The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance notes 
that that the staff of health bodies are expected to recognise and refer those at risk of 
being drawn into terrorism to the Prevent lead who may make a referral to the Chan-
nel programme”.127 Health specified authorities are subject to monitoring by Monitor 
in England and Healthcare Inspectorate in Wales.128 The Scottish Government’s NHS 
Resilience Unit monitors the delivery of Health Boards’ Prevent action plans.129 
The foregoing analysis describes the current Prevent strategy with particular focus 
on health and education. As set forth below, the strategy suffers from structural defects 
that create the risk of human rights violations. 
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III. Structural Flaws in the Current 
 Prevent Strategy
The current Prevent strategy described in preceding section suffers from multiple mutu-
ally reinforcing structural flaws, the foreseeable consequence of which is a serious risk 
of human rights violations, including violations of the right against discrimination, as 
well the rights to freedom of expression and religion, private and family life, and educa-
tion. The fundamental nature of these defects suggest that renaming Prevent strategy 
to “Engage”130, is unlikely to cure them. 
A.  “Pre-criminality”, “Non-violent Extremism”, 
  and “British Values”
“Pre-criminality”, “non-violent extremism”, and “British values” are hallmarks of the 
Prevent strategy. Official public descriptions of Prevent and Channel repeatedly claim 
that these programmes operate in a “pre-criminal” space that targets individuals with a 
view to stopping them from committing terrorist crimes in the future.131 As noted above, 
in 2011, the Prevent strategy was expressly revised to target “non-violent extremism” 
on the theory that it is the precursor to terrorist activity. Thus, the strategy states that 
“preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also 
part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to stop people moving 
from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity”.132 In addition, 
the Revised Prevent Duty Guidance explains that the duty on specified authorities to 
have due regard to the need prevent people from being drawn into terrorism includes 
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preventing them from being drawn into violent extremism and “non-violent extremism 
which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which 
terrorists then exploit”.133 The definition of “extremism” in the Prevent strategy is far 
broader than terrorism134 and includes “vocal or active opposition to fundamental Brit-
ish values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect 
and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.135 
The targeting of “pre-criminality”, non-violent “extremism”, and opposition to 
“British values” is fundamentally flawed. It is unclear how the Prevent strategy might 
determine whether an individual is going to commit a terrorist crime in the future. As 
noted below in the section on domestic legal provisions, the “gap” that Prevent purports 
to fill through its pre-criminal approach should be measured in light of existing broadly 
framed criminal law provisions that criminalise conduct well before the commission of 
substantive acts of terrorism.
Dal Babu, a former Chief Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police, told the 
Justice Initiative in relation to Prevent’s targeting of the “pre-criminal” space: “This is 
a very dangerous road to go down – I don’t know what it means to be ‘pre-criminal’-
-I suspect it means holding a certain point of view”.136 Lord Ken Macdonald, former 
Director of Public Prosecutions, has observed: “many, perhaps most, of the behaviours 
targeted by Prevent, are behaviours that are not in themselves criminal in any way ... 
[this] intensifies the strength of surveillance and government reach into people’s every-
day lawful lives – and indeed into whole areas of their everyday lawful discourse”.137 
Moreover, even though Prevent does not entail an arrest record or imprison-
ment, the case studies documented below demonstrate that Prevent with its labels of 
“pre-criminality” and “vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism” is perceived by its 
targets – who have not committed any crime – as extremely intimidating, humiliat-
ing and stigmatising. Indeed, being targeted by the government under the rubric of 
counterterrorism is likely to be inherently stigmatising for someone who engaged in 
no criminal activity.
The expansion of Prevent to cover “non-violent extremism”, including promot-
ing “views which terrorists then exploit”, widened its net greatly: from those who were 
perceived to be themselves at risk of committing terrorism or violent extremist acts, to 
those who merely espouse views – often on political questions – which are in common 
with the positions held by some terrorists. There must be space for legitimate and seri-
ous debate, and expressing concern, over questions such as the status and future of the 
Palestinian territories, or the suffering of people in Syria, without stigmatising certain 
views (and all of those who express them) as extremist. Of course, it may well be that 
not all who express such views are stigmatised – some of the individuals interviewed 
for this report observed that only Muslims are suspected of extremism if they voice 
these concerns; others are able to engage fully and freely in debates over such issues.
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In addition, it is not clear what “British values” are. A recent survey of 14 to 18 
year-olds from minority and ethnic minority backgrounds, a third of whom were Mus-
lims, found that they were generally “uncomprehending” of the term “British Values” 
but that they “understood Islamic values, Christian values, and humanitarian values 
very well”.138 The students regarded democracy (one of the British values listed in the 
Prevent strategy) as a “system of government, rather than as a value” while several 
Muslim students observed that the “rule of law” was also a “principle of Islam”.139 In 
addition, the term “British values” risks alienating target communities. Scottish govern-
ment officials told the Justice Initiative: “We don’t ever use that phrase ‘British values.’ 
It’s in the guidance, but it’s just not the focus of our approach. It could be damaging or 
unhelpful if it endorses a ‘them and us’ mentality”.140 
The overly broad definition of “extremism” by its terms creates the potential for 
a myriad subjective interpretations – many of them in error – of who is likely to be 
at risk of being drawn into terrorism. The government’s own figures show that over 
2007–2014, 80% of referrals to the Channel programme were set aside – this reflects 
an extremely high error rate.141 The scope for a myriad interpretations of “extremism” 
in turn creates the potential for systemic human rights violations, including most obvi-
ously, violations of the right against discrimination and the right to freedom of expres-
sion and religion, among other rights. See section below on applicable international 
human rights standards.
The potential for discrimination is particularly serious in light of the prevailing 
political climate in the UK, one marked by rising anti-Islamic and xenophobic senti-
ment. Significantly, between July 2015 and July 2016, Islamophobic crime in London 
rose by 94 percent.142 As Simon Cole, the police lead for Prevent, acknowledged: “Pre-
vent doesn’t sit on its own, it sits in a framework where people are concerned about 
Islamophobia, we are a nation that has just voted for Brexit, and immigration is an 
issue”.143 This climate is likely to affect who is regarded as an “extremist”. In this context, 
the statutory Prevent duty to identify and report to Channel individuals at risk of being 
drawn into terrorism (including violent and non-violent extremism) gives legal backing 
to potentially discriminatory determinations of “extremism” by frontline professionals. 
The overly broad definition of “extremism” also creates a serious risk of violating 
freedom of expression. Lord Ken Macdonald has observed that opposition to “British 
values” “might plausibly include much Platonic discourse, Marxist analysis of a sup-
posed class basis for our rule of law, and many atheist deconstructions of religion. To 
the response that these forms of speech are not the ones the government wishes to 
target, we might ask: who is to say?”144 The statutory Prevent duty to identify and report 
to Channel individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism (including violent and non-
violent extremism) gives legal backing to erroneous determinations that identify and 
report lawful speech as “extremist”.
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Regarding the focus in the current version of Prevent on “non-violent extremism” 
and “British values”, Sir David Omand, the architect of the original version of Prevent 
told the Justice Initiative: “My instinct is to be cautious about bringing in all these ele-
ments together. We did think [in the original version of Prevent that] the priority was to 
prevent violent extremism. Once you get into being accused of policing different ways 
of living and ‘thought crime’ over controversial areas such as foreign policy you enter 
a difficult area”.145 
More fundamentally, however, the claim that non-violent extremism leads to 
terrorism is empirically unsupported. This claim is a version of the “conveyor belt” 
theory, which posits that individuals follow a predictable path towards terrorism, 
and that there exist reliable indicators for predicting who is on that path. This theory
 – advocated in 2004 by Zeyno Baran in the course of describing Hizb ut-Tahrir as 
an organisation “active in the ideological preparation of the Muslims”, a “de facto 
conveyor belt for terrorists”146 – has been widely discredited, including by the British 
government itself. 
British government documents leaked in 2010 revealed “a clear assessment that 
individuals do not progress through non-violent extremist groups to violent groups .... 
Extreme groups may also provide a legal ‘safety valve’ for extreme views”.147 One paper, 
entitled “Government strategy towards extremism”, said: “It is sometimes argued that 
violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way of a passing commitment to 
non-violent Islamist extremism for example of a kind associated with al-Muhajiroun 
or Hizb ut Tahrir .... We do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalisation in 
this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalisation, 
to violence …. This thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give 
undue weight to ideological factors”.148 Similarly, in 2008, a leaked briefing by MI5’s 
Behavioural Analysis Unit found that there was no single pathway to terrorism and 
that it was impossible to develop a typical profile of the British terrorist; and that most 
terrorists were not “Islamic fundamentalists”.149 
The claim that ideology – including religious ideology based in Islam--is a root 
cause of terrorism has also been rejected.150 Professor Andrew Silke, a counter-terrorism 
expert who has advised the Cabinet Office, has observed:
The evidence isn’t there to say ideology is the prime reason why people are becom-
ing terrorists, and yet ideology is the foundation on which the counterterrorism 
effort is built on. Everything is pitched in terms of counter ideology, even though 
ideology is not the prime mover in terms of bringing people into terrorism. That 
is a mistake. It is not going to be effective in terms of preventing people becoming 
radicalised. And it diverts attention from other causes which play a role in why 
people become involved in terrorism.151
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Significantly, a 2016 Europol report notes that “[i]n view of th[e] shift away from 
the religious component in the radicalisation of, especially, young recruits, it may be 
more accurate to speak of a ‘violent extremist social trend’ rather than using the term 
‘radicalisation’”.152 The Joint Committee on Human Rights has similarly observed in 
relation to the UK’s counter-extremism strategy that “it is by no means proven or agreed 
that religious conservatism, in itself, correlates with support for violent jihadism”.153 
John Horgan, a prominent terrorism expert, has observed that “the idea that 
radicalization causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism 
research ...  [First], the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not 
engage in violence. And second, there is increasing evidence that people who engage in 
terrorism don’t necessarily hold radical beliefs .... [I]t’s time to end our preoccupation 
with radicalization ... Radicalization is not the issue. Terrorism is”.154 
Former CIA officer and psychologist Marc Sageman has similarly observed that 
“with each new terrorist incident we realize that we are no closer to answering our 
original question about what leads people to turn to political violence”.155 He notes 
that many practitioner-driven programmes are “based on flawed lay understanding of 
radicalization: misinterpretation of Islam and potential terrorist vulnerability to them 
.... But since scientists have not been involved in creating these programs, there has 
been no built-in control group for comparison in any of them. Comparison of people 
receiving any intervention (the test group) with people who do not (the control group) 
is really the only way to estimate the effectiveness of any social intervention. Simply 
put, in the absence of comparison with any control group, we have no idea whether the 
counter- or de-radicalization programs work or not”.156 
Similarly, when referred to a recent report in the New York Times about the lack of 
answers to the question of what causes people to become terrorists,157 Sir David Omand 
told the Justice Initiative:
In the course of developing the CONTEST strategy, the Security Service undertook 
(with professional psychological advice) a study (unpublished) of possible pathways 
to radicalisation based on character studies of those who had come to the attention 
of law enforcement in connection with terrorist offences and concluded there was 
no discernible pattern that could be of operational use to separate those who might 
be vulnerable to radicalisation from those of similar backgrounds who would not 
be. As the New York Times article says, each case has unique characteristics. Profil-
ing was therefore not part of Prevent or the CONTEST strategy generally.158
The lack of empirical support for the Prevent strategy’s assumption that non-
violent extremism leads to violent extremism is problematic because it leads to the 
targeting of “non-violent” extremists who may not be at any risk of being drawn into 
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terrorism. This structural flaw is compounded by the Prevent strategy’s spawning of a 
large number of empirically unsupported “indicators” which purport to identify indi-
viduals at risk of being drawn into terrorism.
B.  Indicators of Vulnerability to Being Drawn into 
  Terrorism
In a recent position statement on counterterrorism and psychiatry, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists notes “concerns” about “the variable quality of the evidence underpinning 
the [Prevent] strategy”.159 It adds: “Predicting very rare events is extremely difficult. No 
tools have been developed that can reliably identify people who have been radicalised, 
who are at risk of radicalisation or who are likely to carry out a terrorist act”.160 As 
noted above, the Prevent strategy rests on the empirically unsupported assumption that 
non-violent extremism is the precursor to terrorism. In addition, the Prevent strategy 
purports to identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism (i.e. violent or non-
violent extremism) through multiple and overlapping lists of indicators, the empirical 
basis of which is also unproven. As the case studies below demonstrate, there is a real 
danger that these “factors” and “indicators” could be applied under Prevent and Channel 
to target innocent people and children who are nowhere close to committing terror-
ist acts. Indeed, these indicators exacerbate Prevent’s potential for generating human 
rights violations.
For example, the Channel “Vulnerability Assessment Framework” (VAF), assesses 
“vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism” based on individual’s (i) engagement with 
a group, cause or ideology (or psychological hooks) which the VAF breaks down into 13 
factors: feeling under threat; a need for identity, meaning and belonging; a desire for 
status; desire for excitement and adventure; need to dominate and control others; sus-
ceptibility to indoctrination; desire for political or moral change; opportunistic involve-
ment; family or friends involvement in extremism; being at a transitional time of life; 
being influenced or controlled by a group; and relevant mental health issues; (ii) intent 
to cause harm, which the VAF breaks down into six factors: over-identification with a 
group or ideology; “Them and Us” thinking; dehumanisation of the enemy; attitudes 
that justify offending; harmful means to an end; harmful objectives; and (iii) capability 
to cause harm, which VAF breaks down into three factors: individual knowledge, skills 
and competencies; access to networks, funding or equipment; and criminal capability.161 
The total of 22 factors identified in the VAF are known as the Extremism Risk 
Guidance (ERG) 22+,162 “an assessment tool” developed by the UK’s National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS) Operational Intervention Services Group and launched 
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in 2011.163 The tool apparently assesses offenders on 22 factors theoretically related 
to “extremist offending”; the “+” in the title apparently indicates that the model may 
consider additional factors if they are shown to be relevant to a particular case. The 
underlying government document relating to the ERG 22+ is not publicly available, but 
is cited to in other public sources as a document produced by the National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS).164 
Professor Andrew Silke, a counter-terrorism expert who has advised the Cabinet 
Office, notes, “ERG is a theoretical model and, as yet, does not have an evidence base 
demonstrating clear links to future offending”.165 Indeed, he observes that the authors 
of the ERG 22+ test themselves highlight that:
The ERG factors are essentially working hypotheses to account for how an individ-
ual became engaged and to capture the features of their mind-set, their intentions 
and their capability for terrorism. None of these factors has a demonstrated link 
with future offending, so are as yet unproven. As such the ERG cannot predict 
risk with any certainty, but directs attention to aspects of the individual associated 
with their offending where intervention may be targeted or proportionate risk 
management approaches deployed.166
In these circumstances, it is unclear how these 22+ factors, apparently developed 
in the context of a prison population by the National Offender Management Service, 
with no demonstrated link with future offending, can be applied to a general popula-
tion to assess vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism. Indeed many of the VAF 
factors--for example, the need for identity, meaning and belonging; a desire for status; 
and desire for excitement and adventure--are so widely prevalent so as to capture virtu-
ally every young person within the net of “vulnerability”. In addition, a UK child and 
adolescent psychiatrist with knowledge of the VAF said that it had been drawn from very 
small samples of people, and that it had “very poor inter-rater reliability” i.e., the degree 
of agreement among those conducting assessments based on the VAF is very low.167 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, in a recent position statement on counter-
terrorism notes: 
Data on evaluations of Prevent, as with any initiative requiring public services to 
alter their practice, must be in the public domain and subjected to peer review and 
scientific scrutiny. Public policy cannot be based on either no evidence or a lack 
of transparency about evidence. The evidence underpinning the UK’s Extremism 
Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+; HM Government 2011c), and other data relating 
to this guidance, should be comprehensively published and readily accessible”.168 
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In addition, the Channel Duty Guidance identifies “indicators” of the presence of 
the 22 factors identified in the VAF. Indicators of engagement with terrorism include, 
inter alia, “spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists”; 
“changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group”; “day-
to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around an extremist ideology, group 
or cause”; or “possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause”.169 
Indicators of intention to cause harm include, inter alia, “clearly identifying another 
group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or politi-
cal ills that group for all social or political ills”.170 Indicators of capability to cause harm 
include, inter alia, having occupational skills that can enable acts of terrorism (such as 
civil engineering, pharmacology or construction); or having technical expertise that can 
be deployed (e.g. IT skills, knowledge of chemicals, military training or survival skills).171 
Once again, particularly in light of the broad definition of “extremism” employed, these 
criteria are susceptible to capturing lawful activity wholly unconnected to terrorism in 
their ambit. The unfortunate reality is that modes of dress or behaviours associated with 
minority religions are more likely to be considered “extreme”, especially in an environ-
ment marked by Islamophobia. The indicator “changing their style of dress or personal 
appearance to accord with the group” appears to have been applied in two of the case 
studies to target under Prevent individuals who had started wearing Islamic dress, but 
had nothing to do with terrorism.172
In 2015, the Safeguarding Children Board of the London Borough of Camden 
published a pamphlet entitled Keeping Children and Young People Safe from Radi-
calisation and Extremism: Advice for Parents and Carers tells worried parents to call 
Prevent officials.173 In a section entitled “What are signs [of radicalisation] to look out 
for?”, the pamphlet lists, inter alia, showing a mistrust of mainstream media reports and 
belief in conspiracy theories; and appearing angry about government policies, especially foreign 
policy.174 In this context, the risk of targeting under Prevent innocent children who have 
views critical of the government and the media is evident, as is the risk of infringing on 
their right to freedom of expression. 
Numerous other lists of questionable indicators are also being applied under Pre-
vent, including through the proliferation of trainings being delivered around England, 
Scotland and Wales. As noted in case study below, the Prevent training that a teacher 
received in the West Midlands gave teachers a list of indicators of “radicalisation” to 
watch out for – if the child has a different group of friends, if the child has strongly held 
political beliefs, if he or she changes the way she dresses, or if there is a drop in grades.175 
These indicators could potentially apply to a broad swath of children who have nothing 
to do with terrorism while running the risk of penalising them for their political views 
and violating their right to freedom of expression. Many young people go through a 
period when they change their dress, when they take strong political stands, when they 
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may be angry at authority. But only certain examples of this behaviour are referred to 
and questioned by the police. As one interviewee notes, “Muslim kids are not afforded 
the same opportunity of rebelling as white kids are”.176
More recently, it has been reported that a police study of 500 Channel cases found 
that “44% of the individuals involved were assessed as being likely to have vulner-
abilities related to mental health or psychological difficulties”.177 It is unclear whether 
and how the results of this study will be applied under Prevent. However, experts have 
warned:
We are too ready to invoke ‘terrorism’ as the cause of most sudden and unpro-
voked acts of individual or group violence, and simultaneously to propose men-
tal illnesses as the explanation behind such complex behaviours. Not only does 
this unfairly stigmatise the many millions with mental health problems, perhaps 
deterring people from seeking help, but it can also stand in the way of the care-
ful analysis that must be undertaken in each case before coming to judgment.178
C.  Statutory Duty Incentives
The Prevent statutory duty, which came into effect for most bodies in England and 
Wales in July 2015, led to a sharp rise in referrals to the Channel programme. From the 
start of July 2015 until the end of June 2016, the number of Channel referrals increased 
by 75% over the preceding year to a total of 4,611 people, a figure that included more 
than 2,000 children and teenagers.179 Referrals from schools more than doubled over 
this period, rising from to 1121 from 537 the previous year.180 Data relating to the num-
ber of Prevent Professionals Concerns (PPC) referrals does not appear to be publicly 
available for Scotland. Scottish government officials told the Justice Initiative that they 
“are unable to provide statistics, but the referrals to the PPC are very low [and] [t]hey 
are likely to remain low”.181 
The United Kingdom appears to be the only country that imposes a statutory duty 
to report individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism. (For more on this, please 
see the section below on Prevent in international perspective.) Significantly, the statu-
tory duty was imposed by the Counterterrorism and Security Act of 2015, 12 years after 
Prevent was first adopted. Baroness Elizabeth Manningham-Buller, who was Director 
General of MI5 when the July 2005 bombings occurred, observed in the context of the 
parliamentary debate on that Act: “I prefer to believe that a voluntary, optional regime 
of securing co-operation is preferable to what is proposed in Part 5 [of the Act] .... 
I have real difficulty in understanding the practicality of requiring an enormous range 
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of authorities to respond to what is described as the “local threat”, which may after all 
be covert. How will they judge who is vulnerable? How will they judge who is a non-
violent extremist?” 182
The architect of the original Prevent strategy, Sir David Omand, told the Justice 
Initiative: 
My instinct would have been not to go down the statutory route. Because if you 
can persuade people of why it benefits everyone to do what you consider best you 
will get a more positive response than you would if you simply instructed them on 
what you want them to do. You don’t want to lessen the effort to persuade people 
this is the right grounds for doing things. And with the statutory duty you could 
get into issues over conflict with the duty to uphold free speech in universities. 
Whereas if you rely on a voluntary system, people can use their common sense 
when something deserves to be drawn to the attention of the authorities.183 
Sir David added: 
“You have to be very careful. If, for example, you impose a legal duty on teachers 
to report signs of radical thinking amongst their students then teachers may feel 
obliged to report to the authorities, and thus start an official process over every 
minor adolescent rebellious outburst, matters that really could be better handled 
by them on the spot”.184 
The sharp rise in referrals to the Channel programme since the statutory duty 
took effect, particularly from schools, appears to reflect this dynamic. The statutory duty 
creates a system in which all of the incentives are stacked in favour of referring individu-
als under Prevent and Channel. The Prevent duty has added weight because it is a legal 
obligation for specified authorities. Health and education bodies are monitored and can 
face adverse consequences for non-compliance with Prevent.185 On the other hand, there 
do not seem to be any adverse consequences for a person who wrongly refers someone 
else to Prevent or Channel.   
Significantly, in March 2016, the National Union of Teachers, the largest teach-
ers’ union in England and Wales, called for the Prevent duty to be withdrawn and 
replaced with new guidance for schools.186 Alex Kenny, a national executive member 
of the National Union of Teachers (NUT), and chair of its education and equalities 
committee, told the Justice Initiative that Prevent is “leading to cases of overreaction 
by schools because of the way schools are judged. We have a very top down school 
inspection system which schools are afraid of, and where Prevent is monitored by this 
inspection authority. Schools are afraid of being seen to be doing the wrong thing. They 
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are afraid of getting caught out by not reporting something that further down the line 
it may turn out they should have reported. Small things, rather than being dealt with 
by the school, are being reported to the police”.187 
A mental health professional and academic in a UK university said that after 
attending a Prevent training, some of her colleagues told her they thought that the 
Prevent strategy was “dodgy” but that they were not allowed to question it because it 
was a statutory duty.188 She added that the Prevent training “was all presented in the 
context of keeping people safe, and that silences people” because if they raise questions 
about Prevent, the response is “don’t you want to be safe”? She observed: “It worries 
me because I feel that as academics we are also silencing each other in the same way. 
This is about keeping us safe and it’s a statutory obligation so we should just shut up 
and do it. We are slipping into a regime ... where we are all handmaidens to state, and 
we are just sleep walking into this, and afraid to question it because if you do you come 
under the radar”.189 The statutory duty creates a system where the incentive for officials 
is to refer, because the cost of not doing so would be borne by them whereas the cost 
of a referral is borne by the referred individual.
Under these circumstances, individuals are likely to err on the side of referring 
under Prevent. The interviews and case studies in this report confirm that the Prevent 
statutory duty creates a tendency to rush to refer people rather than address the issue 
at hand in a manner that comports with common sense.190 
Finally, there are concerns that the Prevent duty privileges countering terrorism 
over other kinds of crimes. Robert Beckley, a retired police officer who became the 
police lead for Prevent in 2004, told the Justice Initiative that he was concerned about 
the Prevent duty’s “singular nature”. He observed: “As a public servant, one should be 
looking out for crime and criminality as a whole, of which terrorism is just one part. 
Bringing out just terrorism feels crude and clunky and puts terrorism on a pedestal. 
Terrorism is always a horrible crime, but it is still just a crime. Child abuse is also a 
horrendous crime”. He added: “There is a real danger of stigmatisation [on account of 
the statutory duty], because state agents of all types could be seen as being marshalled 
to inform on people rather than protect the community”.191
D.  Training Problems 
 
In 2015, over 400,000 frontline staff received Prevent training, more than double the 
number from the previous year”.192 As a threshold matter, there are serious questions 
about whether training that is based on the empirically unsupportable claim of non-
violent “extremism” being the precursor to terrorism and questionable “indicators” of 
“vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism” could possibly be beneficial. As noted 
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above, there are numerous flawed sets of “indicators” that are being used under Prevent 
to spot and report to Channel individuals at “risk of being drawn into terrorism”. Many 
Prevent trainings employ these indicators, and particularly in the absence of meaning-
ful regulation, exacerbate the risk of erroneous and discriminatory referrals.
Alex Kenny, a national executive member of the National Union of Teachers 
(NUT), and chair of its education and equalities committee, told the Justice Initiative 
there were “significant concerns” about Prevent training.193 He said: “there is a whole 
industry now grown up in Prevent training, it’s completely unaccredited and unregu-
lated ... and it’s very varied in content and very varied in quality – that is exacerbating the 
confusion [around Prevent]”. He noted that some of the training was “fine”, but in other 
instances, trainers were including “deciding to learn Arabic” or “a girl deciding to wear 
a headscarf where previously she might not have done”, as signs of radicalisation.194 Mr. 
Kenny said: “In that context, you really are creating lots of problems. This does seem to 
be targeting Muslim students despite what the government says being about it targeting 
all kinds of organisations.... It is largely Muslims that are being reported”.195
A significant number of health and education professionals interviewed for this 
report said that the Prevent training they received was wholly unsatisfactory and, in 
some instances, counterproductive. In many instances, health and education profes-
sionals experienced their training as promoting anti-Muslim bias. A professional who 
works in a London charity that provides vocational education and child care training 
described a Prevent training delivered by her local authority in June or July 2015 as 
“focused mainly on Muslims”. She added: “the training materials only had images of 
Muslim women wearing hijab and men with long beards”. She said the “images of 
extremism were based on ISIS imagery only”. The training gave “just one view of Islam” 
and made “people look at Muslims in a stereotypical way”. “Such exclusive depiction 
of only one form of extremism”, she said, “has fed anti-Muslim sentiment and led to 
attacks in the tube on women wearing hijab”.196 
A consultant in adult psychiatry working with the NHS in Manchester who 
received his Prevent training in February 2015 told the Justice Initiative that it was “quite 
clear” that the trainer didn’t seem confident or knowledgeable about it; and “didn’t seem 
to be wanting to deliver it”.197 He added: “It was very vague stuff, she described what 
the Prevent duty was – she read out from a document – used the term ‘being drawn 
into terrorism’. It was very basic. Changing behaviour, changing patterns of speaking, 
becoming more religious, withdrawing from family, people isolating themselves – these 
were identified as possible indicators of being drawn into terrorism”.198 He said that the 
Prevent training was being done by “people who don’t have expertise .... They deliver the 
training so that the hospital trust can check the box saying the job is done”.199 Similarly, 
an assistant head teacher at a London primary school told the Justice Initiative that the 
Prevent training she attended in January 2016 “did not add anything”; it was “a tick-box 
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exercise” that was not “thorough”. In any event, she didn’t think “a single person knows 
what to look for, how to identify signs of radicalisation”.200
In July 2016, Parliament’s Home Affairs Select Committee expressed concern 
about a “lack of sufficient and appropriate training in an area that is complex and unfa-
miliar to many education and other professionals, compounded by a lack of clarity about 
what is required of them”.201 In addition, a recent Ofsted report into further education 
providers’ compliance with the Prevent duty noted that “staff training was ineffective 
in a third of the providers” surveyed.202 The report found that “[t]oo many providers 
adopted a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach” and relied on online training that “was often too 
superficial to help staff understand the nature of specific risks in the communities that 
they serve”.203
Notwithstanding the flaws in the content of Prevent training, it has been reported 
that it is being extended to entities well beyond the “specified authorities” specified by 
the CTSA. Indeed, taxi drivers have been receiving Prevent training on the theory that 
they have “a unique reach into society”.204 The training provided is on “how to spot 
the signs of radicalisation”.205 The spread of Prevent training beyond the “specified 
authorities” contemplated by the CTSA further exacerbates the risk of spreading incor-
rect notions of who is “vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism” as well as erroneous 
referrals to Prevent. 
E.  Prevent vs. Safeguarding
The government often describes Prevent as a form of safeguarding (a statutory term that 
denotes promotion of welfare and protection from harm).206 The Revised Prevent Duty 
Guidance asserts that “preventing someone from being drawn into terrorism is substan-
tially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic vio-
lence”.207 However, a closer examination of Prevent and safeguarding reveals that they 
have materially different aims, particularly with respect to the treatment of children. 
The 2011 Prevent strategy states that “Prevent is part of our counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terror-
ism”. This goal is reiterated in the Revised Prevent Duty Guidance, which states that 
“[t]he aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by 
stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”.208 
Consistent with this objective, as noted above, the Channel programme is led by 
the police. The Channel guidance itself acknowledges that “the Channel provisions in 
Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the CTSA are counter-terrorism measures (since their ultimate 
objective is to prevent terrorism)” while adding that “the way in which Channel will 
be delivered may often overlap with the implementation of the wider safeguarding 
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duty, especially where vulnerabilities have been identified that require intervention from 
social services, or where the individual is already known to social services”.209 
Safeguarding obligations with respect to children have long preceded the Prevent 
duty. See section below on relevant domestic legal provisions. In contrast to the Prevent 
strategy, for which the primary objective is preventing terrorism,210 the primary objective 
of the duty to safeguard children under domestic legislation is the welfare of the child.211 
This reflects the obligation under article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all actions relat-
ing to children.212 Accordingly, while compliance with safeguarding obligations would 
require the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration in any referral to 
the police-led Channel programme, the Channel duty guidance does not specify that as 
a mandatory or even a relevant consideration. 
While in some circumstances preventing a child from being drawn into terror-
ism may coincide with safeguarding aims, there are serious questions about potential 
conflicts in certain circumstances between the Prevent strategy and the safeguarding 
of children. For example, the Prevent strategy may target a child under Prevent for 
non-violent “extremist” views in opposition to “British values”, but particularly where 
this exposes the child to lasting trauma, this may be inconsistent with safeguarding’s 
primary consideration of serving the best interests of the child. The requirement to 
refer to a police-led process deprives officials of the ability to balance the risks and the 
appropriate response, and to calibrate their actions to ensure that the best interests of 
the child are respected. Notably, all of the case studies documented below relating to 
children appear to be examples of Prevent being applied in a manner that does not give 
primary consideration to the best interest of those children. 
Significantly, Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) recently 
observed in the context of counter-extremism measures: 
Everyone can understand the definition of safeguarding when it comes to child 
neglect, physical abuse and sexual abuse. In relation to extremism, however, there 
is no shared consensus or definition as to what children would be safeguarded 
from. The difficulty around these issues should lead the Government to tread with 
great care, for fear of making the situation worse, not better.213
This reasoning applies to the Prevent strategy, because, as the JCHR recognised, 
“the Prevent Strategy (and the related Duty) are explicitly designed to counter extremism, 
not just terrorism, and are used in schools and universities as well as other institutions”.214
More generally, by securitising relationships between teachers and students and 
stifling debate, Prevent risks undermining schools’ ability to keep children safe. Alex 
Kenny, a national executive member of the National Union of Teachers (NUT), and 
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chair of its education and equalities committee, told the Justice Initiative that “the NUT 
believes fundamentally that schools and teachers do have a duty and obligation to keep 
children safe”, but that Prevent is a “blunt instrument that lacks clarity and is actually 
hindering schools” from doing the important work of keeping children safe. He added: 
“The government say to us that they want schools to be places where debate happens”, 
but “the reality is that by imposing this as a separate duty on schools, by making Pre-
vent a specific thing around terrorism and extremism, it’s leading to a situation where 
that debate is being stifled”. He added: “that’s got to be worrying if a child can’t speak 
to teachers – they will look somewhere else to have those discussions”. He observed: 
“At the heart of this is the relationship between teachers and students and schools and 
students. If you break that trust, if students feel what they say is being monitored, you 
are shifting the boundaries of trust and confidence”.215 
A concrete example of how Prevent can interfere with efforts to safeguard stu-
dents in schools was provided by a secondary school teacher from East London. He told 
the Justice Initiative that a student he was close with told him that he and his friends 
had grown concerned about a fellow student who had been isolating himself, playing 
“Call of Duty” (a first person shooter videogame) and viewing Daesh propaganda online. 
The fellow student ultimately ended up “fine”, but during the time that his friends were 
concerned about him, they were unable to talk with any teachers about their concerns 
because they were afraid that the teachers would report their friend under Prevent. This 
particular school teacher learned of this case after the fact in part because his students 
knew he was critical of Prevent and therefore trusted him.216 
F.  Risk of Confidentiality Breaches in the Health Sector
The Prevent duty risks breaching health bodies’ duty of confidentiality towards their 
patients and undermining the relationship of health professionals with their patients. 
The common law duty of confidentiality, set out in the NHS Confidentiality Code of 
Practice, is founded on the principle that information confided should not be used or 
disclosed further, except as originally understood by the confider, or with their subse-
quent permission.217 In “exceptional circumstances”, confidentiality can be breached 
“in the public interest”, in order to “prevent and support detection, investigation and 
punishment of serious crime and/or to prevent abuse or serious harm to others where they 
judge, on a case by case basis, that the public good that would be achieved by the disclo-
sure outweighs both the obligation of confidentiality to the individual patient concerned 
and the broader public interest in the provision of a confidential service”.218
The General Medical Council (GMC) has published Confidentiality Guidance 
to inform healthcare professionals’ approach to their confidentiality obligations. The 
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GMC Guidance observes that “[c]onfidentiality is central to trust between doctors and 
patients” and “[t]here is a clear public good in having a confidential medical service”.219 
However, the duty of confidentiality is “not absolute”.220 Personal information shared in 
a confidential setting may be disclosed “if it is justified in the public interest” without 
patients’ consent, and in exceptional cases where patients have withheld consent if the 
benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure outweigh both the public and the 
patient’s interest in keeping the information confidential”.221 For example, disclosure 
of personal information about a patient without consent may be justified in the public 
interest “if failure to disclose may expose others to a risk of death or serious harm”.222 
Such a situation might arise, for example, if “a disclosure would be likely to assist 
in the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime, especially crimes against 
the person”.223
The standard for disclosure of confidential information under Prevent appears to 
be much lower than that warranted by the common law duty of confidentiality and the 
GMC guidance. Section 26 of the CTSA imposes on health specified authorities a duty 
of “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.224 The 
Revised Prevent Duty Guidance makes clear that in relation to the health sector, “staff 
... are expected to recognise and refer those at risk of being drawn into terrorism to the 
Prevent lead who may make a referral to the Channel programme”.225 Moreover, the 
guidance adds that “[b]eing drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism 
but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism 
and can popularise views which terrorists exploit”.226 
In a recent position statement on counterterrorism and psychiatry, the Royal Col-
lege of Psychiatrists noted “concerns about the implementation of Prevent” including 
“potential conflicts with the duties of a doctor as defined by the GMC”.227 Sir Simon 
Wessely, chair of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, told the Justice Initiative: “We are 
also aware of possible ambiguities surrounding current legislation, which we suspect 
will sooner or later need to be resolved in the Courts”.228 The Prevent guidance observes 
that “[i]t is important that staff understand how to balance patient confidentiality with the 
[Prevent] duty” and that they get relevant advice and support in relation to this issue.229 
But requiring a medical professional to report (under Prevent) to the police-led Channel 
programme an individual who is at “risk of being drawn into terrorism”, including “non-
violent extremism”, appears to be a much lower standard than requiring the health pro-
fessional to report (under the common law duty and GMC guidance) the individual only 
when failure to disclose confidential information would expose others to a risk of death 
or serious harm. Indeed, Prevent and Channel are expressly designed to intervene at the 
“pre-criminal” stage, not when individuals are about to commit a terrorist or other crime 
that places others at risk of death or serious harm.230 Accordingly, there is a material risk 
that compliance with the Prevent duty will lead to breaches of confidentiality obligations 
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in the health sector. In addition, there is a risk that this aspect of Prevent could potentially 
violate the right to private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.231 See section below on applicable international human rights standards.
Dr. Clare Gerada, a General Practitioner (GP) since 1992 and a former chair of 
the Council of the Royal College of General Practitioners, told the Justice Initiative that 
the Prevent strategy presents a conflict with doctors’ duty of confidentiality towards their 
patients because they have to report certain patients under the strategy. She said she can-
not assure her patients of confidentiality anymore. She added: “I am fearful of this idea 
that we as doctors have a higher standard of duty than the man on the Clapham omnibus. 
I feel that we have been corrupted because we are abusing our position as doctors”.232 
Dr. Gerada added that as a GP she was “very concerned about Prevent”. She 
related an incident in which she was engaged as a GP with Muslim parents who had 
concerns about their children’s schooling. She was interested to ask the father how he 
was coping, but was afraid to ask him questions about himself because she was afraid 
he would mistrust her. She was also afraid that if he said something like “I can’t bear 
the British government”, she would have to report him. She told the Justice Initiative: 
“Prevent completely stopped me in my tracks. It completely changed my relationship 
with my patients. I am an experienced GP unable to ask my patient questions”.233 
A GP from Manchester similarly observed that Prevent risks a “breakdown in 
the doctor-patient relationship” by deterring patients from telling their doctors things 
that are relevant for health care. She added that if her patients could not speak with her 
“openly” because they were “concerned about getting referred” under Prevent, it would 
become “very difficult” for her to treat them properly because she would not have access 
to all relevant information.234 In addition, a London psychologist observed that among 
the Muslim communities she works with, “this focus on radicalisation is causing men-
tal health problems, especially among young people, because their religion and identity 
[is] being pathologised, and this [is] causing depression”.235 
Numerous psychologists also expressed concerns that Prevent could lead to a 
breach of confidentiality and undermine the therapeutic relationship. Clinical psycholo-
gist, A, with the NHS in London told the Justice Initiative: 
One of the most important principles in our work is confidentiality – the absolute 
bedrock of our work is trust. When you first meet a client, you would talk with 
them confidentiality and tell them that there are really limited circumstances 
when you would break it. You would guarantee them privacy except when there 
was a serious risk of harm to them or someone else. That promotes trust.... People 
come to us to talk about the most private things about in their lives – things they 
are ashamed about, scared about. They put their trust in us. Even if we break con-
fidentiality, we tell them we are going to do it unless it would put someone at risk. 
5 0   S T R U C T U R A L  F L AW S  I N  T H E  C U R R E N T  P R E V E N T  S T R AT E G Y
The transparency is really important for building up the therapeutic relationship, 
which is the main vehicle for change in a person’s life. 
She elaborated on the dangers that Prevent posed with respect to the therapeutic 
relationship and confidentiality: 
Where Prevent interferes with [the therapeutic relationship] is that it may lead 
people (clinical psychologists) to not have unconditional positive regard, particu-
larly where it intersects with prejudice that is there already and lack of knowledge 
and understanding. So if a patient starts talking about the political situation for 
fellow Muslims, or Syria, or despair about drone attacks, or how Palestinians are 
treated ... and you’ve been told it’s your duty to detect potential radicals and report 
them, that may influence how you hear that person’s discussion. There is also 
the risk that you will share information about them without consulting with the 
patients first.... And I think that is ethically hugely problematic.236 
Psychologist A said she knew of a number of cases in which other psycholo-
gists had shared confidential information about their patients without informing their 
patients or obtaining their consent. Another psychologist, B, told her about a case some-
where in the Midlands. The case concerned a young man who was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia who had started talking about his religion and was also becoming more 
religious. Psychologist B and her team reported the case to Prevent. As far as psycholo-
gist A knew, the young man presented no threat of violence, and had made no threats 
to anyone, but the police showed up at his doorstep.237 Psychologist A also learned from 
another psychologist, C, that she was working with a person with learning disabilities. 
Psychologist C was worried about her patient and was advised to call Prevent. The 
Prevent officers fed C questions to ask her patient and also asked her to feed back the 
patient’s responses to the officers without disclosing to the patient that this informa-
tion was being relayed. Psychologist C complied with the Prevent officers’ requests.238 
Psychologist A added: 
There is a lot of fear within us as workers with respect to Prevent.... When I have 
tried to raise concerns with my trust, I was told this is just like managing risk. 
I said, no its not, because we do act on violence to others, but this is something 
else – we are being encouraged to police thought crimes and political opinions. 
The Prevent programme tries to make a pretence about not being aimed solely 
at Muslims, so it talks about the far right, but really, the vast majority of people 
reported to it are Muslims.239 
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IV. Applicable International 
 Human Rights Standards
As described above, the current Prevent strategy suffers from certain structural flaws 
that creates the risk of human rights violations in the application of the strategy. This 
section describes in further detail the specific human rights violations that arise from 
these structural flaws. 
The United Kingdom is bound by international human rights law. The Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)240 is incorporated into domestic law by 
the Human Rights Act of 1998. The United Kingdom is also bound by other interna-
tional legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)241, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESR)242 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), article 1 of which 
defines a ‘child’ as a person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country 
set the legal age for adulthood younger.243 
All of the rights listed below are relevant for an assessment of Prevent under 
international human rights law. They apply to children under generally applicable trea-
ties as well as under analogous provisions in the CRC. Importantly, in recognition of the 
special status of children, article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child pro-
vides that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”.244 The U.K. Supreme 
Court has recognised that this is a binding international obligation in international law 
that has been translated into domestic law.245
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A.  Right against Discrimination
The overly broad definition of “extremism” under the Prevent strategy creates a serious 
risk of discrimination, particularly against Muslims. 
Article 14 of the European Convention states that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status”.246 The ICCPR247, ICESCR248 and CRC249 contain similar provisions. 
The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that discrimination means 
treating differently, “based on an identifiable characteristic”, without an objective and 
reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations.250 The Court has 
observed that indirect discrimination “does not necessarily require a discriminatory 
intent”, and occurs where “a difference in treatment ... take[s] the form of dispropor-
tionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in 
neutral terms, discriminates against a group”.251
As noted above, Prevent requires frontline professionals to identify and report 
to Channel individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, including violent and 
non-violent extremism, where “extremism” is defined in overly broad terms “as vocal 
or active opposition to fundamental British values”. Current and former police leads 
for Prevent recognise that currently, Prevent operates in a climate marked by Islamo-
phobia, in a nation that has just voted for Brexit, and where immigration is an issue.252 
Significantly, between July 2015 and July 2016, Islamophobic crime in Britain rose by 
94 percent.253 Particularly in this climate of anti-Muslim sentiment, there is a serious 
risk that the mandatory Prevent statutory duty could lead to the discriminatory identifi-
cation and reporting of Muslims who are in no danger of being drawn to terrorism. The 
police lead for Prevent, Simon Cole QPM, told the Justice Initiative that he does not see 
conscious bias in the referrals under Prevent, but acknowledges there may be uncon-
scious bias, and that there is always room for additional training to conduct unbiased 
risk assessments under Prevent254. Significantly, the case studies described below raise 
serious questions about whether individuals targeted under Prevent would have been 
targeted in this manner had they not been Muslim. 
B.  Right to Freedom of Expression
The overly broad definition of “extremism” under the Prevent strategy creates a serious 
risk of individuals being targeted under Prevent for lawful speech. 
Article 10 of the European Convention provides, in relevant part, that “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of expression”.255 Article 19 of the ICCPR similarly provides 
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that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”.256 Article 13 of the CRC 
establishes the right of children to freedom of expression.257
It is clearly established that freedom of expression is of critical significance for 
democracy and for the full development of a person.258 The European Court of Human 
Rights has recognised that article 10 “is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there 
is no ‘democratic society’. This means, amongst other things, that every ‘formality’, 
‘condition’, ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued”.259 Moreover, the plain language of article 10 protects not only 
the right to freedom of expression but also the right to receive information. 
In determining whether there has been a violation of article 10, the Court first 
examines whether there has been an “interference” with freedom of expression under 
article 10 (1). If the Court finds the measure in question is an interference, it asks 
whether the interference can be justified under article 10(2). If the interference (i) is 
“prescribed by law”, (i.e., state authorities can identify the basis in national law for 
the measure and the law is adequately accessible and foreseeable and formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct); (ii) pursues a 
legitimate aim listed under article 10(2); and (iii) is “necessary in a democratic society” 
(i.e., there is a “pressing social need” for the measure and the measure is proportionate 
to the legitimate aims being pursued),260 it is justified. If the interference does not meet 
all three of the aforementioned criteria, it violates article 10.
The Court has given a wide interpretation to the provisions of article 10(1) and has 
taken the view that in principle most forms and means of expression and speech are 
protected. The Court has also recognised the “chilling effect” of penalties on freedom 
of expression that fosters self-censorship by deterring people from exercising engaging 
in free speech.261 Finally, the European Court has recognised a positive obligation under 
article 10 to protect freedom of expression from threats stemming from private persons.262
 
C.  Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and 
  Religion
Article 9 of the European Convention provides that: “Everyone has the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion”.263 The principles of freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion are also enshrined in article 18 of the ICCPR and article 14 of 
the CRC for children.
The European Court has recognised that freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of 
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the European Convention.264 “It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital 
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but 
it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the 
centuries, depends on it”.265 
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also 
implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] religion” alone and in private or in com-
munity with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares.266 
Furthermore, while article 9 of the Convention protects a person’s private sphere of 
conscience it does not encompass every public conduct generated by that conscience. 
Accordingly, it does not allow general laws to be broken.267
Like freedom of expression, under article 9(2), any interference with the exercise 
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion must be (i) prescribed by law 
(i.e. adequately accessible and foreseeable and formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct); (ii) directed at a legitimate aim listed 
in article 9(2); and (iii) “necessary in a democratic society” (i.e. it must proportionately 
respond to a pressing need).268
The overly broad definition of “extremism” in combination with the anti-Muslim 
sentiment prevailing in the UK and empirically unsupported “indicators” of vulnerabil-
ity to being drawn into terrorism creates a risk of individuals being targeted under Pre-
vent for showing increased religiosity. Two of the case studies below provide examples 
of how this risk may manifest.269
D.  Right to Private and Family Life
Prevent’s requirement that frontline professionals report to Channel individuals at risk 
of being drawn into terrorism (including violent and non-violent “extremism”) creates 
a serious risk of violations of the right to privacy.
Article 8 of the European Convention protects the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence”.270 Article 7 of the ICCPR”271 and 
article 16 of the CRC are similar provisions.272 In addition, the EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/45/EC273, implemented into domestic UK law by the Data Protection Act 
of 1998 (described below), gives substance to the right to privacy.274
The European Court has noted that the concept of “private life” is a “broad term 
not susceptible to exhaustive definition”.275 It covers the “physical and psychological 
integrity” of a person and “can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physi-
cal and social identity”.276 The Court has also recognised that article 8 engages the 
State’s positive obligations to ensure effective respect for the applicant’s private life, in 
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particular his or her right to respect for his reputation.277 However, “for article 8 to come 
into play, the attack on ... personal honour and reputation must attain a certain level 
of gravity and in a manner causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to 
respect for his or her private life”.278
The processing of personal data may constitute an interference with the right to 
respect for private life of the data subject. However, the right to respect for private life is 
a qualified right. Under European Court jurisprudence, an interference does not violate 
this right if it (i) is in accordance with the law (i.e., based on a provision of domestic law 
that is accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects); (ii) pursues 
a legitimate aim enumerated in art. 8(2); and (iii) is necessary in a democratic society 
(i.e. the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, is propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued).279 
In addition, the Court has recognised with respect to article 8(1) that states have 
positive obligations that require them to act so as to allow the effective enjoyment of 
article 8 rights.280 The European Court has emphasised that “the protection of personal 
data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect 
for private and family life, as guaranteed by article 8 of the Convention. The domestic 
law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may 
be inconsistent with the guarantees of this article”.281 
The sharing of personal data – including medical data--by a State agency has been 
found to violate the right to respect for private life. The European Court has recognised 
that:
[T]he protection of personal data, not least medical data, is of fundamental impor-
tance to a person’s enjoyment of the right to respect for his or her private life as 
guaranteed by article 8 of the Convention. Respecting the confidentiality of health 
data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention. It is crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but 
also to preserve confidence in the medical profession and in the health services 
in general”.282
In addition, the European Court has recognised that “information about personal 
religious and philosophical conviction concerns some of the most intimate aspects of 
private life” such that imposing an obligation on parents to disclose detailed informa-
tion to the school authorities about their religious and philosophical convictions may 
constitute a violation of article 8 of the Convention and possibly also of article 9.283
Finally, article 8 protects the right to enjoy family relationships without interfer-
ence from government. Under article 8(2), any interference with family life such as 
taking a child into care or restricting contact between parents and their children, must 
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be in accordance with law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic 
society.284
E.  Right to Education
Prevent’s overly broad definition of “extremism” when applied in the education sector 
risks targeting and/or reporting students for innocent comments made in the context 
of study, thereby implicating the right to education.
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention provides: “No person shall be 
denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in rela-
tion to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure 
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions”.285 
Article 13 of the ICESCR and article 28 of the CRC also recognise the right to 
education. General Comment No. 13 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (the body in charge of monitoring the implementation of 
the ICESCR) states that “education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable 
means of realizing other human rights”.
The European Court has held that article 2 of Protocol 1 does provide a right of 
access to educational institutions.286 While the right may be regulated by the state, “such 
regulation must never injure the substance of the right to education nor conflict with 
other rights enshrined in the Convention”.287 Restrictions are permissible if they are 
“foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim” and if there is a “reason-
able relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be achieved”.288
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has held that it is sometimes neces-
sary, if the parents’ philosophical convictions are to be respected, for pupils to have the 
possibility of being exempted from certain classes.289 
5 7
V. Relevant Domestic Legal 
 Provisions
A number of domestic legal provisions are relevant for assessing the current Prevent 
legal strategy. As noted above, while authorities are obliged to follow clear requirements 
in the Prevent Duty Guidance unless there is good reason to depart from it, the guid-
ance cannot authorise a failure to comply with other statutory duties. Other relevant 
legal obligations on UK health and education described in further detail below include: 
(A) Statutory duties arising under the Human Rights Act 1998; (B) Statutory Duties 
arising under the Equality Act 2010; (C) Statutory duties arising under the Data Protec-
tion Act 1998; (D) Duties of free speech under the Education Acts; and (E) Safeguarding 
duties. In addition, section F describes terrorism-related offences which are relevant for 
assessing the “gap” that Prevent purports to fill. 
A.  Human Rights Act
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 imposes on public authorities the obligation 
to act compatibly with the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This includes articles 2, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention that are described 
in the previous section. Accordingly, while discharging their Prevent duty, public author-
ities remain subject to section 6 of the Human Rights Act and are prohibited from 
violating rights protected under the European Convention. 
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B.  Equality Act
The Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination in the exercise of public functions on 
the basis of specified protected characteristics, including race, religion or belief,290 
as well as discrimination in education291 and work.292 It also prohibits conduct that 
amounts to harassment, namely unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected char-
acteristic that violates a person’s dignity or creates a degrading, humiliating, or offensive 
environment.293
Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 sets out the Public Sector Equality Duty 
(PSED), pursuant to which public authorities (which, by Schedule 19 of the Act, includes 
health bodies and educational establishments) must have due regard to the need to 
eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation; advance equality of opportu-
nity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do 
not share it; and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and those who do not share it.
C.  Data Protection Act
Since referrals under Prevent including to Channel Panels require the sharing of sensi-
tive information, the obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) are relevant. 
The DPA protects the processing or disclosure of personal data and sensitive personal 
data, the latter of which is (by section 2 DPA) data consisting of information as to, 
among other things, a person’s political opinions, religious beliefs or other beliefs of a 
similar nature. Information included in a referral to Prevent/Channel entities is likely 
in practice to frequently include such sensitive personal data.
The processing of personal or sensitive personal data is only lawful pursuant to 
the DPA if certain criteria are met. Schedule 3 of the DPA sets out the conditions for 
processing sensitive personal data. In so far as is relevant to health and education bod-
ies in the context of Prevent, either the data subject must have given explicit consent; 
or processing must be necessary for the purposes of exercising or performing any right 
or obligation conferred or imposed by law in relation to employment; or processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person where con-
sent cannot reasonably be obtained or has been unreasonably withheld; or the personal 
data has been made public by the data subject. 
In respect of processing of personal data which does not amount to sensitive 
personal data, Schedule 2 applies, pursuant to which processing is lawful if it is neces-
sary to comply with a legal obligation on the data controller; is necessary to protect the 
vital interests of the data subject; or is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests 
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pursued by the data controller or by the third party to whom the data is disclosed, except 
where it is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and 
freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.
Section 38(4) of the CTSA sets out that compliance with the Prevent and co-
operation duties does not require or authorise disclosures that would breach the DPA. 
The Channel guidance reiterates that “the duty to co-operate [with Panels] extends as 
far as is compatible with the partner’s legal responsibilities in respect of their functions; 
compliance with the duty does not require or authorise the making of a disclosure that 
would contravene the Data Protection Act 1998 or the disclosure of any sensitive infor-
mation”.294 (“Sensitive” in this context has a different meaning from in the DPA).295 
Whether breaches of the DPA in fact arise will in many cases be a fact-specific 
matter in a particular instance in which personal data is, for example, shared between 
specified authorities and Prevent/Channel entities. Systemic issues may also arise, such 
as where an institution maintains a policy or practice that requires or provides for shar-
ing of personal or sensitive personal information in circumstances that do not meet the 
requirements of Schedules 2 and 3. 
The DPA imposes an absolute prohibition on processing personal data and sensi-
tive personal data when the relevant conditions are not met. Where, therefore, a referral 
would be made to Prevent and/or a Channel panel but none of the conditions that would 
make sharing the data lawful under the DPA are satisfied, the data cannot be shared, 
even if satisfying the Prevent duty would suggest a referral should be made. It is not 
clear, however, that safeguards are in place to ensure that specified authorities know how 
and when disclosures in pursuit of the Prevent duty are permissible under the DPA.296
D.  Free Speech Duty for Education Bodies
Alongside the general safeguarding and statutory duties, educational institutions are 
subject to a number of specific statutory duties. Section 43 of the Education (No 2) Act 
1986 provides in respect of most higher and further education institutions that:
 (1) Every individual and body of persons concerned in the government of any 
establishment to which this section applies shall take such steps as are 
reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is 
secured for members, student and employees of the establishment and for 
visiting speakers.
 (2) The duty imposed by subsection (1) above includes (in particular) the duty 
to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, that the use of any premises of 
the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any 
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ground connected with – (a) the beliefs or views of that individual or any 
member of that body; or (b) the policy or objectives of that body.
There is clear potential for conflict between this duty and aspects of the Prevent 
statutory guidance for higher and further education, such as the guidance on external 
speaker events. This requires consideration of the views likely to be expressed by exter-
nal speakers and, where these constitute “extremist views that risk drawing people into 
terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups”, the event should not be allowed to proceed 
except where the institution is “entirely convinced that such risk can be fully mitigated 
without cancellation of the event”297 
Such an approach is likely to entail denying use of premises on the basis of 
beliefs, views, policies or objectives of an individual or body, which are lawful (albeit 
deemed extremist in accordance with Prevent’s broad definition of extremism). A literal 
application of the approach in the guidance (requiring cancellation unless full mitiga-
tion of any risk however small can be achieved) may also constitute a disproportionate 
interference with free speech contrary to ECHR article 10 so as to be unlawful pursuant 
to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In theory, to the extent that the Prevent statutory guidance conflicts with existing 
statutory duties (such as under section 43), the latter take precedence. This is reinforced 
by the provision in section 31 of the CTSA requiring that, in discharging the Prevent 
duty, further and higher education bodies must “have particular regard to the duty/need 
to ensure freedom of speech” (and also “must have particular regard to the importance 
of academic freedom”). The concern nevertheless remains that prescriptive aspects of 
the statutory guidance, such as on preventing perceived extremist speakers from attend-
ing events, may encourage institutions to act in breach of their binding legal duties 
notwithstanding the clear Parliamentary intention behind section 31 CTSA.
Section 202(2) of the Education Reform Act 1988 places an obligation on uni-
versities to “have regard [in the exercise of their functions] to the need to ensure that 
academic staff have the freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, 
and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing 
themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institu-
tions”. This duty is replicated in the governance documents of many higher education 
institutions. 
As already noted, section 31 of the CTSA makes clear that the Prevent duty is not 
intended to undermine this important duty. As with the CTSA obligations, the section 
202 duty is a duty to have regard rather than to achieve any particular result and theo-
retically it is possible that the obligations can compatibly co-exist. In practice, however, 
conflicts between these duties may arise. Significantly, Parliament’s Joint Committee 
on Human Rights has recently observed that “in the university context, it is arguable 
E R O D I N G  T R U S T   6 1
whether the expression of certain views constitutes putting forward new ideas in the 
form of controversial and unpopular opinions, or whether it amounts to vocal and active 
opposition to the UK’s fundamental values. The potentially conflicting duties on uni-
versities to promote free speech, whilst precluding the expression of extremist views, is 
likely to continue to cause confusion”.298
E.  Safeguarding Duties
Safeguarding obligations with respect to children have long preceded the Prevent duty. 
Section 11 (for England) and section 28 (for Wales) of the Children Act 2004 place 
duties on various public authorities (including certain health organisations) to have 
regard, in the discharge of their functions (including any that are contracted out), to 
the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Furthermore, sections 11 (4) 
and 28(4) provide for statutory guidance to which the prescribed public authorities must 
have regard. Section 22 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 places child safeguarding 
responsibilities on local authorities. 
Educational institutions are not directly bound by section 11 or 28 Children Act 
2004 (though local authorities who have certain responsibilities for maintained schools 
are). The governing bodies of schools and further education institutions are, however, 
bound by section 175 Education Act of 2002 to ensure that their functions are exercised 
“with a view to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children”.299 
Each of these statutory duties must be viewed through the prism of the overarch-
ing safeguarding duty on public authorities to act in the best interests of the child. As 
the Supreme Court explained in ZH (Tanzania) [2011] UKSC 4:
The most relevant national and international obligation of the United Kingdom 
is contained in article 3(1) of the UNCRC: “In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration”. This is a binding obligation in international law, and 
the spirit, if not the precise language, has also been translated into our national law.
As noted above, in contrast to the Prevent duty, for which the primary consider-
ation is preventing terrorism, the primary consideration in the duty to safeguard chil-
dren under domestic legislation is the welfare of the child.300 Compliance with that duty 
would require that when considering whether to make a referral to a Channel panel the 
best interests of the child is a primary consideration – though nowhere in the Channel 
panel guidance does it specify that as a relevant consideration.
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Similarly, rather than prioritising the prevention of terrorism, existing safeguard-
ing obligations with respect to vulnerable adults promote their well-being. Pursuant 
to the Care Act 2014, local authorities have an obligation to promote individuals’ well-
being, which is defined as including their physical and mental health and emotional 
well-being; as well as their social well-being and contribution to society.301 Local authori-
ties are required by section 43 of the Care Act of 2014 to have in place Safeguarding 
Adults Boards with the objective of helping and protecting adults in its areas. The adult 
safeguarding duty applies to adults who have needs for care and support, are experienc-
ing or are at risk of abuse or neglect and, as a result of their needs for care and support, 
are unable to protect themselves against the risk of abuse or neglect.302 
Specific legislation applies to Wales in respect of safeguarding adults. Section 128 
of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 creates a duty on relevant part-
ners (which includes Local Health Boards and NHS Trusts) to report suspected cases of 
adults at risk.303 Section 126 sets out a duty on the local authority to make enquiries into 
whether an adult is at risk, and to determine if any action needs to be taken in response. 
A new Adult Protection and Support Order is introduced304, which supports profession-
als by allowing them to gain access to premises in order to determine whether an adult 
alleged to be at risk is making decisions freely and if any action is required. As with the 
Care Act 2014, the duties relate to adults with care and support needs. 
F.  Terrorism-related Offences
The availability of broadly framed criminal provisions that take a preventive approach 
to the commission of terrorist crimes raises questions about the “gap” left for Prevent 
to fill. To the extent that some may argue that Prevent’s reporting obligations are valu-
able for the purpose of alerting government authorities to the commission of terrorist 
crimes, it is worth noting that UK criminal law already proscribes a broad range of 
conduct as terrorist offences, including the failure to report information that may pre-
vent terrorist acts.305 Thus, pursuant to section 38B of the Terrorism Act of 2000, it is 
a criminal offence for an individual to fail to disclose to the police information that the 
individual knows or believes might be of material assistance in preventing the commis-
sion of an act of terrorism or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction 
of another person, in the United Kingdom, for an offence involving the commission, 
preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.306 
To the extent that Prevent is regarded as a necessary means to prevent individuals 
from traveling to join ISIS in Syria, it is worth noting that travel to engage in terrorist 
acts or training in Syria or Iraq may be prosecuted under Sections 5 and 6 respectively of 
the Terrorism Act of 2006.307 Moreover, since travelling to Syria for this purpose tends 
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to amount to preparation for terrorist acts, failing to report individuals who are plan-
ning to travel to Syria or Iraq to fight or train with ISIS may well amount to a criminal 
offence under the Section 38B of the Terrorism Act of 2000.
In addition, UK criminal law, through its proscription of inchoate offences308, 
authorises law enforcement to intervene well before the actual commission of a terrorist 
act. Traditional inchoate offenses include: conspiracy to engage in terrorist acts (under 
section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, which criminalises the agreement to commit 
a crime regardless of whether further steps taken to execute the agreement); attempts 
to commit terrorist acts (under section 1 of Criminal Attempts Act of 1981, which pro-
scribes an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence); 
and incitement to terrorism overseas (under section 59 of the Terrorism Act of 2000).
The criminalisation of inchoate offences has been criticised on the grounds that 
their boundaries are “vague and uncertain” and because they privilege mens rea (crimi-
nal intent) over the actus reus (criminal act) which can be very far removed from the 
actual commission of a terrorist act, thereby creating the potential for human rights 
violations.309 The Prevent strategy, particularly by authorising interventions for individu-
als at risk of being drawn into non-violent extremism, takes the preventive approach 
of inchoate offences much further by targeting individuals who may be nowhere near 
formulating even an intent to commit a terrorist act. 
There has been an increasing tendency to create terrorist offences for conduct that 
is further and further away from the commission of substantive acts of terrorism. These 
offences include, inter alia, membership of a proscribed organisation (section 11 of the 
Terrorism Act of 2000); encouragement of terrorism (under section 1 of the Terrorism 
Act of 2006, including glorification of the commission or preparation of terrorist acts); 
dissemination of terrorist publications (under section 2 of the Terrorism Act of 2006); 
preparation of terrorist acts (under section 5 of Terrorism Act of 2006, which includes 
any conduct in preparation of a terrorist act); providing or receiving training for ter-
rorism (under section 6 of the Terrorism Act of 2006); and possession of articles for 
terrorist purposes (under section 57 of the Terrorism Act of 2000).
The foregoing analysis assesses the Prevent strategy in light of international and 
domestic law provisions. The subsequent section presents case studies that suggest that 
many of these provisions might have been breached under Prevent.
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VI. Case Studies
In his oral testimony before the Joint Committee on Human Rights, David Ander-
son, the UK’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, observed that “there is 
a real potential [in Prevent] for inhibiting people’s human rights”.310 The case studies 
documented below illustrate how Prevent risks violating a number of rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, including the right to freedom of expression, 
the right against discrimination, the right to manifest one’s religion, the right to private 
and family life, and the right to education. Many of the case studies involve children, 
whose treatment under Prevent raises serious questions as to whether the best interests 
of the child was a primary consideration, as required by article 3(1) of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Many of the case studies also suggest that there have been 
breaches of the Equality Act and the Data Protection Act. Taken together, the following 
case studies make clear how Prevent may lead to possible human rights violations.
A.  Schools
CASE STUDY 1 
Collecting information from Muslim children for the Home Office311 
Some applications of Prevent raise serious questions about possible infringements of the 
right to privacy. In one example, four teachers were running a three-day art workshop in a 
primary state-funded school in a suburb in the Midlands that is predominantly Muslim. The 
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teachers were told that the project was about creating links between Islamic art and British 
culture and that the funding was to be provided by Organisation A. 
The workshops took place in Spring 2016. There were about 25 children, ages nine and 
ten, in the class, all from that predominantly Muslim area. On the first day of the workshop, 
just as it was about to begin, a woman from Organisation A entered the classroom. She 
introduced herself as a representative of Organisation A, and said she was there to observe. 
Then, without prior warning or explanation, she gave questionnaires to all the children in the 
classroom and asked them to fill in their answers. The teachers were unaware that this would 
happen and had not previously seen the questionnaires. The questionnaire, a copy of which 
is included in Appendix A of this report, had a list of 9 multiple choice questions, some of 
which had subparts.
The questions asked the young students whether they agreed or disagreed with 
statements such as: “The UK is a good place to live for me and my family”; “I personally feel 
part of society”; “I would do what a grown up told me to do, even if it seemed odd to me”; “I 
think most people respect my race or religion”; “People should be free to say what they like, 
even if it offends others”; “People from a different race, religion or community are just as 
good as people like me”; “It would bother me if a family of a different race or religion moved 
next door”; “Women are just as good as men at work”. 
The questionnaire also asked whether the students thought people from different 
ethnic and religious groups should mix. It asked what the students intended to do after they 
finished school, and what kind of job they would want. It asked them how much they trusted 
people of their race of religion, people of another race or religion, school teachers, police 
officers, journalists, and the UK government.
The questionnaire stated: “These questions are not designed to test you but are to help 
us understand the effectiveness of this workshop so that we can improve the workshop”. But, 
on their face, the questions had nothing to do with what was being taught in the workshop, 
which was art; the only question actually related to the workshop asked “How interesting did 
you find this workshop”?
The questionnaire also stated: “Your responses will remain anonymous and 
confidential”. Yet the woman from Organisation A asked the children to write their names 
on the questionnaires. 
The next day, a manager from Organisation A came to the art class with another set 
of the same questionnaires, to be filled out by the children on the last day of the workshop. 
One of the teachers asked her if the questionnaires were part of the Prevent agenda. The 
manager said they were. She said that the questionnaires were from the Home Office, and the 
responses would go back to the Home Office for a report. She added that the questionnaire 
measured responses before and after the workshop. 
One of the teachers asked if the parents knew that their children were being asked to 
fill out these questionnaires. The manager said that the school was aware, and that it was 
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up to the school to inform the parents of the questionnaire. The teacher inferred from the 
manager’s answer that the parents had not been informed about the questionnaire, and did 
not distribute the second set of questionnaires. 
This case study raises serious questions about violations of the children’s rights under 
article 8 of the European Convention and under the Data Protection Act. The collection of 
the names and political opinions of the children, without properly explaining what it was 
for – and apparently without first obtaining their parents’ informed consent – constitute an 
interference with the children’s right to privacy. This interference did not appear to serve a 
“legitimate aim”, nor was it “necessary in a democratic society”, nor was it proportionate to 
any aims pursued.
The information collected from the children for the Home Office was sensitive personal 
data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act. Neither the children nor the parents 
appear to have given explicit consent for the collection of this data. It does not appear that 
collecting this information was necessary for the purposes of exercising any right or obligation 
conferred or imposed by law in relation to employment. Nor was data made public by the 
subjects from whom the data was collected. Accordingly, this case raises serious questions 
about the violation of the children’s rights under the Data Protection Act. 
Finally, the collection of this sensitive personal information without informed consent 
does not appear to comport with article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
requires a primary consideration of the best interests of the child in all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions. This underscores 
the serious concerns regarding the proportionality of the interference with article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. These nine and ten year-olds came to the workshop 
thinking they would learn about art, but instead appear to have had their names and personal 
opinions extracted for the Home Office.
CASE STUDY 2 
School dinner lady targeted under Prevent312
Prevent has apparently been used as a pretext for discriminating against Muslims who 
have nothing to do with terrorism. When a school in Lancashire began cooking halal meals 
for Muslim children, who were a small minority of the student body, the cook was not happy 
because it involved cooking different sets of meals and keeping a separate sets of utensils.  
A dinner lady who worked in school’s kitchen and was Muslim pointed out that the 
kitchen staff were not ensuring that the halal utensils were kept separate from the other 
utensils.  In another instance, she noted to the head of the kitchen staff that a five year-old 
Muslim child was given a meal that wasn’t halal.  The head of the kitchen staff told her to 
forget it. 
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Apparently in retaliation for her complaints, the kitchen staff claimed that the dinner 
lady said she supported ISIS.  The head of the kitchen staff reported this allegation to the 
school’s head teacher. Immediately, the head teacher reported this to the local authority under 
Prevent, suspended the dinner lady from her job, and informed the police.  The police said 
this was not of interest to them and did not pursue it. But news about the dinner lady’s 
suspension and the false allegation that she claimed to support ISIS spread through the 
school. The school did not make efforts to guard against this information becoming public.
A disciplinary hearing was set up by the school and the local authority.   Four of 
the kitchen staff submitted signed statements averring that the dinner lady said she supported 
ISIS.  The school’s head teacher argued that she should be dismissed, but the disciplinary 
panel instead gave her a final warning.  She appealed this decision, resulting in an appeal 
hearing.  
Mr. G., a governor of the school who sat on the appeal panel, provided information 
about the case to the Justice Initiative. According to Mr. G, the suspension was not done 
under “normal disciplinary” procedure,  because Prevent had been invoked.  Furthermore, 
according to Mr. G. the head teacher was not in favour of the school’s providing halal meals.    
Mr. G. heard the appeal in March 2016 along with two other governors. Mr. G. told the 
Justice Initiative that “the governors were informed that the head teacher informed the police 
[about the dinner lady] as per the Prevent Duty Guidance”. It was clear to Mr. G. that two 
of the written statements provided by kitchen staff were unreliable: One of the staff denied 
saying what was in her written statement, while another gave an account that differed from 
her written statement.  
Mr. G. told the Justice Initiative that the appeals panel “was concerned that [the dinner 
lady] had been set up to be sacked from her job”.  Mr. G. said: “The reality was that the 
school had used Prevent as a means of getting rid of her with immediate effect and [tried to] 
effectively bypass any formal disciplinary process”. He added: “The case was a travesty.   This 
could be my daughter and someone could make up something about what she said, and she 
would be out the door, sacked from her job, without even being able to explain her version 
of events. Is that right?  This is why you have to dismiss the case”. Mr. G. told the Justice 
Initiative that this type of scenario “typifies Prevent”.
The appeal panel settled on reinstating the dinner lady but also issuing her a 
“first warning”.  Mr. G. said: “This was an example of Prevent being so discriminatory in 
its application that it may mean that Muslims cannot get a fair hearing in the workplace any 
more.  It is so frightening because, suppose someone doesn’t like me, I have a beard, I am 
a practicing Muslim, it’s the perfect ammunition to say something like what was said about 
the dinner lady, a perfect method by which to contrive someone being dismissed from the 
workplace.  And it absolutely bypasses any due process because it is counterterrorism”.
Mr. G. told the Justice Initiative that although five months had passed since the appeal 
panel had heard the dinner lady’s case, she still had not come back to work.  He said: “She is 
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absolutely broken.  It has affected her health.  It has had a severe psychological effect on her. 
The fact that she went through this disciplinary procedure will affect her job prospects.  If she 
applies for another job, she will have to explain.  She will have to clear her name.  Because she 
never said what she said.  The reality is that this is a tragic case, an unjust case”. 
This case presents an example of how Prevent may have a discriminatory effect on 
innocent individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism. Prevent gives enormous power 
and discretion to individuals who may act on the basis of their conscious or unconscious 
biases, or even to get rid of a co-worker they don’t like. 
This case raises questions about potential violations of article 14 in combination with 
article 8 of the European Convention as well as the Equality Act (likely direct discrimination 
which cannot in law be justified). The school’s failure to guard against disclosure of the dinner 
lady’s suspension and her alleged support of ISIS damaged her reputation and caused her 
considerable stress, to the point that she did not return to work. Had she not been Muslim, 
she would likely not have been treated in this way.
CASE STUDY 3 
Nine year-old targeted for making a joke313 
It appears that Prevent has been and can be applied to children in a manner that does not 
give primary consideration to their best interests – a standard required under domestic and 
international law. In addition to apparently violating the best-interest-of-the-child standard, 
Prevent has sown concern among parents of children referred to the programme that records 
created under Prevent will follow their children and taint their future. In this particular case, 
a parent who used to work with Prevent decided to stop working with it because of how it 
treated his nine year-old son.
On 28 January 2016, Mr. M.’s son was laughing and joking at his voluntary aided 
primary school with a small group of boys – including Child A – about the school prom. They 
were fantasising about a fancy limousine, filled with chocolates, which would take them to 
the prom. One of the other children in the group told Mr. M.’s son that he couldn’t attend 
the prom because of his religion, and therefore would not experience the imagined limousine 
and chocolates. Mr. M.’s son joked that, “to get to the chocolate [he] would use bombs and 
guns”. The boys in the group all laughed about this. 
Later, Child A told Child B, a schoolmate who was not part of the original conversation, 
that Mr. M.’s son said that he was “going to use bombs and kill them at the prom and that it 
comes from Islam”. Child B got scared and reported this to the teaching assistant. The same 
day, Mr. M.’s son was called into the school office for questioning. 
In the office, the headmistress and co-head teacher of the school questioned Mr. M.’s 
son. They asked him if he possessed weapons, and “where he would get weapons from if 
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he wanted to”. Mr. M.’s son tried to respond but felt “threatened” and panicked under the 
intensity of their questioning. He started to cry.
At the end of that day, when Mrs. M. went to pick up her son, she was asked to meet 
with the headmistress. During this meeting, the headmistress told her that her son had 
made some inappropriate comments about the school prom, that he said he couldn’t go 
to the prom because of his religion, and that he was going to bomb everyone and kill them 
because of Islam.
Mrs. M. responded: “I am shocked. I can’t believe he said that”. The headmistress 
and co-head teacher said that Mrs. M.’s son had confirmed to the teaching assistant what he 
had said. They also said that he repeated the same thing to them except for mentioning the 
religion – he referred to “his country”. They said that her son had said he could get weapons 
from Yemen. Mrs. M. confirmed that guns were part of the culture of Yemen but that her son 
had never been to Yemen, let alone been exposed to the gun culture there. She said that his 
young cousins had been to Yemen a few years ago, and it was possible they had talked to her 
son about guns in Yemen. The co-head teacher asked Mrs. M. if anyone else could have put 
these thoughts in his mind. Mrs. M. said there not – her son only attended a mosque and 
Arabic school. She said that she and her husband had helped to set up the school and mosque 
and so knew about all the safeguarding precautions that were in place at these facilities. As 
far as unsuitable influences on her son were concerned, Mrs M. could only think of video 
games, which she would now forbid him from playing.
The co-head teacher stated that because Mrs. M.’s son had said that “this is from 
Islam” and had used the words “bombing and killing”, the school had to seek further advice 
from Safeguarding and Prevent. She did acknowledge, however, that this seemed to be a case 
of an “inappropriate joke”. It was agreed that Mrs. M. would talk with her son and relay back 
to the school any further information that might be helpful.
When Mr. and Mrs. M. spoke to their son, he told them what had actually happened 
in school: that he was joking.
The next day, Mrs. M. again met with the headmistress, to relay her son’s side of the 
story. Mrs. M. noted that neither the headmistress nor the co-head teacher nor the teaching 
assistant had actually overheard the banter among the boys. Mrs. M. said that the content of 
the actual conversation had been distorted by third parties. 
Mrs. M. told the headmistress, the co-head teacher, and the teaching assistant that 
the alleged conversation was now completely different from the account given to her the 
day before. Moreover, she noted that there was no adult present during the original banter, 
that her son’s actual words had been distorted, with things being added on and inferred. 
In addition, she said that what her son allegedly recounted to the teaching assistant was 
unreliable, as he was extremely distressed and words were put into his mouth.
Mrs. M. asked the headmistress if the school was acting in this manner because her son 
was a Muslim and because he mentioned the words “bombs” and “guns”. The headmistress 
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responded in the affirmative: it was because of Prevent that they reacted as they had. The 
headmistress and co-head teacher tried to reassure Mrs. M. that they did not think any further 
action needed to be taken, as they now accepted that it was “an inappropriate joke”. They said 
that they did not need to refer the case to Prevent. Mrs. M. was relieved.
However, Mrs. M. learned subsequently that in fact the school had already taken 
the case further: they had contacted the Safeguarding lead (for the school cluster, based at 
another school) and the Metropolitan Borough Council Prevent Coordinator. Although the 
schools’ email concluded that “we do not feel any further action is needed and would like your 
confirmation of this”, Mr. and Mrs. M. were concerned that their son’s school records had 
been tarnished with allegations that would follow him throughout his school years.
This incident caused great distress to the entire family. Within hours of the incident, 
Mr. M. was admitted to hospital with Angina brought on by stress. Mrs. M. couldn’t sleep 
for days and suffered psychological trauma which required medical attention and medication. 
Today, Mr. and Mrs. M.’s son is scared to speak up in school, worried that anything 
he says may be misconstrued. Mr. M.’s three older sons are upset about how their younger 
brother was treated and have asked their parents to no longer work with Prevent. Mr. M. 
concludes: “Though our family are well equipped to challenge and to take our concerns 
further, it has left us exhausted, scarred, and for a short while questioning our belonging and 
acceptance in society as British Muslims”.
According to Mr. M., the school may have reacted as it did in order to avoid an 
“inadequate rating” for not implementing its Prevent duty. He said: 
Since Prevent became a statutory duty, 100% things have gotten worse.... You’ve got a 
policy that comes from the government, but there is limited and inadequate training.... 
Teachers think to themselves, ‘If I don’t report and something happens, I could get into 
trouble.’ The danger is that if you have a racist view, then [Prevent] is a weapon.
Mr. M. believes that if his son was not Muslim and said the same words, he would not 
have been treated in this manner. He observed: “Prevent has created the perception that all 
Muslims are terrorists until proven innocent. It has become a witch hunt and a majority of 
the Muslim community is against it”. He also noted that, as someone who has worked with 
Prevent for many years, he did not see Prevent being applied with the same rigour to the far 
right. He added: “The hijab is being viewed as a sign of extremism. On the other side, there 
is freedom of speech for British people – they can say anything”. 
He concluded: “There is no help for families affected by Prevent, no accountability. 
Me and my wife are going through hell. But when they need the Muslim community, they 
expect you to drop everything and come running”. Mr. M. said he is determined “not to allow 
another family to go through a similar experience”. 
The treatment of Mr. M’s son arguably does not comport with the legal requirement 
that in all actions concerning children, a primary consideration must be the best interests of 
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the child. That the child appears to have been treated in this manner because he was Muslim 
raises questions about possible violations of article 14 of the European Convention combined 
with the right to education enshrined in article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention and with 
article 8 of the Convention. It also raises questions about possible violations of the Equality 
Act (including through direct discrimination). 
More generally, this case shows how Prevent’s statutory duty may create incentives for 
frontline professionals to err on the side of reporting incidents to Prevent rather than dealing 
with them in common sense ways that prioritise the best interests of the child. It also shows 
how Prevent may risk alienating people. This experience caused Mr. M., who used to work 
with Prevent, to discontinue his association with the programme. Many people like Mr. M. 
may be sympathetic to Prevent’s aims, but turned off by its flawed structure and application.
CASE STUDY 4 
From “cucumber” to “cooker bomb”314
This case raises serious questions about whether Prevent is leading education professionals 
to overreact and err on the side of referring students to Prevent. Such referrals are far from 
cost-free: this case illustrates how adverse experiences under Prevent can be traumatic for the 
child and his family, and can cause some British citizens to question their sense of belonging 
in society. No parent should have to warn their four year-old child not to draw pictures, just 
to avoid the risk being referred to a police-led intervention.
Ayesha is a 32 year-old mother in Luton. On 26 January 2016, as she dropped her 
son off to nursery school, she was confronted by the nursery manager and deputy manager. 
Ayesha recalled: “They took me to a side room. They had this file ready. They had pictures and 
a form and stuff. They had drawings my son had done. I recognised one drawing of his dad 
cutting a cucumber”. A copy of that drawing is included in this report; please see Appendix 
B. The nursery manager told Ayesha: “Your son is drawing inappropriate pictures”. Pointing 
to the drawing of his father holding a knife to cut a cucumber, the nursery manager said that 
Ayesha’s son had told them it was a “cooker bomb”. 
Ayesha was shocked. She said: “He has never said that at home. I don’t know why he is 
saying that”. The manager said, “Well, he has talked about blowing things up”. Then she told 
Ayesha: “You need to sign this form”. Ayesha asked what the form was about. The manager 
responded: “They will help you”. 
Ayesha asked the manager if they could discuss and resolve the matter themselves, 
since there had clearly been a misunderstanding. But the manager said: “Oh, but you’ve 
already been referred”. Ayesha asked who she had been referred to and the manager said 
“Channel”. The manager told Ayesha that she would be contacted by the authorities. Ayesha 
did not know what Channel was. She asked: “Why didn’t you speak to me about it”? 
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The manager told her: “Well, we are just telling you – you need to sign this and you 
need to go on your way. They will help you bring up your kids in the right way”. The manager 
added: “You can prove yourself innocent. They might not take your kids off you”. 
The manager gave Ayesha an Early Help Assessment form dated 26 January 2016 that 
checked the “yes” box next to the question “Is this a referral for CHANNEL panel”. The space 
in the form for the parent’s signature was blank. The manager explained to Ayesha that the 
information on the form would go to the early help assessment team and to Channel. Ayesha 
shared a copy of this unsigned form with the Justice Initiative. Another section of the form asks 
“What has led to this unborn baby, child or young person being assessed?” The nursery filled 
in, inter alia, “[Child] drew a man holding a knife and went on to talk about ‘cooker bombs’”.
Ayesha was in a panic. She went home and spoke with her husband. He said that the 
nursery had “obviously got it wrong”, because the word his son was using was “cucumber”, 
not cooker bomb. Ayesha called the nursery manager immediately and told her she had 
misheard her son, who was actually saying “cucumber”. But the manager responded: “But 
you’ve already been referred”. Ayesha was deeply troubled. She recalled: “I was so worried. … 
I know I am not doing anything wrong at home. I feel I am as British as anyone else. We are 
against terrorism as much as the next person. Why would anybody think that of me? ... If he 
wasn’t Muslim, I don’t think this would have happened”.
Ayesha said this incident affected her whole family. She considered another nursery 
school but worried about disrupting her son’s routine. Yet, she keeps wondering, “what are 
they asking him, what are they going to come up with next”?
About a week after the incident, Ayesha wrote a detailed letter to the nursery expressing 
concerns and asking questions about the incident. In a letter dated 10 February 2016, the 
nursery manager wrote back. The letter, which Ayesha shared with the Justice Initiative, stated: 
“To confirm our position we did not make a referral but sought advice from other agencies as to 
whether a referral would be appropriate based on information we had. This is in accordance with 
Local Safeguarding Children’s Board policies and procedures which are obliged to follow, as 
well as compliance with Ofsted guidance on adherence to the Prevent duty within safeguarding 
requirements”. The letter concluded that after the nursery’s conversation with Ayesha, they 
“sought further advice and it was agreed that no further action is required”.315 This contradicted 
the manager’s previous statements that the child had been referred to Channel. 
 Ayesha said: “It’s hard. I’ve never felt not British. And this made me feel very, very, like 
they tried to make me feel like an outsider. We live here. I am born and bred here, not from 
anywhere else”. She added: “I feel this Prevent duty is picking on you because you are Muslim, 
Asian, Pakistani, or whatever. I don’t feel it’s working at all. They are obviously picking on the 
wrong people, it’s ridiculous. They need to look at it and change it”.
She also questioned whether a teacher should be tasked with identifying children for 
Prevent: “Our school teachers, are they best qualified for this kind of job, whether they have 
their own prejudices, or they might not like someone?”. 
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The morning after the incident, Ayesha told her son “no more pictures now”. After that, 
d he came home from school one day and told her: “I drew a really nice picture of a house but 
didn’t bring it for you because you don’t like my pictures”. Ayesha told the Justice Initiative: 
“He is four. The reality is he was referred because he doesn’t speak properly yet.... The more 
we accept it the more it’s going to happen, they more we will be seen as the guilty ones who 
have to suck it up. That’s making a worse world for our children”.
A news report cites a spokesperson for the nursery saying that “no referral to Channel 
was made”, adding: “Under statutory guidance, as reflected by our own safeguarding policies, 
early years providers are required to record – and if necessary, report – any incidents that they 
feel may warrant further attention or discussion ... in this instance, after seeking advice from 
the appropriate agencies, we concluded that no referral was necessary”.316 Another press report 
stated:  “Luton Borough Council advised against the referral, adding: ‘The council does not 
wish to comment in detail on this particular case in order to protect the identity of the child’”.317
This case suggests that Prevent’s statutory duty may create an incentive for education 
professionals to over-refer incidents to Prevent or Channel. The nursery school’s conduct in 
this case is unlikely to have amounted to giving primary consideration to the best interests 
of the child. Because it appears that the child was targeted because he was Muslim, this 
case raises serious questions about the violation of his rights under article 14 in conjunction 
with the right to family life under article 8 and with the right to education under article 2 of 
Protocol 1 to the Convention. It also raises questions about possible violations of the Equality 
Act (through direct discrimination).
The case also demonstrates a fundamental disconnect between how those in power 
applying the statutory duty – in this case, the nursery manager – perceive themselves and 
how they are perceived by the individuals they think they are trying to help. Ayesha noted that 
the nursery manager said she was trying to help. But Ayesha experienced her as coercive, 
discriminatory, and wholly uncaring about branding a four year-old child as a terrorist. 
CASE STUDY 5 
Twelve year-old targeted for playing a terrorist in drama class318 
This case raises serious questions about how Prevent may short-circuit the need to give 
primary consideration to the best interests of the child. It provides a window into how Prevent 
may stigmatise and instil fear into those who fall under suspicion. It also illustrates the acute 
worry a parent can experience at the possibility of his child being referred under Prevent. 
Raza is a 12 year-old boy who attends a publicly funded school in Manchester. The 
school’s student body is predominantly Muslim. One day, during a drama lesson, Raza and his 
fellow students were asked to improvise a situation that was very “tense” and “melodramatic”. 
Raza chose to play a terrorist, with another student playing a journalist whom Raza held at 
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gun point. The scene was set in Africa. The two children played their parts, ending the scene 
with the journalist overpowering the terrorist and breaking free. 
Later, on the evening of 16 December 2015, Raza’s father Javed got a call from the 
school’s safeguarding officer, Mrs. H, asking Javed to come in for a meeting. The next day, 
Javed and Raza met with Mrs. H. and Mrs. W. – both deputy head teachers and safeguarding 
officers in his son’s school. Javed was worried. Raza had sensory processing difficulties, had 
been tested for Asperger’s Syndrome, and struggled with Nystagmus, an eye condition that 
causes his eyes to shake rapidly from side to side, especially when he is nervous. Compounding 
these problems was bullying he had suffered at school. Javed feared that these conditions, 
combined with his son’s deep religious convictions, set Raza apart.
Mrs. H. and Mrs. W. outlined a number of incidents involving Raza that they were 
concerned about. The weightiest incident for the two teachers involved Raza’s conduct in the 
drama lesson. Mrs. H. and Mrs. W. described the situation as if it was real, emphasising that 
the hostage actor was “afraid” and “shaking” and that it was inappropriate for Raza to have 
play acted in this way. 
Another incident recounted by the teachers related to Raza’s behaviour on a school trip 
to France, a few months after the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris. It was in May 
2015. According to the teachers, while on the French trip, Raza asked a lot of questions about 
Charlie Hebdo, and where their offices were. The teachers thought that this implied that he 
was interested in terrorism. The teachers added that when Raza was at the airport on the way 
to France, he had inquired how the scanners worked, and asked what kind of things might 
be able to go through them. The teachers also said that Raza had “an unhealthy interest in 
Syria”. Finally, the teachers asked Javed, “Do you see why we are putting this together”? Javed 
responded: “I can see why it looks this way, but this child has issues, he is going to trip up 
trying to explain things to you”.
Confronted this way, Javed also felt compelled to condemn his son’s behaviour. He 
told the Justice Initiative: “I told him off a bit in front of the teachers”. Javed told the teachers: 
“Raza is not a threat, he is just a little boy, he is struggling. He is just a child trying to work 
out the world around him. He is against terrorism. He is very soft-hearted”. 
The meeting also included a discussion of religion. The teachers asked Javed where Raza 
studied Islam, and whether he knew what his son was taught. Javed said that after school, his 
son went to the madrasa where he was memorising the Qur’an. But, Javed added, “that’s not 
ideology. It’s just a recitation”. Javed explained that Raza had always been strongly interested in 
religion and spirituality from a very young age. “He is very clear that terrorism is unacceptable 
within Islam”, Javed told the teachers. Mrs. H. offered for Raza to speak to the school counsellor. 
Javed accepted without hesitation and asked the teachers if they could refer his son to Child and 
Adult Mental Health Services (CAMHS). Mrs. H. said she would try and get this done. 
Mrs. W. told Javed that their intention had been to refer Raza to Channel, but that this 
was no longer necessary.
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Javed thought he had done the right thing in not challenging the teachers, even though 
it had required him to criticise his own son in front of them. Javed told the Justice Initiative: “I 
felt horrible after this meeting. I kept thinking to myself: What is Prevent? What does happen 
to a child once he is referred? What is really going on in the background? Are they being 
honest when they say they will not refer him?” Javed told the Justice Initiative that he believed 
his son had been identified for potential referral under Channel because he was a Muslim. 
Since that meeting, Raza sometimes comes home from school with his eyes shaking, due 
to stress. He tries to avoid speaking in class, saying “I am worried they think I am a terrorist”. 
The teachers’ response under Prevent to Raza’s behaviour may not have complied with 
the requirement to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. According 
to Raza, the school’s treatment made him feel “paranoid”, afraid of speaking and participating 
in class, worried about being labelled a terrorist. As such, this case raises concerns about the 
possible violation of Raza’s right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the Convention. 
Because it is unlikely that Raza would have been treated like this had he not been Muslim, the 
case also raises concerns of violations of his rights under article 14 combined with his right 
to education, as well as under the Equality Act (through direct discrimination). 
CASE STUDY 6 
Parent targeted for political and religious views319 
The Prevent strategy defines extremism to include “vocal or active opposition to fundamental 
British values”.320 This case raises questions about how the term “British values” is understood 
and how the lack of definitional clarity can lead to innocent people being swept up in Prevent. 
In November 2015, Saif’s oldest child was five years-old. Saif lives in the West Midlands, 
where he works with young people for the local authority. Saif went to his child’s school to 
meet with the parent liaison officer, to enquire about the children’s activities in school. It 
is a primary school that is publicly funded and local authority-maintained. It has a diverse 
student body, but there are a few other Muslims in the school. Saif was wearing his work 
uniform when he went to the school, from which the school could have deduced his place 
of employment. 
In talking with the parent liaison officer, Saif discovered that the school was going to 
take the children to a church service, where they apparently would participate in worship. Saif 
had concerns about that. He recalled: “I am a Muslim. I don’t mind my child visiting a church 
– in fact, as a Muslim, I have a duty to give space to others and to respect non-Muslims for 
their choice of religious beliefs”. But he was upset that the school had not told him that his 
child was apparently going to be taken to worship at a church. 
So he asked the parent liaison officer if he could accompany his child to the church, 
and was told he could. Saif asked specifically what was going to happen in the church. The 
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officer said that the children were going to sit in front and sing hymns, while the parents sat 
in the back. Saif told the Justice Initiative: “I said no to this. That is worship”. He told the 
liaison officer that if he could not sit next to his child, his child would not attend the church 
service. According to Saif, the parent liaison officer “didn’t take [this] very kindly”. She said: 
“We have had these directives from the government to try and promote British values”. Saif 
asked the liaison officer to define “British values”, but said that she “couldn’t give me a clear 
answer, because no one can”. 
The liaison officer was wearing a remembrance poppy. Saif does not remember how 
the conversation about the poppy began. At some point, however, he said to her that he 
respected her choice to wear the poppy, but he was not going to wear it. Looking back, he 
believes that it was “precisely because of this” that the liaison officer “got upset ... and they 
put a complaint to my management at work”.
About a week later, in early December 2015, Saif arranged a second meeting with the 
deputy head teacher of his child’s school, seeking an alternative to his son’s apparent worship 
in a Christian church. He asked whether an alternative outing might be organised, or at least 
whether the school would authorise absences if he decided to take his child out of school 
that day. The deputy head teacher did not agree and, Saif said, “that was that”. In the end, 
Saif and his family ended up going abroad that month, so his child did not have to go on the 
church outing.
In December 2015, when Saif returned to work after his family trip, his line manager 
called him into another senior line manager’s office.. Saif said: “basically I was told that 
somebody had complained”. The two line managers mentioned the issue of the poppy. 
According to Saif: “They tried to probe me to see if I had extremist views. This was, very softly 
and subtly, an interrogation”. Saif asked where the line managers had heard these allegations 
about him. They said they had heard them from the school that his child attended, but they 
would not disclose the name of the individual who had complained. 
He told the Justice Initiative: “I know for a fact that were I not such an integral part to 
the service we provide, my position could have been jeopardised. I could have been sacked 
or disciplined. It is only my hard work, honesty, and integrity that saved me. And the meeting 
was concluded with that”. Saif added: “But to me all of this was very upsetting. [It was] deeply 
offensive and insulting.... What was upsetting was the way my management dealt with the 
situation, the way I was called in without prior notice”. He feels he was treated in this manner 
because of Prevent.
The school official’s refusal – on grounds of the school’s obligation to promote “British 
values” – to exempt Saif’s child from a school trip that apparently involved worship at a 
church raises concerns about the violation of Saif’s rights under article 2 of Protocol 1 to the 
European Convention.321 In addition, if the school shared information about its exchange with 
Saif with his employer, the school might have violated his right to privacy under article 8 and 
also his right to freedom of religion under article 9 of the Convention. Finally, it also appears 
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that Saif may have been treated in the manner because he is a Muslim, raising concerns about 
a violation of article 14 in combination with article 8 of the European Convention as well as 
of the Equality Act (through direct discrimination).
CASE STUDY 7 
Fifteen year-old targeted for drawings of guns and a map322 
It appears that Prevent may undermine education. This case illustrates how Prevent training 
can lead to a spike in teachers making referrals for innocent conduct. It also shows how 
Prevent can shut down debate in schools and alienate students with its talk of “British values”, 
while eroding trust between teachers and students. This case also provides an example of 
education professionals’ fear of being subjected to retaliation for criticising Prevent. 
Martin is a teacher in an inner city all-boys school in the West Midlands. The school is 
publicly funded and maintained by the local authority. Martin teaches boys between the ages 
of 11 and 16. About 90 percent of the students are Muslim. 
Martin told the Justice Initiative that he had his first Prevent training, delivered by a 
police officer, in about February 2015. Martin said: “The police officer scared everyone about 
the possibility of a terrorist attack. He opened by saying ‘our school fields would be used as 
makeshift mortuaries and fridges would be erected to put cadavers in’”. The officer said that 
Prevent is not about Islamic extremism alone, but most of the video he showed was about 
Islamic extremism. The first page of the PowerPoint used by the police officer showed a 
plane hitting the World Trade Center on 9/11. The teachers were given a list of indicators of 
“radicalisation” to watch out for, including if the child has a different group of friends, has 
strongly held political beliefs, changes the way he dresses, or earns lower grades. 
Martin told the Justice Initiative that after that training, there was a marked change in 
the teachers’ attitudes. They were far more willing to report students, including for things like 
talking and laughing about 9/11. He explained: “Better to be safe than sorry, because people 
were being investigated for all sorts of things. They were more ready to pass things on to 
senior managers and Prevent officers. Anything that was Islamic and used in a naughty way 
was reportable. I am obliged to pass things along because of Prevent – if not, there will be 
a penalty. Everyone is so afraid that if they don’t report a child and the child goes to Syria, 
they will get into trouble”.
He also explained that teachers “were less inclined to open up discussions on the 
Middle East or talk about British foreign policy. After the Paris attacks [on Charlie Hebdo], the 
staff body was told to shut down all discussions. Don’t mention ‘the I word’ – this is the policy 
in schools”. Meanwhile, he said the “students were appalled” at the idea of “British values”. 
One of his students told him: “I am from Yemen, we have values as well”. Martin said he 
could see how Prevent’s emphasis on British values could “alienate students”.
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When Martin criticised Prevent, his head teacher implied that Martin could be fired, 
saying “if you carry on, our hands will be tied”.
One of the students in Martin’s school was a 15 year-old boy, Jacob,323 who Martin 
described as “naughty but fine”. Martin had been his classroom teacher for a year. Jacob’s 
parents were converts to Islam who had recently moved to the U.K. from France. In about 
November 2015, Jacob made a drawing in class of two swastikas, six guns, a map, and a 
complex of buildings in which one place was identified as “somewhere to hide”. His teacher 
confiscated the drawing and gave it to the head teacher in charge. The deputy head teacher 
phoned the Prevent authorities to report the child. That evening, the deputy head teacher 
asked if Martin, who speaks French, would translate for Jacob’s father (who was not fluent in 
English) at a meeting about Jacob at the school. Martin agreed to translate. 
Jacob’s father came to the school the next day. The meeting included the deputy head 
teacher, a police officer who worked for the counterterrorism unit with Prevent, and Martin 
as the translator.
According to Martin, the father appeared worried and did not know why he had been called 
in. The Prevent officer “bombarded” Jacob’s father with a long list of intrusive questions. She 
quizzed the father about his religious beliefs: “Are you a Salafi or a Sufi?” When Jacob’s father 
said, “We are not Salafists”, the officer said, “Good, because Salafism is more conservative”. 
Martin observed that “the Prevent officer was very interested in the fact that they were white 
Muslim converts. This raised eyebrows because converts are thought to be more orthodox”. 
The police officer asked Jacob’s father when he converted to Islam, where he prayed, 
who else prayed there, and if he had put money aside for charity. The father answered these 
questions. She asked if Jacob went to a madrasa or whether his father taught him Islamic 
teachings at home. The father responded that his son was taught at home. The police officer 
responded: “That is good, because at madrasa, they teach you only to read the Arabic of the 
Qur’an, not to interpret it”. 
Recounting this conversation to the Justice Initiative, Martin observed: “The questions 
were inappropriate. They were so personal. They were dangerous because they conflated 
religious belief with possibility of terrorist violence. The order in which the questions were 
asked was very disempowering – the questions about religious practice and prayer were asked 
before the father knew about the drawing”.
Jacob’s father was very strict. They did not have a television at home. At one point, he 
caught Jacob smoking and made his son promise to stop. But Jacob continued to smoke, 
hiding this fact from his father. During the meeting, the Prevent officer (who had been told by 
the deputy head teacher about Jacob’s secret smoking) told the father that his son continued 
to smoke and was lying to him. The Prevent Officer told Jacob’s father: “You don’t know your 
own son, he might go fight for ISIS”. The father became very angry. 
At that point, Jacob was brought into the meeting. His father was shown the drawing 
that his son had made. The Prevent officer told Jacob that he had an obsession with guns 
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and asked where he had learned how to draw them. Jacob responded that he had googled the 
guns in school. The Prevent officer asked where the map was from. Jacob laughed and said 
it was from the videogame “Minecraft”. 
The Prevent officer concluded the meeting by telling Jacob’s father that he had to stay 
in touch with the officer because his son was lying to him. Martin, who was translating during 
this time, thought it was very wrong of her to try to turn the father against his son.
After Jacob and his father left, the Prevent officer told the deputy head teacher and 
Martin that she had no concerns, and that the father “had said all the right things”. Martin 
told the Justice Initiative: “I wondered, why then did she turn the father against his son?” 
Martin said that this incident had a harmful effect on Jacob. “The child used to go 
around saying I hate France and now he says he hates Britain”, he told the Justice Initiative. 
Martin thought there was no reason to involve a police officer in this incident. A conversation 
with the deputy teacher would have been enough. But, Martin observed, “instead of having 
a supportive conversation with the child, they decided to police him. He was treated in this 
way because he is Muslim; if he had not been Muslim they would not have thought he 
was a terrorist”. Martin noted: “Schools are more than capable of safeguarding without 
Prevent. Schools should talk to the child before ringing the police or social services. Prevent 
safeguarding involves police at an earlier stage. Students in my school come to school high, 
with weapons, and the police are not called. It is very heavy handed to involve the police for 
Prevent-related matters. Prevent makes Muslims feel like they are hated….There is no reason 
why this wouldn’t drive someone further into radicalisation. You’ve got people who really 
don’t know what they’re talking about being Prevent officers. It’s a bit dangerous because 
they are going around doing things that are alienating people more”.
The incident poisoned Martin’s relations with Jacob’s father, who Martin described 
as “a lot more hostile now…. a lot more questioning of the school”. Martin also argued that 
Prevent is damaging the relationship between students and teachers, saying that the strategy 
is “making teachers afraid of students”. He concluded that “Prevent makes teachers view 
students through a securitised lens”.
This case suggests that the school’s response to Jacob was heavy handed and may 
not have prioritised his best interests as required under the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Moreover, the school’s intervention was arguably counterproductive, because it made 
Jacob hate living in the UK while also alienating Jacob’s father. 
Because other children engaged in far worse conduct (such as coming to school 
high or with weapons) were not targeted in a similar manner, it also raises questions about 
the violation of Jacob’s rights under article 14 combined with article 2 of Protocol 1 to the 
European Convention, as well as under the Equality Act (through direct discrimination). It 
appears that had he not been Muslim, Jacob would not have been targeted in this manner. 
The Prevent officer’s intrusive questioning of Jacob’s father also raises concerns about the 
violation of his rights under article 8 of the European Convention.
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This case also shows how Prevent can cause teachers in school to shut down debate on 
issues relating to terrorism. Moreover, it provides an example of how teachers who criticise 
Prevent may face retaliation for doing so. Finally, this case provides insight on the nature and 
effects of Prevent training, which trains teachers to view students through a securitised lens, 
thus eroding trust between teachers and their students.
CASE STUDY 8 
Fourteen year-old targeted for Facebook photo324 
The story of Amina and her son’s exclusion from school presents questions about the 
counterproductive effects of Prevent on a child’s education, and the failure to give primary 
consideration to the child’s best interests. 
Amina is a struggling single mother of four who lives in England; the children’s father 
lives in Pakistan. In about June 2015, after his uncle in Pakistan died, Amina’s youngest son 
went to Pakistan to visit relatives. He returned to England in about August 2015 so he could 
re-join his publicly funded, local authority-maintained school in September. But Amina’s son 
had been taken off the school’s rolls.
Amina thought this was because he had left in June without notice. She requested that 
he be allowed to re-join the school, but the school kept delaying her son’s re-entry into the 
school. Amina called the school repeatedly but could not get an answer. She said: “One of the 
teachers was abrupt, rude, almost racist. They were suspicious of my son going to Pakistan”. 
Finally, in late September or early October of 2015, the school called Amina and her son 
in for a meeting. The school authorities asked her if she was aware that her son had posted 
on Facebook a picture of himself holding a gun. They said that was the reason that they were 
reconsidering whether or not to let him back into school. The teacher in charge of pastoral 
care said that: “By law, I have to refer your son to Channel, and they will check it out. That is 
what we have to do”. 
Amina told the Justice Initiative: “I was flabbergasted. I had already seen that picture 
months ago on WhatsApp, I didn’t think anything untoward had happened”. The picture, 
taken that summer, was of her youngest son sitting in his father’s house in Pakistan, wearing 
a salwar kameez, holding one of his father’s guns. Amina said that the guns were licensed 
and usually kept locked away. 
Amina explained this to the school authorities. It was an innocent photo, she said, but 
she also told her son to take the photo off Facebook. But the school authorities persisted, 
telling Amina that her son had a phone at school, and that they didn’t know who he was 
ringing. She told the Justice Initiative: “Instead of saying it’s not good for his learning, they 
were hinting at things. It was really scary. It was being spun out of proportion. I was getting 
more and more upset”.
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When the subject of Channel came up, a teacher in the meeting said that “Channel 
are the ones who deal with this kind of thing”. Amina did not know what Channel was. She 
later sent a text message to a teacher whom she knew, asking about it. The teacher said: “It’s 
something that teachers have to do and it makes us feel like we have to mistrust the children”. 
Amina was devastated by the way the school treated her son with suspicion. She told the 
Justice Initiative: “I think he was referred to Channel because he was a Muslim and because 
he went to Pakistan and so the picture said it all for them”. She added: “It was something a 
normal teacher could have dealt with by a conversation between the teacher and me”.
Eventually, in about October 2015, Amina’s son was allowed back into school. Amina 
said that her son was picked on in school, often being blamed for things other children had 
done. In late October or November, the school authorities told Amina that they were going 
to refer her son to the Pupil Referral Unit (PRU), a school for troubled children. 
Her son joined the PRU in early 2016. According to Amina, a teacher from the PRU said 
that her son didn’t belong there. The children in that school have a lot of issues. The teacher 
told Amina: “He shouldn’t be here because he hasn’t shown the behaviour of children that 
come to this place. He should go back into a mainstream school”. But the original school 
would not take Amina’s son back, and at the time of writing, he was still at the PRU. 
Reflecting on the experience, Amina observed: “I have always felt I was British. But 
… I don’t feel like it is the Britain I know. The media and these Prevent powers have totally 
made the teachers misconstrue things, it has thwarted the actual aim – to safeguard. It has 
prevented trust rather than terrorism, broken down communications and trust between pupils 
and parents and teachers and undermined the education system”. 
  She added: “I still feel sorry for the teachers even though they have to implement 
this Prevent duty. Teachers are supposed to be a support, but this Prevent thing has given 
teachers the powers to cut support of parents. … The teachers have so much pressure to refer, 
they don’t want to be blamed. The teachers, once they have referred a student, they just want 
to get rid of him”. 
It appears in this case that the school may not have prioritised the best interests of the 
child. Indeed, the school’s intervention was counterproductive because it caused Amina’s son 
to become more withdrawn. The school delayed his re-enrollment and referred him to Channel 
apparently because of a photo posted on Facebook. If he had not been Muslim, it is unlikely 
that the Amina’s son would have been treated in this manner, raising concerns about the 
violation of his rights under article 14 combined with article 2 of Protocol to the Convention 
as well as under the Equality Act (through direct discrimination). More generally, this case 
shows how Prevent can destroy trust between teachers on the one hand and students and 
their parents on the other. 
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CASE STUDY 9 
Seventeen year-old targeted for becoming more religious325 
This case raises concerns about individuals being targeted under Prevent for showing signs 
of increased religiosity. It happened in about September 2015. Taufiq, a 17 year-old boy, was 
referred to Prevent by his college in Birmingham.326 His family, concerned about the referral, 
reached out to Nadim, a family friend and lawyer. 
When police from the counterterrorism unit came to Taufiq’s house in inner city 
Birmingham, Taufiq, his mother, and Nadim were there. Nadim told the Justice Initiative: 
“We had no idea what the allegations [against Taufiq] were, we were literally walking in blind”. 
During the meeting, the police said the college had referred Taufiq under Prevent. Nadim 
told the Justice Initiative: “And this is a kid with no history of trouble. No one in the faculty 
had tried to talk with him”.
Nadim said: “There was a list of allegations against him, concerns which the college 
had raised with the police. They came in and went through allegations one by one. Taufiq 
responded, and I intervened when I thought the allegations were inappropriate”. The 
allegations included the fact that Taufiq had become more religious and had started wearing 
an Arab gown called a thawb. Taufiq responded that he wanted to emulate the prophet and it 
was his choice to wear the gown. The police also said that the school had noticed that instead 
of using the college computers, Taufiq used his own iPad. Taufiq said he kept all his notes 
on his iPad, and found it easier to use than the college computer. The police said that Taufiq 
did not seem to have many friends. He responded that he was still new to the college at that 
time, and that he did have some friends. 
The police also raised the fact that during one of his classes, Taufiq asked if his parents 
would have to pay back his student loans if he died. Nadim intervened here. He explained that 
Taufiq’s sister had just passed away a year or two previously. It was “still raw in Taufiq’s mind”. 
Nadim told the Justice Initiative: “I know him, I know a bit about the family. I understand 
these things. As Muslims we are told you are held back from paradise if you have outstanding 
debt when you die”. Nadim thought that the police’s questions demonstrated “a lack of 
appreciation of the teachings of Islam”.
The police concluded the meeting by saying they were satisfied that there was nothing 
of concern here. Nadim thought that was the end of the matter. 
But in December 2015, Taufiq went to help with the refugee crisis in Calais. As many 
people were doing at the time, Taufiq brought food and clothing to the refugees gathered 
there. Taufiq stayed in Calais one or two nights, then came home. A few days later, the police 
called his family said “We need to come and see you, because we think your son has gone to 
Syria, we are concerned about his whereabouts”. His brother said: “But he is upstairs”. The 
police said: “Are you sure? You won’t mind if we come and check?” Taufiq’s brother phoned 
Nadim, and Nadim came over to the house. 
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The police came to the house, where Taufiq and Nadim explained the situation and 
asked why the police had automatically assumed that Taufiq had gone to Syria. Nadim 
observed: “Obviously, even after the first meeting they still believed that….I don’t know. They 
apologised, but it was pretty useless because it didn’t mean anything – they could easily come 
back again. As teenagers, you assume ‘the whole world is against me.’ I am no psychologist, 
but it wouldn’t surprise me if this only enhanced those alienated feelings. It’s not healthy for 
a 17 year-old kid“. 
Nadim observed: “There was no other reason for subjecting Taufiq to this other than 
the fact that he was a Muslim. If he was dressed in black and wearing eyeliner, they wouldn’t 
have gone after him. Muslim kids are not afforded the same opportunity of rebelling as 
white kids are”. Now, Nadim says, “the family has lost trust in our government and in our 
police. Taufiq is a sweet little boy. He is lucky in that he has a strong family unit to keep him 
grounded. Had he not had that, something like this could push someone into the hands of 
terrorists .... You have created a problem where there was no problem”.
It seems that Taufiq was targeted for his Islamic clothing which was interpreted as 
a sign of “radicalisation”. Prevent’s targeting of Taufiq on account of his religiosity raises 
concerns about the violation of Taufiq’s right to freedom of religion under article 9 of the 
European Convention. Arguably, had he not been Muslim, he would not have been targeted 
in this manner. This raises additional concerns that his rights under article 14 in combination 
with article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, as well as under the Equality Act (through direct 
discrimination) were violated. The police’s intrusive questioning of Taufiq, their tracking of 
his movements, and repeated appearance at his home also raises concerns that his rights 
under article 8 of the convention were violated.
CASE STUDY 10 
Fourteen year-old targeted for talking about eco-terrorism327
This case raises concerns about how Prevent may cause schools to overreact to innocent 
comments made by students. A 14 year-old student, A., loved the school he attended in 
London. The school is publicly funded and maintained by the local authority. A. had attended 
it for three years and loved his teachers, who in turn regarded him as an outstanding student.
On the morning of 14 May 2015, A. was attending his French class. During the 
lesson, which was about the environment, the French teacher showed the class an image of 
deforestation, including heavy machinery, tree stumps, and trees. The teacher asked the class 
to comment on what was happening in the image. Various students suggested “Greenhouse 
effect” and “deforestation” in response. A. said “l’ecoterrorisme” or eco-terrorism. The 
teacher looked at him, concerned. A. explained that “eco-warriors” sometimes spike trees with 
metal nails to blunt the blade of chainsaws and prevent them from chopping the trees down. 
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He said that some people call it “eco-terrorism”. Other students joined in the conversation 
about eco-terrorism and noted that they had learnt about it as part of their extra-curricular 
debate club activity. The lesson ended.
The next day, on 15 May 2015, the French teacher wrote an email to the Designated 
Child Protection Officer (DCPO) stating: “I was teaching a year 9 French class yesterday 
afternoon on the topic of the environment and [A.] made several inappropriate references 
to terrorism which were out of context. For instance, they were asked to brainstorm words 
relating to an image of deforestation and he said ‘environmental terrorism.’ I just wanted 
you to be aware”.328 (The Justice Initiative reviewed this email, which the school produced in 
legal proceedings). 
Three days later, A. was in class when a member of staff entered the classroom and 
spoke with the teacher. In front of the entire class, the teacher pointed at A. and said: “There 
he is”. The member of staff asked A: “Can you come with me?” A. stood up, took his bag 
and left, not knowing why he was being called out of class. He was taken to an office, where 
a woman, who A. did not know, was sitting at the desk. The school had not contacted A.’s 
parents or attempted to obtain their permission to conduct this meeting with their son. 
The woman introduced herself as a child protection officer. She told A. that “a safety 
concern” had been raised. A. did not understand what she was talking about. She said: “Your 
French teacher… mentioned you used the word ‘terrorism.’” A. was surprised. He did not 
understand. He explained how he had mentioned the phrase “eco-terrorism” in relation to 
“eco-warriors” and saving the environment. 
According to A., the child protection officer asked him if he had any affiliation with 
ISIS. (The school, in legal papers, stated that he was asked instead if he had heard of ISIS.329) 
A. became even more alarmed when he heard the word ISIS. He thought of ISIS beheading 
and killing people. He didn’t know why she was asking him this question. A. said he did not 
have anything to do with ISIS. The staff member who brought A. to the meeting asked: “Do 
the chainsaws explode”? The child protection officer asked: “Do you understand why there 
could be a misunderstanding”? A. replied he did not understand and explained that he and 
his classmates knew about eco-terrorism through their debate club. The member of staff said: 
“Boring debate that must have been”!
When A. got home that day, he told his mother what had happened. His mother 
rang the school and was put through to his head of year, who confirmed that A. had been 
questioned, but insisted that, “It was nothing”. A.’s mother asked if this had been done under 
Prevent and was told: “Yes, we have to do it. It is Government strategy”. In a letter dated 
19 June 2015, the head teacher of the school denied that this was done under Prevent, and 
stated instead that “[t]he process followed in this case was in line with and following our child 
protection policy”.330 However, legal papers subsequently filed by the school state that it was 
“implementing its duty to safeguard and protect the welfare of children in line with statutory 
and non-statutory guidance, including the Prevent Duty”.331
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A. was devastated by this episode. For the first time, he was made to feel that he 
did not belong at the school he loved. He became worried that anything he said could be 
misconstrued. He feared being taken away from his family. 
His mother told the Justice Initiative: “He is much more careful, much more wary in 
school to this day. First time in his life he wanted to be alone in his room”. She added: “He 
was really lucky that his peer group fully supported him. Had that not been the case I dread 
to think where he would be today. Why was he treated in this particular way? The only thing I 
could put it down to was because he is black and he’s a Muslim”. She told the Justice Initiative 
that the day of the incident, her son was talking about it with his friend, who was white. His 
friend told A: “They wouldn’t have done it to me”. 
To the extent that A. was targeted in this manner under Prevent because he was black 
and Muslim, there are concerns that his rights under article 14 in combination with article 2 of 
Protocol 1 to the Convention as well as under the Equality Act (through direct discrimination) 
were violated.332 
If he was penalised for appropriately expressing his views on eco-terrorism, this raises 
additional concerns that his rights under article 10 of the Convention were violated. This 
case shows how the Prevent duty may cause teachers to over-react to students’ innocent 
comments about terrorism that are entirely legitimate, thereby creating a chilling effect on 
the expression of legitimate views. 
More generally, this case suggests there is a risk that the implementers of Prevent may 
not understand that their heavy-handed enforcement of the Prevent duty can be extremely 
traumatic for a child. In legal proceedings, the school argued that its response to A’s 
comment was “reasonable and proportionate”.333 But pulling A. out of class in front of the 
whole class and then questioning him about ISIS, all because of his reasonable comment on 
eco-terrorism, does not appear to comport with prioritising the best interests of the child as 
required by article 3 of the Convention on the rights of the child. 
CASE STUDY 11 
Fifteen/Sixteen year-old targeted for pro-Palestinian views334
In this case, the school appears to have overreacted under Prevent to a child’s political 
expression. The case shows that while Prevent may not entail criminal sanction, it is intensely 
intimidating for a child to be visited in his home for questioning by police officers. 
Rahmaan, now 17 years-old, recalled his experience with Prevent from about 2014 and 
2015, when he was 15 and 16 years-old and studying in a state school in North London. 
Rahmaan recounted that school officials told him not to wear a keffiyah (a black and white 
scarf sometimes associated with Palestine) in school because it “could offend some people”; 
confiscated a “Free Palestine” wristband and a pro-Palestine badge that he was wearing on 
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his uniform; told him to modify a poster (for a fundraiser that Rahmaan and his friends were 
organising for Palestinian children affected by war) by removing a picture of a Palestinian 
child from it, because it picked a political side; told him to remove from the same poster a 
quote from Ali Ibn Abu Talib, a revered Muslim leader, because it would suggest supporting 
a political cause; and confiscated from Rahmaan a leaflet made by Friends of Al Aqsa, a UK 
based NGO concerned with defending the human rights of Palestinians and protecting the 
sacred al-Aqsa Sanctuary in Jerusalem.335 
A couple of hours after the school teacher confiscated the Al Aqsa leaflet, Rahmaan 
was brought in for a meeting with a “special constable” who told Rahmaan that one of his 
roles was to deal with Prevent. He asked why Rahmaan had brought in the leaflet, and why he 
supported Friends of Al Aqsa. Rahmaan said that they supported freedom for the Palestinian 
people. The constable said that from his research it appeared that Friends of Al Aqsa had 
some “radical tendencies”. The constable told Rahmaan that he did not want Rahmaan to be 
speaking about Palestine in school. Rahmaan asked if he could do so at lunch time and break 
time. The constable replied that he could not. 
A few weeks later, Rahmaan’s friend brought to school another leaflet, about water 
shortages in Gaza. Rahmaan was holding it in his hand when a teacher took it away from 
him. A few hours later, Rahmaan was brought to meet with the same special constable. At 
the bottom of the leaflet was a quote saying something like, “the sun will never set until they 
have”, written by Rahmaan’s friend. The constable said that the quote could be a warning to 
the school. Rahmaan laughed. The constable said that they need to be a 100 percent sure 
that the school was safe.
It appears that the school referred Rahmaan to Prevent, because in the summer of 
2015, two policemen came to Rahmaan’s house and asked to talk with him. One was from 
the Bedfordshire Prevent Task Force, and the other was from Channel. Rahmaan described 
them as “big and intimidating”. He added: “For an Afghan household, for police to come 
round to the house, it’s automatically a bad thing. My parents said it was a matter of shame 
for the police to come. It made me feel intimidated and targeted”.
The police officers asked Rahmaan: “Do you know why we are here? ... We are talking 
about what happened in school, can you explain what happened?” Rahmaan said: “What are 
you talking about specifically”? One of the police officers shouted at Rahmaan: “Don’t get 
smart with me”! 
One of the officers said that he had read the report on Rahmaan, according to which 
he was wearing extremist badges and wristbands. He asked Rahmaan if he could see those 
wristbands and badges, which Rahmaan showed them. The police officers said that they 
did not see a problem with the wristbands and badges. They also asked if they could see 
the leaflets that he had at school. Rahmaan showed them the leaflets and one of the police 
officers said this was not extreme at all. Then he asked Rahmaan about what was going on in 
Palestine, what was going on in Syria, and what Rahmaan’s opinion of ISIS was. 
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Rahmaan was translating all of this for his mother, who speaks only Persian. This upset 
one of the officers, who, according to Rahmaan, “got very angry and shouted at me”.. The 
other police officer calmed his colleague and continued the questioning, asking Rahmaan 
what sect of Islam he belonged to. 
Rahmaan recalled: “When I replied I am a Shia Muslim, he said ‘we are only looking for 
certain types of Muslims’. If I was a Sunni, I would probably still be on their radar. They came 
to the conclusion that I wasn’t a radical person – they looked at the leaflets and badges, and 
said ‘from what we can tell, you are not a radical person’”. He added: “If I was a white person 
asking to raise money for Save the Children or a white person wearing a Palestinian badge 
I don’t think I would have been referred to authorities.... If you are a Muslim and an Afghan 
and you are talking about Palestine, it ticks all the boxes. I am pretty sure that if I wasn’t a 
Muslim, I wouldn’t have been referred”.
Rahmaan asked if police records relating to him would be retained. The officers explained 
that the records would be retained but that they would be dormant, they would not be used.
These incidents had a chilling effect on Rahmaan’s and his friend’s political expression. 
They made Rahmaan reluctant to talk about Palestine in school. His friend – who had written 
the quote on the leaflet – completely “shut down”. He told Rahmaan that his parents told 
him not to talk with Rahmaan because he had been radicalised. 
Rahmaan told the Justice Initiative: “If Prevent is meant to stop young people from 
expressing their views, it is working. If it’s meant to be stopping violent extremism, maybe in 
one or two cases it might wipe out ISIS sympathies, but in most cases it doesn’t do that. And 
it could be doing the opposite of what it intends – if I was a radical person, if police officers 
came to my house and questioned me and intimidated me, I could be vulnerable to being 
drawn into violent extremism”.
In February 2016, Rahmaan’s school issued a public statement saying that “due to the 
confidential nature of these matters, and for obvious reasons, we are unable to discuss how they 
may or may not relate to any individual students or why someone may have been referred as 
this is a private matter relating to an individual pupil”. The school added that “teachers were not 
concerned about the nature of the badges and wristbands or because he asked to raise money 
for Palestinian children ... the school does not permit the wearing of any accessories that are not 
part of the school uniform except for official badges such as prefect badges or badges that relate 
to curriculum projects that are going on within the school”. The school also said that: “At no 
point was the student told not to talk about Palestine in school”. The school added that it needed 
to “ensure that any materials that are presented within school represent a fair and balanced 
view” and that it had supported the efforts of students (including Rahmaan) with respect to a 
fundraising initiative to raise money for charities that alleviate poverty in Palestine.336 
Rahmaan graduated from school and now attends college. One day, a teacher there kept 
him back and told him to be “careful” because someone had written a letter to the college about 
Rahmaan’s “radical tendencies”. In addition, senior staff had been asking the teacher about 
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Rahmaan’s views. Rahmaan told the Justice Initiative: “Even though the police found I wasn’t 
radical, they are still interested in me”. Rahmaan’s referral to Prevent, it seems, has followed him.
Even if the school’s confiscation of the wristband, leaflets, and badges was not related 
to their pro-Palestinian content, there are serious questions about whether its reporting of 
these facts to the police and its confiscation of the leaflets amounted to a violation of his 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention. Moreover, the school’s 
actions appeared to have had a chilling effect on valid political expression by students at the 
school. To the extent that Rahmaan was targeted in this manner because he was Muslim, 
this case raises questions about a violation of his rights under Article 14 of the Convention 
combined with the right to education under article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention. His 
intrusive questioning by the police on intensely personal issues (including whether he was a 
“certain type of Muslim”) raises concerns about the violation of his right to private life under 
article 8 of the Convention. This case also suggests that contrary to article 3 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, Rahmaan’s best interests were not a primary consideration for the 
school and the police.
More generally, this case shows how intimidating it can be for a young person to be 
questioned by the police under Prevent. It also raises serious concerns about the creation, 
retention, and use of records about individuals referred under Prevent and the lingering 
effects of being targeted as a “radical” under Prevent.
B.  Universities
The Prevent duty in universities entails particular scrutiny of speakers, with a view to 
determining whether they might be “extremist” and undermine “British values”. 
On 17 September 2015, the day before the Prevent statutory duty for further and 
higher education was to take effect, Prime Minister Cameron’s office issued a press 
release announcing that “for the first time, universities and colleges in the UK will be 
legally required to put in place specific policies to stop extremists radicalising students 
on campuses, tackle gender segregation at events and support students at risk of radi-
calisation, as part of the government’s plans to counter extremism”.337 The press release 
added: “Last year at least 70 events featuring hate speakers were held on campuses, 
according to the government’s new Extremism Analysis Unit ...”.338 In “Notes to Edi-
tors”, the press release stated:
In 2014 there were at least 70 events involving speakers who are known to have 
promoted rhetoric that aimed to undermine core British values of democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of those with 
different faiths and beliefs, held on university campuses. 
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Queen Mary, King’s College, SOAS and Kingston University held most events. 
Events included the hosting of 6 speakers that are on record as expressing views 
contrary to British values, including Haitham Al-Haddad, Dr Uthman Lateef, 
Alomgir Ali, Imran Ibn Mansur (aka ‘Dawah Man’), Hamza Tzortis and Dr 
Salman Butt”.339 
All four universities mentioned in the release objected to Mr Cameron’s claims.340 
Julius Weinberg, Vice Chancellor for Kingston University, told the Justice Initia-
tive that the “PM was wrong in detail and also wrong in principle” and that “the two 
speakers who spoke at Kingston spoke about anodyne subjects”.341 A spokesman for 
Kingston University said Dr. Haddad and Dr. Lateef had each addressed the university’s 
Islamic Society once in 2014. Their topics, respectively, were, “How one needs to strike 
the balance between the worldly life and hereafter”, and the crisis in the Central African 
Republic.342
The Vice Chancellor added: “We believe the data [ for the PM’s press release] 
came from an organisation called Student Rights (who are trying to push a particular 
agenda and not a helpful one), which is close to the Henry Jackson Society”. (The Henry 
Jackson Society is a conservative British think-tank which lists Student Rights as one 
its projects.343) The Vice Chancellor observed that the same data was also used by the 
Home Office counterterrorism unit to demonstrate why Prevent is needed. He wrote to 
the Home Office to ask about their data, but received no response.344 The Home Office 
has separately acknowledged that its “Extremism Analysis Unit” relied in part on the 
Henry Jackson Society’s research in identifying “hate speakers” for the press release.345 
The case studies and other interviews conducted for this report strongly suggest 
that the Prevent statutory duty is restricting freedom of speech, including by creating a 
chilling effect in universities. A student at a London university told the Justice Initiative 
that it had become difficult to bring in external speakers, that the process of getting 
approval for them had become “highly bureaucratic”, and that Prevent had created an 
“atmosphere of fear”, particularly amongst Muslim students.346 Martyn Rush, politics 
officer for the Oxford University Islamic Society, observed: “It is not simply that events 
might be cancelled or changed by College authorities, but also that Muslim students 
are put off from political activism by the legislation. Students in Oxford are increasingly 
unwilling to put their heads above the parapet politically, and the Prevent legislation is 
in danger of encouraging quietism and disengagement. Several events, in my experi-
ence, have not got off the drawing board due to self-imposed concerns about Prevent”.347 
More specific examples that raise concerns about restrictions on freedom of speech are 
described below. 
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CASE STUDY 12 
University of Huddersfield conference on racism and Islamophobia 
cancelled
This case raises concerns about whether onerous conditions were placed under Prevent on a 
conference organiser because of the views of a civil liberties and human rights organisation 
invited to attend. 
On 12 July 2016, the school of Music, Humanities and Media at the University of 
Huddersfield was scheduled to host a one day interdisciplinary conference on “Racism and 
Islamophobia”.348 The conference was widely advertised, including on Eventbrite, an online 
event invitation and listing service. David Miller, Professor of Sociology at the University 
of Bath, accepted an invitation to be a keynote speaker at the conference. However, a few 
days before the conference, on 6 July 2016, the conference organiser informed him that the 
conference had been cancelled for “various reasons”.349
Partially redacted records received under the Freedom of Information Act350 suggest 
that the cancellation may have been partly related to the University Secretary’s insistence 
that additional conditions be met with respect to the participation of JUST West Yorkshire, a 
non-profit organisation advocating for racial justice, civil liberties, and human rights, set up 
in 2003 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.351 The conditions were apparently motivated by 
the views espoused by JUST on its website. 
Vetting procedures for the conference began almost two months before the conference 
date. On 19 May 2016, the Dean of the School of Music, Humanities and Media wrote an 
email to the conference organiser asking him if he had gone through the University’s Freedom 
of Speech (FOS) procedure or if it was something to be done. If it was still to be done, the 
Dean asked the organiser if he could “complete the External Speaker log as soon as possible”. 
The next day, the organiser sent the University Secretary and the Dean the current 
list of confirmed speakers, who were all academics, while informing them that he was still 
waiting for confirmation from Police/Prevent speakers, including representatives of the 
Prevent programme of the Metropolitan Borough of Kirklees, which includes the town of 
Huddersfield. He said he was also hoping that some members of JUST would talk, and that 
he might also invite another advocacy group, Secure Societies.352 
On 24 May 2016, the University Secretary wrote back asking the organiser to discuss 
the event with his Dean “in the first instance” in light of Huddersfield University’s Freedom 
of Speech and External Speakers Policy. 
On 20 June 2016, the University Secretary sent an email (presumably to the organiser, 
the recipient’s name is redacted) saying: “It is difficult to clarify exactly what types of 
expressions would need to be closed down quickly, but I have set out below some guidance, 
which I hope is of assistance to you.... Whilst the programme for the academic conference 
may not of itself be a concern under the Freedom of Speech policy, there is a risk that given 
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the topics to be discussed, it may attract attendees which hold extremist views and, as such, the 
Chair(s) must be confident that they understand their responsibilities under the Freedom of 
Speech policy and would be able to manage any questions/behaviours which would pose a 
challenge to this and provide an opposing view should any extremist views be expressed” 
(emphasis added).
The “guidance” attached to the University Secretary’s 20 June email notes, in relevant 
part: “Your specific query relates to the fact that you are holding an event in which speakers are 
critical of the Government’s Prevent Strategy. Simply being critical of the Prevent duty would 
not, in itself, constitute an extremist view, but as Chair, you would need to be confident that 
the invited Speakers will not express extremist views and, if any such views are raised from 
the floor that you, as Chair, would be confident in challenging these and be able to provide 
an opposing view. The conference advertisement states ‘it will further debate if Government 
policies can successfully challenge issues like radicalisation or are they stigmatising Muslim 
communities;’ if the only view presented during the conference is that government policy is 
‘stigmatising’ Muslim communities and it isn’t acknowledged that other viewpoints exist then 
this would pose a problem under the University’s Freedom of Speech policy’” (emphasis added).
The guidance provided by the University Secretary goes on to provide further detail 
on the definition of extremist views (as defined by the Government) and the University’s 
obligations under the Prevent Policy under the guidance for Higher Education. 
The guidance adds: “Some examples of extremist ideology that have been provided to 
the University during training, including those that (obviously this is not an exhaustive list):
• Deny equality of opportunity for women/girls – ideologically different/role in society.
• Purport fundamental differences between people and hatred of minorities and hatred 
of differences – for example ‘rising tide of islamophobia’, promotion of anti-semitism, 
or encouraging sectarianism.
• Deny that all are equal in the eyes of law and have the right to its protection, irrespective 
of their differences. Individuals who argue that secular law is subordinate to law of God.
• Reject democracy – any suggestion that an individual cannot participate in democracy”.
On 21 June 2016, the organiser responded to the University Secretary, stating: “I did 
ask PREVENT officers to take part and I also asked academics who fully support PREVENT to 
take part but they declined. The conference is not about PREVENT but about Islamophobia 
and racism. I assume speakers who are talking about PREVENT will provide an Overview of 
the policy”. Apparently exasperated, he wrote: “I quite simply don’t know what to do”.
On 22 June 2016, the University Secretary wrote to the Dean (while copying the deputy 
Vice Chancellor) saying: 
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It has been brought to my attention that the text advertising the above event on 
eventbrite, is different to the conference poster…shared earlier that week. The eventbrite 
posting contains in the following additional text: ‘The Conference has invited community 
groups such as Just West Yorkshire and Kirklees Prevent and also to participate in the 
audience’. We had understood this event to be an academic conference, as opposed to 
a community/public event; this was the basis on which the event was presented and, I 
believe, assessed and approved by you. If community groups have been encouraged not 
only to attend, but to also have active participation in the event, their representatives 
should be assessed as external speakers in accordance with the Freedom of Speech 
Policy and recorded on the external speakers log.
Thereafter, the Dean and the University Secretary engaged in a series of emails about 
whether it was possible to distinguish an academic conference from a community/public 
event, and whether it was necessary to formally pre-vet JUST instead of managing through 
“active chairing of contributions from the floor”, particularly since (as the Dean noted) JUST 
had been invited in “general terms” and “did not have a formal presence on the conference 
programme”.353
On 4 July 2016, the University Secretary, while copying the Deputy Vice Chancellor, 
wrote to the Dean asking if he had been able to clarify whether JUST had been invited to 
address the conference, and if so whether they had been assessed under the Freedom 
of Speech policy. She added: “If these issues have not been resolved to your satisfaction 
presumably this has left you with heightened concerns around the management of this event 
which, if not resolved within the next 24 hours, would lead you to consider very carefully whether 
the event can proceed “ (emphasis added).
On 5 July, the University Secretary wrote that “the clarification on the involvement/‘par-
ticipation’ of Just West Yorkshire, is of particular importance given the views espoused on their web-
site” (emphasis added). A copy of this email is included in this report; please see Appendix C. 
On 6 July 2016 – just six days before the conference date – the University Secretary, 
while copying the deputy Vice Chancellor, wrote again to the Dean. This email, also included 
in this report (please see Appendix C), states that “[i]n light of the attendance of community 
groups/members of the public at the above event”, the University had sought “guidance” 
which recommended that another group (whose name is redacted, but which appears from 
the email to be Kirklees Prevent) “should be approached again to attend”. The email notes: 
“The rationale behind this is that whilst the academic community are fully adept in critical 
thinking and providing an appropriate response to vigorous debate, it is less certain how 
members of the public may respond to such a debate and there is the potential for strong 
opposing views, or legitimate concerns to be raised” (emphasis added). The email also 
suggests the event be recorded so that there would be an “independent record” “if there is 
any subsequent controversy”. The email also states there should be a “strong Chair” who 
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“would need to intervene and respond appropriately to any expression contrary to ‘British Values’” 
and that this was being mentioned “for completeness” in light of the “emphasis that BIS [the 
government department of Business, Innovation and Skills] placed on this role” (emphasis added).
David Miller was informed on 6 July 2016 that the conference had been cancelled.354 
This strongly suggests that the cancellation was related at least in part to the three conditions 
identified in the 6 July 2016 email from the University Secretary. In response to a Justice 
Initiative inquiry, a University official stated: “The conference in question was cancelled by the 
academic member of staff who had been organising it and I am not in a position to comment 
on the reasons for his doing so. The organiser and his colleagues had been supported through 
the University’s Freedom of Speech and External Speakers Policy (which can be consulted at 
http://www.hud.ac.uk/services/vco/policiesandprocedures/#f) and all appropriate steps had 
been taken to ensure that academic freedom and freedom of speech had been protected in 
the context of UK law”. 
Not all of the facts relating to why the conference was cancelled are available. 
However, the records received under the Freedom of Information Act strongly suggest that 
the cancellation was likely related to the University Secretary’s concerns about the views 
“espoused” by JUST on its website and the additional conditions proposed to address these 
concerns. A review of the JUST website reveals that the organisation advocates “promoting 
racial justice, civil liberties and human rights” and is critical of Prevent.355 
Significantly, in her 22 June 2016 email to the Dean, the University Secretary noted 
that the text advertising the conference stated that the conference had invited community 
groups such as JUST West Yorkshire and Kirklees Prevent. However, her concerns and 
recommendations for pre-vetting were directed only at JUST, and not at Kirklees Prevent. 
Moreover, the 6 July 2016 email from the University Secretary suggests that invitations to 
the conference be re-issued to Kirklees Prevent, even though they had previously declined to 
attend. With just days to go before the conference, that email assumed that Kirklees Prevent 
did not need to be vetted in a manner that was being recommended for JUST.
If the event was cancelled because the organiser could not meet the University’s 
conditions so that it could be “entirely convinced” that JUST West Yorkshire’s “extremist 
views” could be “fully mitigated”, this raises concerns about a possible violation of the 
Education Act (1986) because the cancellation “den[ied] use of ... [university] premises” on 
a “ground connected” with the “beliefs or views” of an individual or “policies or objectives” 
of a body. This case also raises questions about whether the conditions in the University 
Secretary’s 6 July 2016 email collectively constituted, contrary to article 10 of the European 
Convention, a disproportionate interference with the invited speakers’ right of free speech as 
well as the right of the conference attendees to receive information from the speakers.
More generally, this case raises questions about whether conferences relating to 
Islamophobia in particular are receiving heightened scrutiny under Prevent. The 20 June 
2016 email from the University Secretary states, in relevant part: “It is difficult to clarify exactly 
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what types of expressions would need to be closed down quickly .... Whilst the programme for 
the academic conference may not of itself be a concern under the Freedom of Speech policy, 
there is a risk that given the topics to be discussed, it may attract attendees which hold extremist 
views ...” (emphasis added).
The case also raises questions about whether there is particular pressure to counter 
criticisms of government policy. The guidance appended to the University Secretary’s 20 
June 2016 email notes that “if the only view presented during the conference is that government 
policy is ‘stigmatising’ Muslim communities and it isn’t acknowledged that other viewpoints exist 
then this would pose a problem under the University’s Freedom of Speech policy’” (emphasis 
added). It appears that the policy treats the view that government policy is stigmatising 
Muslim communities as an “extremist” one. 
The University Secretary’s insistence that the chair of the conference “would need to 
intervene and respond appropriately to any expression contrary to “British Values’” is also 
troubling, particularly in light of the lack of clarity as to the definition of “British values”. 
Finally, this case provides a clear example of how the multiple layers of time-consuming 
procedures under Prevent could be daunting to an organiser, and could potentially deter 
future conferences relating to Islamophobia. 
CASE STUDY 13 
Cambridge College actions lead to Islam in Europe debate being 
cancelled356
This case raises concerns about possible infringements on the freedom of speech under 
Prevent in the context of a debate on Islam organised by the Cambridge University Islamic 
Society.
In early 2016, a team within the Cambridge University Islamic Society decided to 
organise a debate on Islam in Europe, to be held on 16 February 2016. In January 2016, 
the organisers applied to book a room for the debate at two different Cambridge colleges, 
College 1 and College 2, in case one of the venues was unavailable. They had four confirmed 
speakers, one of whom was an alumnus of College 1. Nasir, a student at College 1, filled out 
the relevant information, including the names of the four speakers, on College 1’s website 
for booking events. 
On 2 February 2016, College 1’s administration informed Nasir by email that his 
requested had been approved. A fellow student had handled the inquiries at College 2, and 
even spoken with porters from that college, but then cancelled when College 1 agreed to host 
the event. 
About a week before the conference, Nasir got an email from a professor at College 
1, asking if they could meet. When they met on 9 February 2016, the professor told Nasir 
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that College 2 had contacted College 1 regarding the event to be held the following week and 
the professor wanted to talk with Nasir about it. The professor said that a new law required 
colleges and universities to be more careful about the platforms they give to speakers. Nasir 
understood the “new law” to be the Prevent statutory duty.
The professor said there was concern that one of the invited speakers was sympathetic 
to ISIS, and that the senior tutor had been consulted on this matter. Nasir recounted to 
the Justice Initiative that the professor effectively told him: “If one of the speakers were to 
say something troublesome at the event, then the college would get into trouble with the 
government. And because you are booking the event, you would be responsible”. 
Although the professor did not specifically mention the particular speaker at issue, the 
student knew which one he was probably referring to because he had previously seen a July 
2015 news report in The Telegraph attacking that speaker – Abdullah al Andalusi – for holding 
extremist views.357 Al Andalusi is a frequent speaker on issues related to Islam, who has 
appeared on a wide range of media outlets in the UK and internationally. The article popped 
up prominently on doing a quick online search of the speaker. Nasir also knew there were 
other reports describing how The Telegraph had misrepresented al Andalusi’s views, including 
a refutation written by al Andalusi himself, but a quick Google search would not reveal these 
reports as prominently as The Telegraph piece.358 Nasir surmised that College 1 had probably 
done a hasty search on al Andalusi, seen the Telegraph article, because it was the first article 
that popped up, and decided he presented a problem under Prevent. 
Nasir told the professor that if College 1 did not want the problem speaker to be at the 
debate, Nasir could disinvite him, but that Nasir did not want the debate to be cancelled. 
The professor responded ambiguously, saying that that maybe if the speaker were disinvited, 
the debate could go ahead. The professor did not attempt to explore ways in which any 
“extremism” in the speaker’s views might have been mitigated while allowing him to speak. 
Soon after that conversation, one of the organisers from the Cambridge University 
Islamic Society wrote to al Andalusi to disinvite him from the debate. Following the 
disinvitation, one of the other invited speakers, who knew al Andalusi, declined to speak at 
the event. A third speaker wrote to the Islamic Society saying she had concerns and wanted to 
speak with the event organiser. Having effectively lost three of its four speakers, the Islamic 
Society cancelled the event. 
Nasir told the Justice Initiative that cancelling such events “stops free discussion in a 
neutral environment where views can be opposed. This leads to conversations about such 
topics being held underground, where there is less of an opposing view, and this can feed 
extremism”. This incident has had a chilling effect on free speech at Cambridge University. 
According to Nasir, this incident made the Islamic society even more reluctant to organise 
events on the subject of Islam and politics. In general, he said, it was much more difficult to 
organise events on this kind of subject because it is “so easy these days for Muslims to be 
labelled as ‘extremists’” and “because the speakers will always be vetted”. He also noted that 
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this environment also created “some self-regulation of what content to put on the Islamic 
society’s blog because of concerns that anything written could lead to trouble”. 
This incident also made Nasir consider his professor’s perception of him. At one point 
after this incident, when the professor became aware that Nasir was writing a paper on 
Islamic anti-imperialism, the professor asked Nasir if he would be able to be “unbiased” 
in researching this topic. Nasir told the Justice Initiative: “I felt the attempt to organise 
the debate coloured his view of me”. The climate of fear at the university appears to have 
pervaded academic research. At the end of May 2016, Nasir’s supervisor was giving him a 
reading list for his coursework and gave him topics – including the Ayatollah in Iran, Osama 
Bin Laden, and Hezbollah – to look up. The supervisor told Nasir: “Don’t search the names I 
gave you on Google. Be intelligent with the names. Don’t raise any alarm bells”. Nasir looked 
at his supervisor, confused. Moments later, on reflection, he understood that this was a “hint 
to be a bit more careful”, and not to “give the impression that you are up to no good”.
More generally, Nasir told the Justice Initiative that some of his Muslim friends at 
Cambridge University say that they feel “very uncomfortable speaking in supervisions because 
they could be reported for anything ... that fear is always there”.
This case study raises concerns about the violation of article 10 rights on the part of 
the debate’s speakers’ right to free speech and the audience’s right to receive information. 
College 1’s intervention a week before the conference indicating that the debate could not 
go forward as long as al Andalusi was a featured speaker raises questions about a possible 
disproportionate interference with these rights. The College appears not to have conducted 
sufficient research on al Andalusi before summarily concluding that he held “extremist” 
views. In any event, even if there were valid concerns about his views, the College could have 
explored methods to mitigate those views short of requiring him to be dropped as a speaker. 
By denying use of university premises on a ground connected with al Andalusi’s alleged 
beliefs, this case also raises concerns of a breach of section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act.
CASE STUDY 14 
Student targeted for reading course book359
It appears from this case that merely reading course material related to terrorism can lead to 
a student being targeted under Prevent. 
Mohammed Umar Farooq is a 32 year-old student at the University of Staffordshire. He 
is pursuing a Master’s degree in Terrorism and Security Studies. On the evening of 23 March 
2015, Mohammed was sitting in the University library, reading a book required by his course. 
The book was “Terrorism Studies: A Reader”, edited by John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. He 
had been sitting there for about ten minutes, when two women sat down near him and started 
to talk with him. It emerged from the conversation that both women were studying law. One 
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of the women – Woman A – also worked at the university and the other – Woman B – was 
a magistrate. The magistrate asked Mohammed what he was reading. He told them about 
the book. They asked what he was studying. He responded that he was studying terrorism 
and security. At this point, Mohammed noted Woman A gave him “a very strange look”. 
Mohammed thought little of it and the conversation continued. 
They talked about his course and the fact that Mohammed had lived in Saudi Arabia, 
and then discussed that country’s laws and reputation for women’s rights. The two women 
asked Mohammed about ISIS, about the three girls from Bethnal Green in London who went 
to Syria, his views on Sharia law, and his views on homosexuality. 
Then the two women left and Mohammed said goodbye. He was still reading in the 
library when Darren, a University security guard, came into the library. The guard, who knew 
Mohammed, told him that a lady had come to the security office and said: ”There is a man, 
who is Asian, and with a beard, who is not a student and is reading a book on terrorism”. 
She told the security guard to go and “check [Mohammed] out as she suspect[ed] that [he 
was] a radical terrorist”. 
Mohammed was shocked and upset at Woman A’s “lack of acceptance and tolerance of 
other faiths and races”. He later observed: “She was fully aware that I am student and that I 
study terrorism. During our discussion we even spoke about my reason for my study and how 
I believe that my course is important to stop and keep our country safe, and how I am third 
generation British and proud of my identity and country. So how she came to the conclusion 
that I am a radical terrorist reading books in the library I don’t know”. 
On 25 March 2015, Mohammed went to the University security office to ask about the 
complaints procedure. The security guards informed him that Woman A had come in to see 
them the same morning and asked them for his name and his student number. They informed 
her that they had known Mohammed for five years, that he was third generation British, and 
that they had never had an issue with him. She insisted on taking his details. She said: “You 
can never be safe given the current climate with his kind. You don’t know who is living next 
to you until the media find out. Third generation British doesn’t mean anything”.
That day, Mohammed wrote an email to University officials to complain about the 
woman’s conduct. The University reviewed Mohammed’s complaint under its complaints 
procedure and concluded that it could not find any grounds to support allegations of racism 
or discrimination. It also recommended mediation between Woman A and Mohammed, 
which he agreed to. In the mediation, he asked her: “What was it that I said that led you to 
think I was a terrorist”? She responded that she had a duty of care, and that she found the 
things that he was saying to be “radical”. The conversation did not go well; she left crying. 
Eventually, Woman A wrote an apology to Mohammed. The University also apologised 
to Mohammed. In a June 2015 letter to Mohammed, the University regretted the distress 
caused to him. It also noted that the Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 imposed “a 
duty on the University to have due regard to the need to prevent individuals from being 
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drawn into terrorism”. The letter added that “[t]his is a very broad duty, devoid of detail” 
that was “underpinned” by statutory guidance that contains “insufficient detail to provide 
clear practical direction”.360 The letter noted that in practice, “particularly in the absence 
of extensive experience in dealing with such sensitive matters”, it could be a “significant 
challenge” to distinguish “between the intellectual pursuit of radical ideas and radicalisation 
itself”.361
But the apologies could not ameliorate Mohammed’s suffering. The accusation of 
terrorism and its stigmatising effect devastated Mohammed. The incident made him question 
his being British and left him feeling depressed, alienated, and unable to concentrate. 
On 17 November 2015, Mohammed spoke of his experience before the Home Affairs 
Select Committee. Asked by the Committee Chair if someone else in his situation might have 
been radicalised by what he went through, Mohammed said: “Yes, I would say, if there wasn’t 
somebody who was as focused and being able to deduce from my experience ... what has 
happened to me, although its ruined me in a way, it’s also quite nice to know that we live in a 
society where people will look at me and there are lessons learned from what has happened 
to me. That’s what I hold on to, otherwise there is a potential that what you are referring to 
could happen. And that is what scares me’”.362
In comments to the press in relation to this case, Noel Morrison, the academic registrar 
and director of student experience at Staffordshire University, said that he was “very sorry that 
a misjudged situation has impacted on this student. We do, however, have the right policies 
and procedures in place and are confident that the situation was investigated and concluded 
appropriately”.363
This incident raises serious concerns about the violation of Mohammed’s rights under 
article 14 combined with article 8 of the European Convention, as well as under the Equality 
Act. It appears that had he not been Muslim, it is unlikely that he would have been targeted 
under Prevent in this manner. His rights under article 8 were arguably undermined by the 
university complaints’ officer’s intrusive questioning of his political and religious beliefs. More 
generally, this incident shows how Prevent can be counterproductive and cause significant, 
lasting damage. It caused Mohammed to question his Britishness. He has observed that had 
he not been as focused as he was, the incident could have “radicalised” him.
Finally, it appears that Mohammed is not the only student to experience such 
treatment. Similar human rights concerns are raised with respect to another incident in the 
University of East Anglia in which a politics student was visited at home and questioned by 
counterterrorism police for reading course materials associated with ISIS and al-Qaeda.364
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CASE STUDY 15 
Birkbeck College Islamophobia conference cancelled365
This case suggests that Prevent may have played a role in the cancellation of a conference 
on Islamophobia. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) decided to organise a 
conference on Islamophobia to be held in London on 12 December 2014. According to Razia, 
an IHRC representative: “We started planning the conference six months beforehand. A lot 
of work was being done”. 
IHRC picked Birkbeck College, part of the University of London, as the venue for the 
conference. Birkbeck agreed to host the conference and Razia worked for about a month with 
a particular person at Birkbeck to prepare for the conference. 
On 7 December 2014, Razia received an email from a South London anti-fascist group 
saying that, according to social media, a far-right group, Britain First, might attend the 
conference and try to cause disruption. The anti-fascist group mentioned that this sort of 
talk on social media happened all the time and, most often, groups that reportedly intend to 
cause disruption do not turn up at the event at issue. 
On 10 December 2014, two days before the conference, Razia and her colleague went 
to Birkbeck for a site visit, to check if everything was in order. Razia recalled: “When we went 
to Birkbeck, about three Birkbeck officials put me and my colleague in a room for a meeting. 
We were taken by surprise. We weren’t well-versed on how to deal with these officials. There 
were four people in the room other than us. One of them was a Prevent officer, from the 
local council”.
The Birkbeck officials told Razia and her colleagues that they wanted to meet because 
the Metropolitan Police had been in contact with Birkbeck regarding concerns that “Britain 
First” and “Casuals United” (another far-right group) were planning to disrupt the conference.
Razia told the Justice Initiative: “My colleague and I were surprised. We didn’t know 
how to respond, firstly because we weren’t expecting a Prevent officer to be present and 
secondly, we were also surprised that the Metropolitan police had contacted Birkbeck without 
contacting IHRC…. They didn’t explain why the Prevent officer from Camden council was 
there”.
As Razia recalls, the far right groups had set up a Facebook event page indicating their 
intent to disrupt this conference. The South London anti-fascist group had emailed her to say 
that in response to the far right demonstration, a counterdemonstration had been planned 
by a society from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). 
She observed: “The problem at the meeting was that the Birkbeck staff seemed to be 
more concerned about the SOAS counter-demonstrators, whom they referred to as ‘left-wing 
extremists’ than the far right threat. The Birkbeck officials said the SOAS group was notorious 
for being a “bit ferocious” in their demonstrations. The officials said they were worried that 
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the SOAS group would become violent. According to Razia, IHRC offered to pay for their 
security for the event, but Birkbeck wanted their own security officers.
On 10 December 2014, two days before the conference, Birkbeck announced it was 
cancelling the event due to concerns about safety. IHRC complained to Birkbeck that 
cancelling at the last minute was unacceptable, especially because so much time and money 
had been spent on planning the conference. According to Razia, “We also told Birkbeck that 
cancellation of the event itself was a victory for the far right”.
Eventually, IHRC managed to find a gallery space in Central London for the event. The 
Islamophobia conference “passed off peacefully and successfully”.366 
While it is not possible to conclusively state that Prevent obligations caused the 
conference to be cancelled, the Prevent officer’s presence at meetings relating to the 
conference raises serious questions about the role of Prevent in the cancellation. Relatedly, 
there are questions about whether safety may be used as a pretext for cancelling controversial 
events. Lord Ken Macdonald, former Director of Public Prosecutions and Warden of Wadham 
College, Oxford, observed in relation to another university’s cancellation on safety grounds 
of a conference on international law and the state of Israel: “I do not believe anyone at [that 
university] was under any security threat .... It was the easiest way out to say there was a 
security threat”.367 He added that he was “very, very suspicious [when] organisers [say] they 
cannot guarantee the safety of their guests”. Cancelling a conference on such grounds, he 
observed, amounted to a “heckler’s veto”.368
It is notable that like the conference cancelled at Huddersfield University, this one 
was also about Islamophobia. The cancellation raises concerns about possible violations of 
article 10 of the European Convention, both on the part of the conference speakers’ right to 
free speech and the audience’s right to receive information. Significantly, there are serious 
questions about whether the interference with these rights was “prescribed by law”, that is, 
accessible and sufficiently clear and precise to be “foreseeable” in its application. Birkbeck 
and the Metropolitan Police did not provide IHRC with sufficient notice of their concerns. 
Nor did they engage in effective consultation with IHRC about these concerns. There was 
also insufficient disclosure of Prevent’s role in the cancellation of the conference. Finally, 
Birkbeck’s failure to sufficiently explain why they had no reasonable way, other than cancelling 
the event, to ensure the safety of conference participants is particularly concerning in light 
of the positive obligation under Article 10 to protect freedom of expression. There is also a 
concern as to whether Birkbeck and the Metropolitan police took “reasonably practicable” 
steps to ensure freedom of speech, as required by section 43 of the Education (no 2) Act.
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C.  Health
CASE STUDY 16 
Patient quizzed about political views by general practitioner369
This case raises questions about the role of medical professionals under Prevent and, in 
particular, as to whether Prevent may undermine doctor-patient relationships. It also suggests 
that the Channel programme generates considerable fear (including of continued surveillance) 
in its targets.
In May 2014, Abdul, who was 17 at the time, went to see his General Practitioner (GP) 
about a problem with his leg. Abdul said: “When I got there, the doctor was very friendly, 
very smiley with me”. At first, the doctor and Abdul made small talk. Five minutes later, while 
checking Abdul’s blood pressure, the doctor asked: “What are your political views”? Abdul 
told the Justice Initiative: “For a second, I froze because a Muslim doesn’t even share political 
views with friends, so why would I share my political views with him”? Abdul responded that 
he didn’t really have any political views and asked the doctor what he meant. The doctor then 
asked Abdul: “Are you left wing or right wing”? Abdul dodged the question and left soon 
after. Asked by the Justice Initiative if he thought the doctor was asking him these questions 
under Prevent, Abdul responded: “Why else would he be asking me about my political views”?
About a year later, in May or June 2015, Abdul’s mother came into his room and said: 
“Get ready, the police are outside waiting for you”. Abdul dressed and opened the door. There 
were two police officers, who asked if they could come inside. Abdul said they could not, and 
asked them what the problem was. They said that there was no problem, and that they just 
wanted to talk. 
Abdul’s father runs a charity for humanitarian relief in connection with which he has 
been to Syria on a number of occasions. The police officers told Abdul: “We know your father 
has been to Syria a few times, we are from the Channel programme”. The police officers 
told Abdul: “We really, really care about you”. Abdul thought this was strange because he 
did not know them well enough for them to care about him. They told him that the Channel 
programme was a voluntary programme and asked him if he would like to join it. Abdul said 
he did not want to join Channel, and made it clear that he wished to be left alone. Abdul 
told the Justice Initiative: “They seemed to know a lot about me. This kind of thing can easily 
make someone go crazy”. 
In September 2015, having finished college, Abdul started a new job. In about October 
of that year, while he was at work, he got a phone call on his private number. The voice at the 
other end said “Good afternoon, Abdul. This is PC [xx] calling from the [xx] police station”. 
The private constable told Abdul: “We know about your views on Channel, from our colleague 
[xx]. We want to meet up with you. Will you come to police station”? Abdul asked why they 
needed to talk with him, they told him that there were young people being radicalised in the 
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area, and that they thought he could help “safeguard” the local area. Abdul said he was not 
interested. He surmised that the police wanted to recruit him to work with Prevent. 
He told the Justice Initiative: “[Prevent] is such a good tactic to silence people. Because 
I am silenced now. I have loads of friends who don’t even know about this. It leaves a stain 
on your life--if you tell someone about it, they will be suspicious that you must have been 
involved in something”. He added that Prevent may be counterproductive, noting “Prevent 
can channel energy in the wrong way by harassing people”. 
This case study – the doctor’s questions as well as the continued monitoring of 
Abdul – raises concerns about the violation of Abdul’s right to private life under Article 8 
of the European Convention. It shows that even after someone has refused to enter the 
Channel programme, they may be made to feel like they are under police surveillance. More 
generally, it shows how Prevent (including Channel), although it claims to be “pre-criminal” 
and concerned with “safeguarding”, makes its targets feel like criminals even when they have 
done nothing wrong. 
CASE STUDY 17 
Nurse targeted after showing religious inclinations370 
This case study is another example of Prevent’s appearing to target individuals who display signs 
of increased religiosity. Nazia is an auxiliary nurse who had been working in the haematology 
and bone marrow transplant ward in a Birmingham NHS hospital since about March 2014. 
In 2015, Nazia turned 27 and began thinking more about what she was doing with her 
life. In about June or July 2015, Nazia started becoming more focused on her Muslim faith, 
searching for something that would bring her peace and contentment. Towards the end of 
July 2015, she began wearing a headscarf at work. Nazia said she was barraged with questions 
from the hospital staff as well as the patients about why she was wearing the scarf. 
On 17 August 2015, Nazia got a letter from work stating that a Human Resources 
meeting had been scheduled with the safeguarding lead nurse and the associate director 
nurse of the relevant division. 
On the morning of 19 August, Nazia went to the meeting. There were two people 
there, one of whom introduced herself as the safeguarding lead nurse; she introduced the 
other person to Nazia as the associate director nurse. There was also a third woman there 
who was initially not introduced to Nazia. The safeguarding lead nurse asked Nazia: “Do 
you know what Prevent is”? Nazia responded that she did not know exactly what it was. The 
safeguarding nurse said that Prevent was “like safeguarding on a terrorism scale” and that it 
was routine procedure for an officer to be present. 
The safeguarding nurse then introduced the third person in the room as a counter-
terrorism police officer. The police officer took notes throughout the meeting. The safeguarding 
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lead nurse started asking Nazia intrusive questions, including about the headscarf and black 
abaya (a loose robe worn by some Muslim women) that she was wearing. The safeguarding 
nurse asked Nazia who lived at home with her. Nazia said she lived with her sister and 
mother, who suffered from depression. The safeguarding nurse continued to ask “nitty 
gritty” questions about Nazia’s life. Nazia felt that this interrogation was intended to find 
information that linked her to terrorist activity, and see if she was being influenced by others 
or exerting influence upon others.
The safeguarding nurse indicated that she was “concerned” about certain allegations 
that had been made against Nazia by her colleagues. During the course of the conversation, 
Nazia inferred that the allegations were that Nazia empathised with those were behind the 
2015 terrorist attacks in Tunisia, that she wanted to go to Syria, and that she supported ISIS. 
Sometimes addressed as “allegations” and sometimes as “concern”, the safeguarding nurse 
asked “Why are colleagues saying this?” 
Nazia could not understand why her colleagues were saying such things about her. 
She told the safeguarding nurse that she had nothing to do with violence, that she was not 
into politics, and did not follow the news. Nazia couldn’t be sure, but her guess was that 
her manager, who did not know Nazia well, had issued a complaint against her to Prevent. 
Previously, when her manager had pushed Nazia for her views on the terrorist attacks in 
Tunisia, Nazia had responded that the attacks in Tunisia had nothing to do with Islam, 
because real Muslims could not think of doing such deeds, especially during Ramadan, which 
is when the attacks happened. 
Nazia also explained to the safeguarding nurse that she had planned to go to Tanzania, 
not Syria, through a charity called “Islamic Help”. With respect to the allegation that she 
supported ISIS, Nazia told the nurse that she didn’t know much about ISIS. Among the 
proliferation of articles and photos floating around on Facebook, she might have shared or 
liked the famous picture of ISIS members praying in different directions. Nazia thought the 
picture clearly showed that the ISIS members were not real Muslims. She told the Justice 
Initiative: “If you claim to be a Muslim, you certainly know which way Mecca is in order to 
face during prayer”. 
But the personal questions continued. The safeguarding nurse asked Nazia about how 
she spent her time, who she talked with, and who was in her social circle. Nazia started to cry. 
Nazia told the Justice Initiative: “I told her it is my choice to wear my scarf, it’s my 
own decision”. Nazia said they also wanted to discuss her praying – the safeguarding nurse 
asked whether Nazia prayed at work or at the faith centre. Nazia responded that she prayed 
on break and she made sure there was no work outstanding when she did. 
Eventually, the police officer said she had no concerns and gave Nazia her card, saying 
Nazia should contact her if she needed support. Nazia took her card but didn’t contact her.
The meeting left Nazia feeling distraught. She had already been feeling unwell when 
she was interrogated under Prevent. She had to take a month of sick leave because she felt 
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so awful. Her health deteriorated; she suffered heart palpitations and breathing problems. 
Just as she was preparing to return to work, around mid-day on 16 September 2015, two 
counterterrorism police officers, whom Nazia had never seen before, came to her house. 
They said they were from the counterterrorism unit, Prevent. Nazia protested that the officer 
who interviewed her earlier had told her that she had no concerns about Nazia. The officers 
responded that it didn’t work like that. They said “we have to go through your case file”. 
Nazia had had enough. On 8 September 2015, she submitted her 4 week notice to her 
manager. She was polite in the notice because she knew it would go in her file. She said she 
wanted to leave because of personal circumstances. 
Because of the way she was treated, Nazia gave up her full time permanent job, one 
that she loved. To make ends meet, she had to work with the hospital on a temporary basis 
while she looked for another job. 
Nazia feels she was discriminated against on religious grounds. She said: “I think I 
was treated in this way because I am a Muslim. In my ward there are only 3 or 4 colleagues 
who are Muslim, I was the only one who was open about being religious and they saw the 
transition in me”. 
She thinks Prevent is counterproductive. She told the Justice Initiative: “It could 
have gone the opposite way if I wasn’t thinking straight, if I were the type who was being 
brainwashed. The way they went about it, it could have made me do exactly what they told 
me not to do. I associate with Prevent negatively, it is not helpful at all”. 
This case raises concerns about the violation of Nazia’s rights under Article 14 combined 
with article 8 of the European Convention as well as under the Equality Act (through direct 
discrimination). Had Nazia not been Muslim, it is unlikely that she would have been treated 
in this manner under Prevent. The intrusive questioning by the authorities and the police 
appearing at her home implicate her right to privacy under article 8. Like the preceding cases, 
this case also shows that while authorities acting under Prevent talk about being motivated 
by “concern” for the person they target, the person who is unfairly targeted perceives the 
authorities’ actions as extremely intrusive and discriminatory, based on crude stereotypes of 
Muslims. More generally, this case demonstrates the counterproductive effects of Prevent. 
As Nazia indicated, Prevent may do more to alienate people than to help them. 
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VII. Effectiveness of the Prevent 
 Strategy
The government’s most recent annual report on CONTEST states that “[s]uccess in 
Channel is when, following the assessment and a programme of support if necessary, 
there are no remaining concerns that the individual will be drawn into terrorism. The 
vast majority of cases achieve a successful outcome”.371 But the strategy does not explain 
whether and how it determines that the Prevent strategy was the reason that the indi-
vidual was not “drawn into terrorism”.
Another metric for evaluating the Prevent strategy is whether it is preventing 
people from traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight with Daesh. In 2015, Baroness Elizabeth 
Manningham Buller, a former director general of MI5 who held that office when the 
July 2005 London bombings occurred, observed that “Prevent [was] clearly not working” 
on account of the large number – 600 – “dangerous extremists who are British citizens 
ha[d] fought in Syria”. She added: “If Prevent had been working for the past 10 years, 
we might not have seen so many going”.372 The government’s most recent annual report 
on CONTEST notes that since the start of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, a total of 850 
persons of “national security concern” had travelled there from the UK.373 It adds that 
“more than 150 attempted journeys to the conflict area were disrupted in 2015”, but does 
not say how many of those thwarted journeys were on account of the Prevent strategy.374
The high rate of erroneous referrals to the Channel programme raises serious 
questions about whether the significant financial and human resources devoted to Pre-
vent are yielding commensurate gains. According to data disclosed by the National 
Police Chiefs Council, between April 2007 and 31 March 2014, the total number of 
Channel referrals was 3,934, of which only about 20% were assessed by a multi-agency 
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panel to be vulnerable to being drawn towards terrorism so as to receive support through 
the Channel process.375 The government’s annual report on CONTEST adds that “dur-
ing 2015, there were several thousand referrals to Channel” around 15% of which were 
linked to far right extremism, and around 70% linked to Islamist-related extremism”; 
but that of those referred, only “several hundred” were provided with support in 2015.376 
Assuming that “several” is used similarly in the two contexts, this suggests that the 
number of individuals who were wrongly referred to Channel was significant in 2015. 
Sir Peter Fahy, former Chief Constable of Greater Manchester who was the 
National Policing lead for Prevent from 2010 until November 2015, told the Justice Ini-
tiative he did believe that Prevent has been effective, and that he did not that think that 
the 80% figure was “too high” “as long as the vulnerable [were] being identified”.377 He 
added: “I fully accept there are dangers of people’s rights being violated and of people 
being wrongly labelled, in the same way that safeguarding means that people may get 
wrongly labelled – this is hugely regrettable but inevitable if you are putting the safety 
of a child, for instance, as more important than other considerations”.378 
But the dichotomy between security and rights is a false one, especially so in the 
context of Prevent. As Professor Louise Richardson, Vice Chancellor of Oxford Univer-
sity, and an expert in the study of terrorism aptly stated in her testimony before Parlia-
ment’s Joint Committee on Human Rights: “The best intelligence on the people trying 
to do us harm comes from the communities in which they recruit.... So if members 
of that entire group feel that they are being singled out, that they are suspect and that 
they are not trusted, they are not going to assist us in identifying the people who really 
want to do us harm”.379 
Viewed in this context, an 80% error rate in Channel could generate a significant 
sense of grievance that in turn could compromise the ability of law enforcement to 
gather intelligence to thwart terrorist attacks. The 2011 Prevent strategy noted that suc-
cessful Prevent work depended on “developing a sense of belonging to this country and 
on a perception of the importance and legitimacy of integration”.380 The interviews and 
case studies in this report suggest that Prevent is eroding this sense of belonging, partic-
ularly amongst Muslims erroneously targeted under Prevent. Notably, in his 2016 testi-
mony before Parliament’s Home Affairs Select Committee, the independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation, David Anderson Q.C. observed that “Prevent has become a more 
significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial 
powers (extended arrest and detention powers, port powers, passport removal, TPIMs 
with relocation) that are exercised under the Pursue strand of the CONTEST strategy”.381
The case studies in this report show that being wrongly targeted under Prevent has 
led Muslims who had previously never questioned being British to question their place 
in society.382 Adults wrongfully targeted under Prevent have told the Justice Initiative 
that had they been different, their experience of Prevent could have led them towards ter-
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rorism.383 Notably, the Channel “Vulnerability Assessment Framework” (VAF), assesses 
“vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism” based on, inter alia, an individual’s “need 
for identity, meaning and belonging”; and “Them and Us” thinking.384 The case studies 
and interviews conducted for this report demonstrate that Prevent itself is generating 
a “Them and Us” thinking. This in turn creates an environment of reluctance to share 
intelligence about future attacks with the police. 
Dal Babu, a former Chief Superintendent for the Metropolitan police told the 
Justice Initiative: “Prevent is counterproductive because you need a good relationship 
with the community for people to come forward with intelligence. If the community 
doesn’t trust law enforcement, they will be reluctant to share information vital for coun-
tering terrorism”.385 Not surprisingly, in December 2015, the Times reported that less 
than a tenth of tip-offs to Prevent came from within Muslim communities.386 Empirical 
studies demonstrate that the perceived fairness in police tactics (procedural justice) is a 
significant predictor of cooperation in counterterrorism by British Muslims.387 Particu-
larly in light of such evidence, any serious assessment of Prevent’s effectiveness should 
attempt to measure not only whether it has prevented individuals from being drawn 
into terrorism but also its unintended consequences, including the degree of anger and 
alienation it has caused. 
In sum, the evidence and analysis in this report strongly suggests that Prevent 
is counterproductive. Erroneous referrals and human rights violations under Prevent 
will, in the long run, significantly undermine effectiveness. As Sir David Omand, the 
architect of the original version of Prevent, observed: “The key issue is, do most people 
in the community accept [Prevent] as protective of their rights? If the community sees 
it as a problem, then you have a problem”.388 
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VIII. Prevent in International 
 Perspective
Over the last decade, counterterrorism efforts around the world have witnessed a para-
digm shift as governments increasingly adopt programmes directed at countering “radi-
calisation” or “extremism” in its violent and non-violent forms.389 The theory underlying 
these programmes is that by intervening early and “upstream” on an individual’s path 
to “radicalisation”, governments can prevent that individual from becoming a terrorist.
This paradigm shift was led by the United Kingdom. In 2003, when it launched 
Prevent, the UK government was among the first in the world to adopt a formal pro-
gramme aimed at preventing terrorism by tackling “radicalisation”. Today, there is a 
proliferation of such international, regional, and national initiatives around the world, 
known variously as “countering violent extremism” (CVE), “preventing violent extrem-
ism” (PVE) or “counter-radicalisation” or “de-radicalisation” programmes.390 
In January 2016, the United Nations Secretary-General issued his Plan of Action 
to Prevent Violent Extremism.391 In December 2015, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Ministerial Declaration on Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism.392 Since 2005, 
the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror-
ism has provided guidance through joint standards and measures that aim at prevent-
ing terrorist radicalisation and recruitment.393 The European Council has established 
an EU-wide Radicalisation Awareness Network, which connects key groups of people 
involved in countering violent radicalisation across the EU.394
Other national initiatives include France’s new action plan aimed at fighting 
against radicalisation and terrorism (Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le ter-
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rorisme (PART))395; the Netherlands’ comprehensive action programme to combat 
jihadism396; Australia’s Building Community Resilience programme397 replaced by the 
Living Safe Together programme398; the United States’ Strategic Implementation Plan 
for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism399; Nigeria’s Countering 
Violent Extremism Programme led by the National Security Advisor400; Norway’s Action 
Plan Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism401; and Saudi Arabia’s Prevention, 
Rehabilitation and After-Care (PRAC) approach.402 
The precise contents of these programmes are far from clear, and many include ele-
ments of counter-radicalisation (targeting individuals who have not committed criminal/
terrorists offences) and “de-radicalisation” (targeting individuals who have already com-
mitted criminal/terrorist acts). The concepts of “radicalisation” and “extremism”, whether 
violent or non-violent, remain “elusive”, with no universally accepted definitions.403 
As described above, the UK targets violent and non-violent extremism as part of 
“terrorism” and defines “extremism” as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental Brit-
ish values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect 
and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.404 The U.S. defines “violent extremists” as 
“individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further politi-
cal goals”.405 Sweden uses the term “extremism” “to describe movements, ideologies or 
people who do not accept a democratic social system”; a “violence promoting extremist” 
is one “deemed repeatedly to have displayed behaviour that does not just accept the use 
of violence but also supports or exercises ideologically motivated violence to promote 
something”.406 The Australian Government defines violent extremism as “the use or 
support of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals”407 ; and Norway 
describes “violent extremism” as “activities of persons and groups that are willing to use 
violence in order to achieve political, ideological or religious goals”408.
Some CVE programmes provide no definition of relevant terms. The U.N. Sec-
retary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism contains more than 70 
recommendations for national, regional and international action, but fails to define 
“violent extremism”.409 The OSCE Ministerial Declaration on Preventing and Counter-
ing Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism did not define “violent 
extremism” or “radicalisation”.410 Similarly, the European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism does not appear to define “radicalisation” 
or “violent extremism”.411
The UN special rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights has observed 
that “[many programmes directed at radicalisation are based on a simplistic understand-
ing of the process as a fixed trajectory to violent extremism with identifiable markers along 
the way .... States have tended to focus on those that are most appealing to them, shying 
away from the more complex issues, including political issues such as foreign policy and 
transnational conflicts”.412 He added that in light of “the absence of a clear definition of 
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violent extremism” and “broad national definitions” of “violent extremism”413 the use of 
that term to adopt new strategies may have “a serious impact on human rights” that prove 
more dangerous than strategies based on the term “terrorism”.414 Despite the potential for 
adverse impact of CVE programmes “on a number of rights, including the right to free-
dom of thought, religion, privacy and non-discrimination”, the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
notes that “[i]ndependent evaluations of the programmes’ effectiveness is scarce, largely 
due to a lack of transparency in their implementation”.415 
Governments vary on whether they expressly target non-violent “extremism” or 
do so implicitly. Regardless, notions of “extremism” underlying CVE strategies remain 
extremely broad and susceptible to human rights violations. The Danish action plan on 
radicalisation and extremism expressly targets “extremism” while defining the term to 
include “simplistic views of the world and of “the enemy”, in which particular groups 
or aspects of society are seen as a threat”; “intolerance and lack of respect for other 
people’s views, freedom and rights”; “rejection of fundamental democratic values and 
norms, or non-acceptance of democratic decision-making processes; and use of illegal 
and possibly violent methods to achieve political/religious ideological goals”.416 
In contrast to these programmes, in August 2011, the White House released its 
national CVE strategy – Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States.417 While the content of the strategy and its implementation are far from 
transparent, its goal is “preventing violent extremists and their supporters from inspir-
ing, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to 
commit acts of violence”.418 In 2014, three U.S. cities – Minneapolis, Greater Boston, 
and Los Angeles – launched pilot CVE programmes.419 
Unlike the UK, the US does not expressly target non-violent extremism, focusing 
its stated aim solely as that of preventing “violent extremism”.420 However, like the UK 
Prevent strategy, the US CVE programme has been criticised by civil society organisa-
tions for being “based on discredited and unscientific theories positing a progression 
from religious or political beliefs to violence ... [and for] targeting people for monitoring 
based on their beliefs or ideologies”.421 
It appears that the Prevent strategy has influenced other governments’ CVE ini-
tiatives. For example, like the Prevent strategy, US CVE programmes seek to enlist 
health and education professionals to counter “radicalisation”.422 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), drawing on the UK model of Prevent, reportedly plans to set up 
“Shared Responsibility Committees” – consisting of social service workers, teachers, 
mental health professionals, religious figures, and others – to identify and intercept 
young people on the path towards “radicalisation”.423 Like the factors and indicators of 
radicalisation employed in the Channel programme, leaked National Counterterrorism 
Center guidelines appear to instruct educators and social workers to monitor and evalu-
ate students on a five-point rating scale according to factors like “perceived sense of 
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being treated unjustly”, “expressions of hopelessness, futility”, and “connection to group 
identity (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity)”.424 In Minneapolis, school staff have said 
they would “identity issues and disaffection  –  root causes of radicalization”425; similarly, 
the Boston pilot programme has proposed a plan to introduce “multidisciplinary teams” 
consisting of social workers, psychiatrists, medical, and school staff, among others, to 
conduct interventions.426 However, unlike the U.K., the US does not impose a statutory 
obligation on professionals to comply with CVE efforts. 
While the U.K. appears to be the only country thus far to have imposed a statutory 
duty on such professionals to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism, as 
noted in a recent editorial by Baroness Warsi and others, “a growing number of govern-
ments – in Austria, Spain, Switzerland, France and Denmark for example – have asked 
schools to take a more active role in preventing future attacks”.427 
Australia’s CVE programme, launched as “Building Community Resilience” in 
2010, also has been influenced by the UK Prevent strategy.428 The focus of the programme 
was primarily to address cognitive radicalisation by building resilience at the commu-
nity level.429 Following a change in government and subsequent review, it was concluded 
that the initial range of activities missed the mark and did not respond adequately to 
the emerging threat.430 In 2014, the “Building Community Resilience” programme was 
replaced with the “Living Safe Together” initiative. This initiative is based on three core 
pillars of activity: (i) tailored intervention programmes to connect at-risk individuals with 
a range of services to help them disengage from violence; (ii) education and engagement 
activities to build resilience to violent extremism through well-informed and equipped 
families, communities, and local institutions; and (iii) engagement in the online environ-
ment. The key focus of the initiative is on diverting individuals from violent extremism.431
More recently, France is reported to be “exploring” the UK’s Prevent strategy as it 
attempts to counter “radicalisation”.432 Recent reports suggest that individuals who have 
“never been convicted for acts linked to radicalisation” may be referred by “concerned 
teachers” to “voluntarily” live for ten months in a “de-radicalisation” centre.433 Similar to 
the Prevent strategy’s promotion of British values, France’s efforts have included train-
ing school staff to teach the “values of the Republic”.434 The French education minister 
has said: “Schools and heads of schools have to be able to detect the early signs, the 
precursor signs of radicalisation in their pupils.... Handbooks have been made and 
given to heads to help them detect those signs and when they do they are given to the 
police and to specialised social services”.435 This resembles the Prevent strategy’s risk 
assessment and reporting requirements in schools. 
In light of the influence of Prevent beyond the UK’s borders, the analysis in 
this report is relevant not only for the UK, but for other governments adopting similar 
programmes.
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IX. Conclusion
This report presents legal analysis and case studies demonstrating that the Prevent 
strategy creates a systemic risk of human rights violations. The case studies also indicate 
that the Prevent duty creates the risk of securitising relationships between teachers and 
students, and between doctors and their patients, thereby undermining trust critical 
for the effective functioning of these sectors. Moreover, there are serious concerns that 
the Prevent strategy is counterproductive because its erroneous targeting of individuals 
who are nowhere near being drawn into terrorism may make them more susceptible to 
that path. Prevent is also causing some wrongly targeted British Muslims to question 
their place in British society and may engender the very “Them and Us” mentality that 
Prevent treats as an “indicator” of vulnerability to terrorism. More generally, there are 
serious concerns that the perception of unfairness associated with Prevent will under-
mine the ability of law enforcement officials to obtain intelligence to prevent future 
terrorist acts. This analysis is relevant not only for the UK, but also for other countries 
which already have adopted elements of the Prevent strategy or are looking to adopt 
them in the future.
Accordingly, this report recommends, inter alia, that the Prevent duty should be 
repealed with respect to the health and education sectors. There should be an inde-
pendent public inquiry – with civil society participation – into the Prevent strategy and 
associated rights violations as well as a formal and independent complaints mechanism 
through which individuals whose rights have been violated by the Prevent strategy can 
seek and obtain prompt and meaningful remedies. In addition, the government should 
publicly disclose data relating to the total number of Prevent referrals, including a 
breakdown of those referrals, as well as any evidence underpinning the Extremism Risk 
Guidance (ERG) 22+. In light of particular concerns about the impact of Prevent on chil-
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dren, the report recommends that the Children’s Commissioners for England, Wales, 
and Scotland conduct an assessment of the impact of Prevent on children, including 
but not limited to whether the best interests of the child are a primary consideration 
in Prevent-related actions. Finally, the health and education professional associations 
should also conduct impact assessments of Prevent, draw attention to their particular-
ised problems with the strategy, and advocate for reform.
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Open Society Justice Initiative
The Open Society Justice Initiative uses law to protect and empower people around the 
world. Through litigation, advocacy, research, and technical assistance, the Justice Ini-
tiative promotes human rights and builds legal capacity for open societies. Our staff is 
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Since the London bombings of July 7, 2005, the threat of 
terrorist violence in the United Kingdom has not abated. 
In the face of increased public fears about homegrown 
terrorism, the UK government has responded with a 
counter-extremism strategy known as Prevent. 
From its inception in 2003, the scope of the Prevent 
strategy has repeatedly been expanded, and its obligations 
enhanced. In 2015, the strategy imposed a legal duty on 
schools, colleges, universities, and health bodies to pay 
“due regard to the need to prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism”—effectively requiring teachers, 
doctors, nurses, and other caregivers to report to the 
authorities any students and patients seen to be at risk 
of “extremism”. 
Eroding Trust assesses the human rights impact of the 
United Kingdom’s current Prevent strategy in the health 
and education sectors. Through legal analysis and case 
studies, the report concludes that Prevent is flawed in 
both its design and application. Drawing on extensive 
interviews in towns and cities across Britain, it argues 
that Prevent is potentially undermining the battle against 
terrorism—by fueling distrust and feelings of alienation 
in Britain’s Muslim communities. 
